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 Abstract 
Trigger-Narratives: A Perspective on Radical Political Transformations  
By Sarit Larry 
Advisor: Richard Kearney 
 
This work addresses an important phenomenon in the contemporary philosophy of narrative and 
coins it as a term. Trigger-narratives denote myth-like stories that ignite certain mass social 
participation. Juxtapose to five well-established philosophical concepts of narrative this work 
demonstrates that while trigger-narratives share formal characteristics with all, they fail to be 
meaningfully and comprehensively subsumed under any. I use three protagonists as comparative 
case studies to illustrate trigger-narratives: Rosa Parks (US), Mouhammed Bouazizi (Tunisia) 
and Daphne Leef (Israel). The sociopolitical reaction to trigger-narratives exceeds them in 
content and in size. Yet, these protagonists continue to serve as catalysts and perennial symbols 
of the transformative events that follow their protesting acts. Trigger-narratives are not lived-
narratives. They do not disclose what Arendt’s refers to as a unique who or MacIntyre’s unity of 
a human life. They do not answer the ownmost rhythm of Heidegger’s Being-toward-death or 
operate like Ricoeur’s or Kearney’s concepts of testimony. The protagonist perspective is rarely 
heard or seriously considered. Unlike historical narratives trigger-narratives are not the product 
of research. They form quickly and in their aftermath they resist change. Trigger-narrative 
protagonists draw their power from being portrayed as context-less, weak and uncalculated while 
historical leaders draw power from descriptions of authority, skill, and deliberation. Trigger-
narratives have the effect and/or aspiration of metanarratives. They aim at a new order. However, 
they spring from articulated singular accounts rather than form an all-encompassing tacit sub-
current narrative. Adding a sixth sociological concept of narrative I refer to issue-narratives. 
Trigger-narratives congeal around an issue. But they instill a far greater expectation for change. I 
conclude that: 1. trigger narratives are closest to fiction 2. They operate through a condensation 
of Ricoeur’s mimetic cycle configuring and refiguring reality in a rapid rotation that ossifies 
them into a mobilizing form, and that 3. Interpreting trigger-narratives through the perspective of 
world-creating myths illuminates many of their typical characteristics in a unifying, 
comprehensive manner. The study points to two new research directions: 1. trigger-narratives’ 
aftermath operations (specifically rituals and newly erected institutions).2. Further 
interdisciplinary cooperation between contemporary political philosophy of narrative and the 
sociological methodology of frame-analysis.  
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An Introduction: Three Protagonists and a Question 
The smallest act in the most limited 
circumstances bears the seed of the same 
boundlessness, because one deed, and 
sometimes one word, suffices to change every 
constellation 
 
        Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, 190 
 
This work coins a term. Some monumental sociopolitical changes, such as revolutions or 
major changes in policy happen in response to a small, myth-like, narrative. This study suggests 
that we name such narratives: trigger-narratives. Radical political transformations such as 
revolutions or other fundamental sociopolitical changes that stem from mass resistance leave us 
sometimes with questions concerning the reasons behind their success or failure. Why did this 
revolution happen now? We might ask. Why not at another time? Why here and not elsewhere 
where grievance was bigger? Where the government was weaker? We look for a reason, a 
pattern, a way to explain our surprise. This need for a cause and a reason can develop into a more 
practical quest. If we know what “makes people” go out to the streets and change their worlds, 
we can possibly “make it” happen again. Social activists do little more than wonder how they 
can “make” something happen. I say this as a part of this community. Most activists want to 
mobilize people to bring along change.  We want our issue to be at the center of the agenda. We 
hope that it will receive public interest, which would translate to power and to possible 
transformation.  Mostly we fail. It is not easy to get people to protest together and for enough 
time. It is hard to predict what might work. Of course, the activist way of thinking about political 
arenas runs the risk of comparing it to the field in which humans make artifacts, what Arendt 
would call, work. We can shape inanimate matter, into things. We can learn as we create one 
thing how to better create it next time. But I am persuaded by Arendt’s claim that the political is 
governed by the possibility of radical novelty brought about by action in concert. This fact 
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wedded with the interconnected web of human relations that the political is, makes one, for 
better or worse, expect the unexpected in matters of political action.  
The aim of action, as oppose to radical novelty and regardless of the unexpected 
outcome, is always to create something that will outlast us. People act together in order to create 
a world that will carry their name and will furnish a good life to those who come after them. 
Action is the attempt to build stable sociopolitical structures in an arena governed by novelty. 
This almost tragic look on political action that Arendt propounds makes the description of forms 
in the unexpected relevant theoretically and practically. In the light of this stable aim we write 
political philosophy and towards its horizon we act. Coining the term trigger-narrative is an 
action of discerning a form in the midst of collaborated radical novelty. This is not so we could 
“make a replica” of the events that we are about to discuss. It is to helps us map the deep waters 
of the unexpected so that we can navigate better as we act in concert to create structures that we 
hope, against all odds, will stand forever. This coining is intended as a part of a certain grammar 
of the political, articulating one form, among many.  
Historical Background 
Three historical events stand at the heart of this work as examples and as case studies. 
Two of them, the beginning of the democratic Revolution in Tunisia and the beginning of the 
Israeli Social Justice Movement took place in 2010 and 2011 respectively. One of them, the 
beginning of the US Civil Right Movement transpired in 1955. The first two were the impetus to 
write this work. They presented a question to me. I chose the latter case not only because it is a 
great instance of the term that I am coining, but also because it was further away chronologically 
and it allowed me a distance that the other occurrences, especially the Israeli case, did not. It is 
harder to judge and discern forms in events that are still unfolding. The democratic revolution in 
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Tunisia and the Israeli Social Justice Movement are still part of the news and evaluations as to 
their meaning, success or failure are still unsettled. This uncertainty, however, does not change 
the claims that I make here nor are such uncertainties frequently come to a point where they are 
completely settled and solved. A trigger-narrative may start a process that fails and of course the 
political arena in all its undulating complexity renders success and failure intricate terms to 
define. The Israeli Social Justice Movement, for example, is referred to as a failure quite 
frequently. Since it did have achievements I use this sense of failure to indicate what the 
expectation was. The expectation was a wonderful new and just world. This, as I will shortly 
show, is part of the definition of trigger-narratives. Trigger-narratives always aim at a new and 
just order.  In that sense all trigger-narratives, to an extent, entertain unachievable goals. They 
are all doomed to a degree of failure. Even the monumental success of the Civil Rights 
Movement that could not possibly be overestimated didn’t succeed completely. Racial equality 
in the US is sadly not a settled and done with issue. Change and disintegration always lurk in the 
political. We act against the tides. Of course this could be said about almost any social 
movement or revolution not only those revolving around a trigger-narratives. The following 
analysis offers a descriptive account of a phenomenon that could develop in several unexpected 
ways. The point of the coining is to draw attention to and conclusions from the fact that trigger-
narratives aim at the same thing and in very similar ways. 
The descriptions below which are my points of departure for this conversation are not 
detailed and comprehensive in a manner that can even resemble adequate historical descriptions. 
They are not intended as such. I am interested in the way that these historical events came across 
and still resonate in the popular outlook. Our question emerges from the way that these events 
are generally depicted and described regardless of historical accuracy. The descriptions here 
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focus intentionally on what happens long before we have the time to academically process and 
analyze. The reason behind this particular choice is that I am analyzing narratives that trigger 
mass participation. This triggering is rarely, if ever, an outcome of academic in-depth work. It is 
usually communicated via the media, pamphlets, newspapers and in our times the social media as 
well. These events are usually inculcated in the communal memory in their inception forms. 
Time hones them into a certain compelling structure that becomes a landmark. As such they tend 
to resist change. I want to look into the ways that the heroines and the heroes at the center of 
these events are popularly conceived and portrayed and outline the form of their compelling 
power.          
Rosa Parks and the Civil Rights Movement 
On March 2 1955, Claudette Colvin, refused to give up her seat for a white woman on a 
bus in Montgomery Alabama when she was asked to do so by the bus driver. She was 
subsequently arrested. The headline in The Alabama Journal read: “Negro Girl Found Guilty of 
Segregation Violation”. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(N.A.A.C.P) received more than 100 support letters.1 She was 15 at the time of her arrest and she 
later became one of the five plaintiffs in the case of Browder vs. Gayle which by the end of 1956 
ended bus segregation because it was unconstitutional.  If you google “the other Rosa Parks”, her 
name comes up.  
Nine months later on December 1, 1955 Rosa Parks did the same thing. Got arrested in 
the same way and became the undying symbol of what became the US Civil Rights Movement.  
Parks’ story is usually told without this historical context and her background as a seasoned 
                                                
1 Brook Barnes. “From Footnote to Fame in Civil Rights History”. The New York Times – Books. (New York: Ochs 
Sulzberger, Jr. November. 25, 2009)  
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activist, investigator,2  and the elected secretary of the local chapter of the N.A.A.C.P. It is not 
usually part of the story that she organized the Committee for Equal Justice for Mrs. Recy Taylor 
prior to her famous bus incident. This is not to say that these facts are secrets. They are readily 
available to those interested.  It is just not common knowledge and not part of the glorified story 
we repeat briefly on December 1 or Martin Luther King Day to a child or a student hearing about 
the US Civil Rights Movement for the first time. Why not? It seems relevant enough. Parks knew 
Colvin. Colvin was a member of the N.A.A.C.P Youth Council. In fact Parks let Colvin spend 
the night at her apartment sometimes after Colvin was arrested in March 1955. Parks also was 
the one to process the support letters Colvin received after her refusal. 3 It seems significant to 
the story that Parks was an activist that knew there were plans to harness such rebellions for non-
violent resistance. Why is it not part of the popular story? Why did telling these details of the 
story elicit an apologetic justification and a demand for correction? Three days after the article 
about Colvin was published in 2009 The New York Times added this correction:  
An article on Nov. 26 about Claudette Colvin, who protested segregation on the 
Montgomery, Ala., buses nine months before Rosa Parks did and is the subject of 
a book for young people that won a National Book Award last month, referred 
imprecisely to Mrs. Parks’ protest. While the boycott that followed her arrest for 
refusing to give up her seat to a white passenger was planned by civil rights 
leaders who were waiting for the right case, her protest itself on Dec. 1, 1955, 
was not ‘carefully planned’.4 
Parks became one of Time Magazine’s 100 most important people of the 20th century.5 The bus 
she was riding before her arrest, No. 2857, became a museum exhibit at the Henry Ford 
                                                
2 Janell Ross. “Rosa Parks is the name you know. Claudette Colvin is a name you probably should”. The 
Washington Post. (Washington DC: Fred Ryan, December 1, 2015) 
3 Brook Barnes. “From Footnote to Fame in Civil Rights History”. The New York Times – Books. (New York: Ochs 
Sulzberger, Jr, 25 November 2009)  
4 Brooks Barnes. “From Footnote to Fame in Civil Rights History”. The New York Times – Books. (New York: Ochs 
Sulzberger, Jr. 25 November 2009) 
5 “Heroes and Icons of the 20th Century”. 153.23 (New York: Time Inc., June 14, 1999)  
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Museum. Streets are named after her. Needless to say neither Claudette Colvin, nor the bus she 
was riding before she was arrested made it to Time Magazine or the museum.  Why is it 
important that we perceive Parks who indeed acted bravely as unplanned and politically almost 
context-less? Let me be more exact, even if Parks was unplanned which would be an extremely 
hard term to define considering the context (does imagining doing such a thing count as 
planning? What kind of planning does not getting up when asked necessitates? Etc.), why is it 
important to us? Why is it important for the story that she did not plan this? After all she 
succeeded either way and there is nothing immoral in planning. In fact, the danger she put herself 
in front was the same danger, plans or no plans. Why is it that it ruins the story when we learn 
about the context? 
Mouhammed Bouazizi and the Arab Uprisings 
At 11.30am December 17th 2010 Mohammed Bouazizi, a 26 year old vendor in Sidi 
Bouzid, Tunisia self-immolated in front of his town’s governor office in protest of the 
confiscation of his digital scale by a police officer an hour earlier. His subsequent death three 
weeks later sparked a regime change in Tunisia during which the ousted President Ben-Ali had 
to seek refuge in Saudi-Arabia. Bouazizi’s act continued to spark what was later called the Arab 
Uprisings. The news around the world kept referring to the monumental surprise of the event. It 
was describes as a 
[…] breakthrough [that] was akin to an inexplicable 'big bang' which created its own 
chain reaction, irreversibly converting singularity into plurality across an emerging Arab 
Spring geography. 6  
Indeed it was referred to not only as a Big Bang, but also as a last straw7, a kick-start8, a 
revolution-bug,9 an igniting spark10 etc. Bouazizi’s act created a monumental change in a sudden 
                                                
6 Larbi Sadiki  “The Bouazizi 'Big Bang’”. Aljazeera.  (Al Jazeera Media Network, 29 Dec 2011). 
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stroke and the choice of metaphors echoes that. The abruptness of the event and the disparity 
between the singular individual act and the monumental wideness of the consequences it inspired 
are key features in its popular descriptions.11 Bouazizi who, to the best of our knowledge, was 
not an activist like Parks is remembered much like her, spontaneous, unplanned and from a 
vulnerable background. He remains the undying honored symbol of the democratic revolution in 
Tunisia and the Arab Uprisings although his protest was not articulated as a quest for a 
democratic revolution or even any revolution at all. Like Parks, he too was recognized by Time 
Magazine. He became The Person of the Year in 201112 and streets were named after him.  
Daphne Leef and the Israeli Social Justice Movement 
On July 14th 2011 after being evicted from her rented apartment in Tel Aviv, Israel and 
having to find a new place to live, Daphne Leef, a 25 year old film student, took a sleeping bag 
and a tent and went to camp at Rothschild Boulevard at the city’s center as protest against the 
                                                                                                                                                       
7 Draggan Mihailovich and Nathalie Sommer. "How A Slap Sparked Tunisia's Revolution". 60 Minutes. (New York: 
CBS News Productions ,February 20, 2011)  
8 Ivan Watson and Jomana Karadsheh. "The Tunisian Fruit Seller Who Kickstarted Arab Uprising". CNN World. 
(Atlanta: CNN International News, March 22, 2011) 
9 Khan, Mohammed. ‘The Project For A New Arab Century’, Al Jazeera English,( Al Jazeera Media Network 
February 22,2011). 
10 Robert F. Worth. “How a Single Match Can Ignite a Revolution”. New York Times. (New York: Ochs Sulzberger, 
Jr.,January 21, 2011). 
11 In his novel World Shadow (Tel-Aviv: Am Oved, 2013) Nir Baram is outlining a fictional world-strike that also 
answers these formal terms and resonates with the events of 2010-2011. The trigger of the universal movement the 
book describes is a dream its founder dreams. Nir Bar-Am writes:  
 so they claimed that there was no founding dream and that it was the biggest hoax of the 21st 
century at least so far, a brilliant invention of media consultants and that this is the best evidence 
to the fact that our entire story was fake to its core. It could be the case that we didn’t deal with the 
dream story properly. I think it is fair to say that we definitely fell in love with it a long time 
before it became a symbol, but we didn’t make anything up. If Christopher wouldn’t have dreamt 
that dream nothing would have happened. My translation.    
]ה האמה לש רתויב הלודגה תימרתה וזש ןנוכמ םולח םוש היה אלש ונעט םה זא21 לש תינואג האצמה ,םייתניב תוחפל ,
ונלפיט אלש תויהל לוכי .דוסיה ןמ ףיוזמ היה ונלש רופעסה לכש הדבועל רתויב הבוטה הייארה וזשו תרושקת יצעוי 
 אל לבא ,למס היהנש ינפל בר ןמז וב ונבהאתהש רמול ןתינ טלחהבו ותעפשהב ונזרפה םתסה ןמ .םולחה רופיסב בטיה
!הרוק היה אל רבד םוש ,הזה םולחה תא םלוח היה אל רפוטסירכ םא :םולכ ונאצמה[  
 
12 Kurt Andersen. “The Person of the Year: The Protester” Time Magazine 178.25 (Time Inc. Dec. 14, 2011) 
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rising prices of housing. She and eight of her friends opened a Facebook event and invited the 
world to join them. The Facebook event read: 
True, most of us get by, work hard, and borrow a little from our parents so that out check 
to the landlord won’t bounce. But why are we paying so much damn it? Why is this real-
estate bubble our problem? Why doesn’t anybody care? Why is a one bedroom apartment 
with a gallery, a falling apart kitchen costs $750 [a month s.l.] why can’t young couples 
even dream of buying their own place surely not in the center of Israel? Why isn’t there a 
fair and just solution for all? Why is the city we love [i.e. Tel-Aviv s.l.] becoming a city 
for the rich only13 
Within weeks Leef was joined by thousands of other demonstrators and Israel’s streets way 
beyond Tel-Aviv teemed with tents, walks, cries and signs. Leef soon became a symbol of the 
biggest civil disobedience movement Israel has ever known since its foundation in 1948. At its 
peak, the movement brought 6% of all Israelis to the streets. In the US such a percentage would 
have meant 18 million demonstrators. If one adds to this monumental event the fact that Israel 
does not have an elaborated history of civil disobedience the depth of its magnitude emerges in 
its full.  
But something strange happened to this movement. The gap between the igniting event 
and the transformation it inspired presents itself in content as well as in scale. Under its signature 
slogan “The People Demands Social Justice”14 a proliferating assembly of contents, on occasion 
mutually exclusive such contents, dynamically clustered. To give a very partial picture of the 
proliferating reaction Daphne Leef’s call received, below is a collection of signs one could find 
in the 2011 demonstrations: “Egypt is Here”, “Gilad [Shalit s.l.] – we are waiting for you”, “Stop 
                                                
13 Ezri Amram. “Tel Aviv Municipality Vs. The Tents Protest”. Mako News. (Israeli Channel 2. 14 July 2011). My 
translation 
] לזאזעל המל לבא .רוזחי אל תיבה לעבל ק'צהש קר םירוההמ תצק םיוולמ ,השק םידבוע ,םירדתסמ ונבור ,ןוכנ ונחנא
וזה ן"לדנה תעוב ונלש הייעבה תאז המל ?הברה ךכ לכ םימלשמ ?ול תפכאש דחא ףא ןיא המל ? םע רדח תריד המל
 הלוע ףלקתמה חבטמה לעמ הירלג3000 ח"ש?  אלש חטבו תיב תונקל לע םולחל וליפא םילוכי אל םיריעצ תוגוז המל
זכרמה רוזיאב.וכל קדוצו םלוה ןורתפל ךילהת וליפא ןיא המלםל ?דבלב םירישעל תכפוה םיבהוא ונחנאש ריעה המל[?  
 
14 “יתרבח קדצ שרוד םעה” 
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racism”, “Bring peace”, “Saving Our Home”, “Justice for All”, “Education for All”, “Through 
Capitalism to Fascism”, “They are Afraid”, “Love Your Neighbor”. There were banners quoting 
Theodore Hertzel, talk of women’s right, Bedouins rights, Bedouin women’s rights and single 
mothers’ rights. Israeli Palestinians were invited to publically speak on several of the new stages 
erected in major cities while a group of settlers built a tent inviting people to live in the Occupied 
West Bank. There were educational tents for all sorts of subjects, religion and politics most 
prominently. A reading of the Israeli declaration of independence was organized and one could 
find Che Guevara posters alongside balloons of the Jewish religious gay community.  
Once again one heroine became the symbol of this event. If you mention the Social 
Justice Movement in Israel, for better or worse, it is accompanied by Leef’s story. And then the 
movement died out and Leef disappeared. She did not really disappear. She lives in Tel-Aviv and 
she is doing important and innovative social work.  What I mean is that the heroic protagonist 
that made so many waves is nowhere to be found. Her power and influence do not apply in 
almost any other political realm in a manner even close to the effect she had during the 
movement.  As I said, the Israeli Social Justice Movement is many times referred to as a failure 
popularly and in the press although it has palpable achievements. It changed the Israeli agenda 
substantially; many social organizations emerged and grew stronger. It even produced two 
members of Knesset. It failed, however, to create a completely new order of things. It did not 
succeed changing the world in the “swiftness we hoped for when we were in the tents”15 says the 
Member of Knesset and one of the former leaders of the Israeli Social Justice Movement Stav 
Shafir.     
                                                
15 Rotem Shterkeman. “Who Is Threatening Stav Shafir and What does She Think of Silvan Shalon,  
Oren Hazan and Yinon Magal”. TheMarker. (Tel-Aviv: Amos Schocken. 25 December 2015). My Translation. 
"]םילהואב ונשישכ וניימדש תוריהמב אל["  
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The Conundrum 
These three protagonists share some characteristics and diverge greatly in others. They all 
ignited mass participation that wanted a fundamental change in the order of things. The 
movements and revolutions that ensued exceeded their acts in size and content. Namely not only 
were they monumental in comparison to the singular actions in the story, but their demands were 
much wider than the demands implied in the action. Tunisia’s revolution and most of the Arab 
Uprisings were about democracy and not about commerce and/or police brutality. The Israeli 
Social Justice movement was about the many forms of possible Social Justice and not about the 
rent prices in Tel-Aviv. Finally, the Civil Rights Movement was not only about bus segregation 
but carried people to demand a much greater change in their political arena. The issue at the heart 
of each of the single acts was not the issue of the socio-political transformation that ensued. 
There is a leap from a specific issue to much more encompassing values.    
These two similarities make the third similarity into a question: all three events centered 
on a heroine or a hero depicted similarly as unplanned, lacking in connection and generally 
seeming not powerful. This insistence, which in itself is curious and will be addressed here, is 
even more peculiar if we attend to the first two similarities: the gaps in content and size. The 
three protagonists become symbols of these events. This would have not been surprising if the 
change thee figures inspired was something they aimed at. But in all three cases the change 
exceeds the deed not only in size, but also in content. If indeed the gap between the commencing 
events carried out by Parks, Bouazizi and Leef and their consequences is so big, why did they 
remain such heroic symbols? Why would movements that moved away from the content and size 
of their first igniting-moment, keep this moment and its protagonists as their indisputable 
symbol?  This is the question at the heart of my quest for the coining of trigger-narratives. In 
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what follows we attend to their uniqueness in form and content and reflect on their role in the 
immense force that trigger-narrative manage to gather and exert.  
The status of narrative  
One of the theoretical debates going throughout this work addresses the status of 
narrative in human comprehension and action. The two opposing extremes of this debate are: On 
the one hand, the claim that action and comprehension are normally structured as narrative. 
Narrative is depicted as constitutive of comprehension and action and spinning out of narrative is 
an experience marked by a certain lack.  Stories, as a consequence of this view, take their forms 
from life and not the other way around. The opposing extreme propounds that narrative is but an 
artificial construct imposed on the aggregate random events that truly make up our lives. On this 
gamut there are more dialectic descriptions of comprehension, action and their relationship with 
narrative. I could coin trigger-narrative on any point on this interpretational gamut. Trigger-
narratives can be described as a constitutive part of comprehension, or alternatively as a 
construct that I am imposing on otherwise chaotic aggregate. They can also be a part, and they 
are mostly portrayed as here, of a more nuanced dialectic movement. This makes the relation of 
this work to this debate ambivalent. On the one hand, it is not necessary to fully delve into the 
niceties of this debate because it does not touch the heart of my argument and it diverts us from 
its trajectory. On the other hand, this issue stands at the foundation of my ongoing conversation 
with narrative philosophers, and emerges in the work several times. In what follows I will offer 
two perspectives on the issue that are relevant for my argument and that frame both my stand and 
the tangent points in which this debate affects my argument.   
First, it seems problematic to me to define narratives as artificial and randomness as true 
or the other way around. If one of them is truer than the other, I do not see how we can possibly 
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determine which is which. We more often than not understand ourselves, the world and others 
via narratives and therefore, we might conclude, narrative is the “fuller” way to experience life. 
The prevalence and dominance of narrative as a mode of comprehension, to my mind, need not 
assign a lesser status to existence that is outside of narrative form. There are parts of experience 
that are chaotic, beyond words and full. Defining them as a form of lack misses something about 
them. Even if when we are in such modes we are grasping for words, as Carr suggests, this is not 
a proof of the superior or fuller status on narrative. It is only a proof of our discomfort. Minute 
quantities can still be full. Losing a loved one, falling in love, being betrayed, being 
tremendously disappointed - all might leave us speechless as great beauty and great horrors 
might. These are full moments of life defined by speechlessness. As an aside I would say that 
these are the places where the great moments of poetry can emerge. Poetry captures the ineffable 
with words and this might be the reason why it leaves us speechless. We are amazed when 
reading a good poem because it caught the part of existence that seems too nuanced for words 
and many times we can say very little about poems because once again we will be using words 
and failing to describe the nuance. So we nod. Or gesture. Or sigh. Trigger-narratives can contain 
such moments because they are intense experiences. We can be in awe. We can find ourselves 
disappointed beyond words or horrified. A time which is punctured by such moments is defined 
by them and by their fullness. We grasp for words to describe a feeling that escapes them not in 
order to do away with these moments or in order to subsume them. We grasp for words because 
we want to communicate and we agree to let some things be lost in translation.  
Second, I think that finding the rare events in which we explain ourselves and understand 
ourselves and others outside of narrative as a proof for the fact that narrative is not ubiquitous, is 
not necessarily helpful. It matters very little to my mind if narrative is ubiquitous in the way we 
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come to understand the world or almost ubiquitous. It is enough for almost any important 
political debate that narrative is extremely fundamental, prevalent and hard to resist. 
Epistemologically the ubiquity of narrative is a great and fundamental question of course but 
politically it has little consequence. If our goal is to understand the way we act, empathize and 
communicate than I think it is enough to say that narrative plays an extremely important role in 
all these functions.  
As I said, any position on this gamut allows for my argument. I converse with narrative 
theories throughout this work be their position on the matter as it may. I use and address the parts 
that I find relevant, illuminating and helpful. I do try to contextualize the different positions and 
mine as I advance from one chapter to the other for the sake of a fuller perspective. We break in 
and out of two authentic and constitutive modes when it comes to narrative. The moments that 
we grasp for the explanation, as the moment in which we are “fully narrated” are both, to my 
mind, full, authentic and normal. Narrative is almost ubiquitous and this work because of its 
political topic addresses it as ubiquitous.  
Sources 
This work oscillates between a discussion of academic sources and popular press. It leans 
substantially toward the former but it does give a considerable enough space for popular 
description of reality to justify a comment and an explanation in the introduction. The space 
between academic and popular sources is an odd place to conduct philosophy. This work 
emerged from a conundrum presented to me in the news. It is thus entangled with news items 
and other forms of popular reporting through and through. Its subject matter, the three case 
studies that I elaborated on, serve as an example that could, I think, be applicable in the 
interpretation of other historical events and onto future occurrences. But I use the news not only 
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around these three cases but other more current events. I would like to say something about the 
choice of using the news as a philosophical source.   
In the four years that I was teaching philosophy at Boston College I would ask my 
students to bring news clips, works of art, or music clips to class while reading Plato’s Republic, 
or Locke’s Second Treaties of Government or whatever other philosophical text that I put on the 
syllabus. The student’s assignment was to explain how they thought the material we read and the 
item they brought to class were relevant for each other. Some of them brought great new 
connections that illuminated the texts and the items in new light. Some were a bit far-fetched. 
But I think all of the students in my class went through the process of reading the news more and 
that they all attempted to find the relevance of our class in it. It is an activity that I hoped would 
surface for them later in life.  I wanted them to know that everyday life and philosophy were 
relevant to each other. That if they were not relevant at all, there was a problem. The border 
between the research desk and the street, between class and life is of interest to me. This is a 
work of philosophy. It relies on philosophers, builds on and argues with them. It is engaged in 
abstract debates and philosophical questions such as the possible status of narrative structure in 
human comprehension, and the truth claims fiction can or cannot make. But the urge to write it, 
came from the news. It came from the description of people in the streets demonstrating. 
Sometimes this person was me, demonstrating in Tel-Aviv. Looking around for philosophy and 
bringing it, just like my students, back to the pages to explain how it was relevant, what shape it 
had, and how all that I read and wrote applied.  
Outline of the Chapters 
Most of this work, the first four chapters, is a proof by comparison and elimination. What 
I am doing in the best part of this work is show that the events we describe here cannot be 
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successfully and meaningfully subsumed under existing concepts. By the end of chapter four 
there is a clear concept of trigger-narratives against the backdrop of other possible names, 
concepts and definitions. The last chapter, Chapter Five, adds to this discussion a perspective 
that unifies trigger-narratives under one framework and not only via a new name. This gives this 
work, in a sense, two endings: one, at the end of chapter four where a formal concept exists but 
does not have a coherent and unifying framework. The other is at the end of Chapter Five where 
a unifying framework for interpreting trigger-narratives is suggested.  
Throughout this work I sometimes use the term trigger-narrative as if it is a given 
although this work is coining the term. Until Chapter Five this will be done to denote the three 
case studies that stand at the heart of the current description.    
Chapter One examines trigger-narrative against the gamut that stretches between lived-
narratives and fiction. Trigger-narratives, I conclude, are formally closer to fiction than to lived-
narratives but they include one aspect that makes them a very strange kind of fiction: one can 
and is even compellingly invited to join in. This comparative analysis revolves around five 
concepts: (a) authorship, (b) cohesion of plot, (c) status of character, (d) the fourth wall and 
finally (e) truth claims. Fiction has a declared author, usually more or less coherent plot at least 
in the sense of beginning and ending points. A story starts in the first page and ends at the last. 
The characters of fiction come second to the plot. They are reflection, mirrors and outlines 
something true about life. We normally care about these characters only when we are engaged 
with the story.  Fiction of course has a fourth wall which allows us to dive deep into feelings of 
fear, sadness, anger knowing that we can at any given time get back to our own lives where we 
are more careful and safe. Finally, fiction can be truthful or untrue but in a very different sense 
than a lived-narrative would. While fiction’s truth claims refer to the narrative’s world coherence 
16 
 
and its ability to reflect something true about life, truth claim of lived-narratives refer mostly to 
soundness. Lived-narratives, in addition, do not have clear authors. Their plot breaks in and out 
of cohesion and of course they have no fourth wall. Most importantly lived-narratives assign the 
most substantial status to the protagonist. Their focus is always the person whose life is being 
described and she need not mirror or reflect anything true about existence. A lived-narrative is a 
disclosure of the unique who  someone is or was.  
Trigger-narratives are a compelling amalgam. They have neatly arranged plots. These are 
stories that have a beginning and end point that are not necessarily birth and death. Their stories 
do not center on their protagonists’ uniqueness as persons. These protagonists are portrayed in 
general lines that do away with much personal data. In that they are very similar to fiction. Their 
author is not a fiction author of course but neither is it similar to lived-narrative author. The 
protagonists of these narratives, if they survive their act, many times protest or at least correct the 
way they are depicted. Trigger-narratives of course have truth claims that refer to soundness. But 
these are rarely at the center of events as they take place. Verification does not figure much in 
these events. Most interestingly these narratives do not entertain a fourth wall and it is this fact 
wedded with their fictional aspects that renders trigger-narrative very dangerous and exciting 
fiction narratives since one can actually join them. They offer an entry into a very clear world in 
which all that was until recently impossible is suddenly, and usually quite quickly, rendered 
possible.   
Chapter Two deepens the analysis of trigger-narratives as participation-based forms of 
fictional narrative by elaborating on the ways in which trigger-narratives are neither lived nor 
regular historical accounts. The uniqueness of these narratives emerges as we map the 
differences between lived and historical narratives. I concentrate in this differentiation on two 
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main features: (a) revelatory vs. scientific truth; (b) the status of being-toward-death. Lived-
narratives, as I said, center upon a revelatory truth the aim of which is to disclose a unique who. 
A radical uniqueness that is close or reminiscent of Levinas’ concept of the face. History, on the 
other hand, uses personal stories in order to put together an image of a world. I compare the 
status of personal stories in this historical process of putting a world together to Husserl’s 
process of pairing. The persons in this process are of the same order of other things in the world. 
History builds a world from many pieces brought together all of which serve as building blocks. 
It reduces testimonies into a clues and it unifies different kinds of evidence in service of one 
descriptive goal. The second difference between history and lived-narratives that we focus on 
builds on Heidegger’s concept of being-toward-death. Lived-narratives I propound move to the 
very specific bit of an impending radical ending. History does not. In fact history is where 
mortals with lived narrative seek eternal life through fame.  
Trigger-narratives are neither lived, nor historical narratives. These are not stories that are 
oriented towards death. Unless a heroines dies in her act of protest we are unlikely to know how 
and when she died after her deed. We usually know very little about the protagonists of trigger-
narratives. These are not regular historical narratives either. These narratives congeal quickly and 
spread widely. They start to operate and have an effect long before any historical analysis can 
take place. More than that, trigger-narratives offer a story that is almost without context. When 
research finally takes hold of these events, their context, and the many forgotten details the 
triggering already took place. Most interestingly, such elaborations ruin the force of trigger-
narrative. They make them transform and disappear. The fact that Parks was an experienced 
activist and not the first to refuse to give up her seat and get arrested does not help the story. 
Very little can help these stories be more effective. They come in a specific compelling form and 
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changes in this form weaken them. Their protagonists must be weak, spontaneous and 
courageous. A hint that they were planned or well-connected undercuts their force and allure. A 
hint that they were not acting from choice but a threat or personal gain would hurt the story. 
These are specifically formulated stories that answer neither the demands of the detailed worlds 
of history nor the rhythm of finitude and radical singularity of lived narratives.   
I proceed in Chapter Three to look into the ways in which trigger-narrative relates to 
historical accounts. Specifically we ask how the protagonists of trigger-narratives are different 
from other historical figures. The answer is three-fold: first, trigger-narratives are not written 
texts that were deeply researched. They are stories that travel through communities and 
disseminated either orally or via popular press and social networks. This process hones them 
down to the very essence of their activating aspect. These are narratives of an event that has 
already happened but is now acting as an invitation to join and participate. Acted out narratives, 
as written narratives, are kernels of temporalities that carry meaning. These kernels call for 
action. They unfold against the imagined possibility of success or failure. Historical accounts do 
not have that component. They tell stories the end of which we all know. They might discover a 
new meaning to these events or uncover something that shatters the meaning we all have. But we 
all know who won WWII. And we all know what became of monarchy during the French 
Revolution. The second part of the answer does not touch on the way that we describe the 
protagonist of trigger-narratives as oppose to historical figures but rather on the different 
expectation we have from either kind. We prefer out trigger-narrative protagonist weak, 
uncalculated spontaneous and brave. We prefer our historical leaders calculated, skilled, 
experienced, and powerful.  We might be unhappy if spontaneity figured in their conduct too 
much. Finally, the answer touches on our modes of engagements with the two kinds of 
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individuals. Our engagement with the stories of the protagonists of trigger-narratives is closer to 
the engagement with fiction than it is to the engagement with history. The struggles of trigger-
narratives are not “safe bets”. We do not join them because we calculate all risks. We join them, 
if we do, as one opens a book: open, curious, ready to be positively surprised. The absence of a 
fourth wall and the status of the story as “not-yet”, means that the suspense is active which 
brings us back to our assertion in Chapter One that trigger–narratives are fiction without a fourth 
wall. Historical figures are either dead in which case we do not contemplate joining them. Or if 
they are alive and in power and we decide to follow them – we tend to calculate their possibility 
of success. In the wake of trigger-narratives the streets fill with people writing together the 
fantastic story of a great battle the end of which they do not know yet but against all odds strive 
to achieve together.  
Chapter Four addresses the leap in size that trigger-narrative elicit. These are relatively 
small actions done by one person that sometimes change the state of things in a substantial and a 
dramatic way. The aim of this chapter is to juxtapose trigger-narratives as we defined them so far 
to existing politically mobilizing narratives. To do that I am borrowing from the sociologist 
William Gamson the trifurcation of the politically mobilizing narratives into meta-, issue and 
personal narratives. Trigger-narrative, I then demonstrate, share characteristics with each of these 
narratives but cannot be meaningfully and comprehensively be subsumed under any of them.  
Metanarratives are tacit and ubiquitous. They dictate the way that we might decipher 
events and point to the preferred values and behaviors. Rather than provide one clear narrative 
with a protagonist and a plot, they provide a framework that materializes via the dissemination of 
many narratives in which we are all entangled. Metanarratives of the idea of progress, for 
example, appear in many versions of songs, newspapers, articles of scientific innovations, 
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children’s books and TV shows. They emphasize the advance of science as the advancement 
from darkness to light and by the time we actually learn the word “progress” or “enlightenment” 
we already know the narrative. Since they are all encompassing and deep reaching when 
metanarratives change, they bring with them a new order of things. The change is monumental.  
Trigger-narratives are not tacit or ubiquitous. These are not deeply layered narratives 
passed down for generations. Rather trigger-narratives are articulated narrative centering on a 
protagonist and a plot. However, trigger-narratives have the effect or aspiration of meta-
narratives. They aim to create and sometimes manage to create a new order of things: a new 
political arena or a substantially new understanding of values. Their impact and the expectation 
stirred in the wake of trigger-narratives is a fundamental and all-encompassing change.   
Issue narratives are a term borrowed from the sociological school of frame analysis. This 
school which emphasized the interpretive and meaning-giving aspect of mobilization is 
extremely fitting perspective to this work of contemporary philosophical narrative analysis. Issue 
narratives are narratives that congeal around current events and echo already existing concerns 
and shared beliefs and values. This congealing of a narrative is a mobilizing force that is 
composed of the internal way that the issue-narrative is constructed and the way it echoes its 
political environment. A good example would be a leak in a nuclear plant that is structured as an 
enraging story about the placing of this plant close to living neighborhoods or, alternatively, an 
enraging story about the damage to the environment. In arenas where such concerns (safety and 
environmental concerns) circle, this issue narrative might become a good mobilizer. Trigger-
narratives start off as what seems as issue narrative. They are stories that points to an issue. But 
the events that follow trigger-narratives soon exceed their issue by far greater aspirations. Yet 
they keep their moment of beginning as their symbol and inspiration. 
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Finally personal narratives and testimonies play a crucial part in the political arena. These 
could be testimonies that support the metanarratives and then their role is ceremonial. For 
example holocaust survivors’ testimonies in Israel are not told to convince or mobilize but rather 
to remember and respect. Testimonies could also be challengers of the metanarratives in which 
case they are usually vulnerable to two reactions that testimonies supporting metanarratives are 
not: forgetfulness and extreme need for validation. Unlike testimonies that support the 
metanarrative, challenging testimonies do not enjoy the support of the system. They do not have 
commemoration days and sites. They are not included in the study books. If they are not repeated 
they could be easily forgotten. This need for repetition helps such testimonies against their other 
challenge as well: extreme requests for validation. Because such narratives challenge long held 
beliefs they elicit suspicion and doubt. It is not always easy to prove something really happened. 
Repetition helps. If many people recount stories from the same event over and over again it 
becomes harder to dismiss it and it is more likely to receive some serious investigation. Trigger-
narratives are a sort of a testimony to a grievance. They are a challenge to the existing 
metanarratives in the form of a singular story. They are also repetitive but in a very different 
way. Rather than offer many testimonies of one issue. They offer one story, of an act of protest 
that is repeated many times over.  
And so we end the analysis of these four chapters with a concept of trigger narrative as a 
form of fiction in the sociopolitical arena which formally shares in the shape of three different 
politically mobilizing concepts of narratives. This patchwork conceptualization is in essence an 
argument about the necessity of a new term. It is not yet an elaboration on the nature and the 
dynamics of these narratives regardless of the need for a new coining. To this we turn in Chapter 
Five.   
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Chapter Five suggests a perspective through which we could understand and further 
investigate trigger-narratives as myths anchored in the present. Trigger-narratives, I claim, are 
world creating narratives that are shaped after a formula of a great battle between a small but 
courageous heroine or hero and a monster. We begin with establishing world creation as part of 
the definition of myths and the battle of monsters as a highly prevalent formula within 
mythological narratives. We then differentiate between Kant’s sublime and the monstrous 
claiming only the latter could be fought and that in front of the former we recoil in ineffable fear 
and trembling. No human made evil, I claim, should ever be treated as an ineffable and/or 
sublime. The protagonists of trigger-narratives transform the ineffable into a form that one can 
resist. They free us into the possibility of resistance and action. They remind us that the great 
Wizard of Oz is just a man in a room. This reminder is so empowering. It fills the participants 
with a sense of capability and world creating powers.  
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Chapter One: Fictional and Lived-Narratives 
  
Rosa Parks, Mohamed Bouazizi and Daphne Leef invite us to participate in unsafe 
stories.16 Trigger-narratives,17 inhabit the border between fiction and reality and by virtue of this 
position harness and release the great powers that fiction awakens in an arena that is not 
fictional. They let us into the world of heroines and heroes. They make authors, editors, audience 
and protagonists of us. We live our lives “entangled in stories”.18 We are born into personal, 
national and tribal histories, implanted in the languages, symbols and culture which produce 
books, sayings, songs, and rituals all of which carry a story along with them and more often than 
not, roles in these stories for us.  From the moment we arrive in the world a new story, our story, 
deeply intertwined with others’ stories is weaving itself around and through us. Trigger-
narratives are players in this deeply layered web of interlocking stories. They shake, tear, scar 
and transform these networks creating orders and doing away with orders. They encourage 
massive and sudden participation, solidarity, empathy, courage, rage and hope. What is it in 
trigger-narratives that calls upon us in such a way? The task ahead is to begin mapping their 
characteristics against existing conceptual frameworks. As the excerpt opening this chapter 
suggests this chapter takes its cue from the demarcation line and the overlapping spaces between 
fictional and lived-narratives. To what extent are trigger-narratives fictional? To what extent are 
                                                
16 This work, since it comments on three specific historical events that are used as case studies, could not be fully 
understood without the brief historical background about these three protagonists that I provide in the Introduction 
(p. 2-11) 
17 I refer to the narratives at the heart of the events that we are examining as trigger-narratives throughout this work. 
Clearly coining the term is the goal and we cannot assume the uniqueness of these narratives as proven at his early 
stage. Until the end of Chapter Four when the defining process reaches certain formal fullness, the term trigger-
narratives should be treated as an abbreviation for “the narrative at the heart of the events that we are examining.” In 
Chapter Five I use it as a defined term. 
18 Paul Ricoeur, “New Ethos for Europe”. Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of Action. (London: Sage Publications, 
1996), 6 
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trigger-narratives a form of lived-narratives? What are the implications concerning their force, 
allure and influence if they are one or the other? 
Narration is  
a theory of symbolic actions – words and/or deeds - that have sequence and meaning for 
those who live, create or interpret them.[It] has relevance to real as well as fictive worlds, 
to stories of living and to stories of the imagination19 
The discussion of the relation between fiction and lived-narratives could start from either fiction 
or life. The former, “the return path from fiction to life”20, would revolve around the aim of 
fiction, the awe it inspires and the relation between fictional narratives and human life of action. 
The latter would be concerned with the narrative structures in human life, their status and ways 
of operation. Does human life have a structure? Is this structure story-like? Do we come to 
understand human life through the form of a story? What does this form contain that makes it 
essential and constitutive? The two perspectives overlap. The narrative structures in human life 
are not detached from forms of fiction and fiction takes its cue from nascent narrative forms in 
human lives. For the extent that it is possible and for the sake of discussion we are making a 
divide between the two. The former question which takes its departure point from written fiction 
will be a substantial part of the discussion in chapters three and five where we discuss literature 
and mythology respectively. Here we inquire into the latter.  
When asked, in interviews, dates or breaking-the-ice social activities, to tell the story of 
our lives we usually pause for a brief moment before commencing on a well-rehearsed concise 
narrative. It is likely that we were expecting something like that might come up and yet, one 
usually takes a small breath before she begins. While telling the story, we become a listening 
audience as well. We might get tired hearing ourselves telling the same story again. It might 
                                                
19 Walter Fisher, “Narration a Hunan Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument”, 
Communication Monographs. 51.1. (1984), 2 
20 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 159 
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please us because things are going as we planned or maybe even better. It might frighten us 
because they are not. We are the narrative’s authors, editors and the heroines at its midst. 
Peculiarly we are also the audience.  Why do we pause before beginning? Why do we listen to 
the story we author and already know?  
In very broad strokes, lived-narratives, the stories describing our lives, differ from fiction 
in five essential features: (a) the degree of authorship; (b) the coherence and unity of the 
storyline; (c) the coherence of the protagonist as a character (d) the existence of the 4th wall and 
finally in (e) the kind of truth claims they can and attempt to make. Sharing a narrative about our 
lives entails a five-fold leap between the structures and dynamics of fiction and the structures 
and dynamics of life. Even if we are persuaded by MacIntyre that 
Human life has […] the form of a certain kind of story. [And thus] it is not just that 
poems and sagas narrate what happens to men and women, but that in their narrative form 
poems and sagas capture a form that was already present in the lives to which they 
relate21 
the gap stands. If we take the five features above as indicators than it is clear that the forms of 
narrative that exist within human lives are not fully fledged narratives but pre-figurative 
structures that are narrative-oriented. Our finitude, temporality, symbolic and linguistic-cultural 
orientation are fecund ground to the cultivations of the activity of emplotment. Comprehension 
itself is deeply connected to narrative form. But life does not have an author, a plot, characters, a 
4th wall or truth claims in a manner that is identical to fiction.  Life is not fully emplotted and the 
relationship between fiction and lived-narratives is dialectical. As Nussbaum clearly puts it:  
Narratives are constructs that respond to certain pattern of living and shape them in their 
turn. So we must always ask what content the literary forms themselves express, what 
structures of desire they represent and evoke22 
                                                
21 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1981),124. My emphasis.  
22 Martha Nussbaum. Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. (New York: Oxford  
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in any given moment. Ricoeur suggests that a plot is a mediator between individual events and 
the narrated story. The event in a plot, according to him, is promoted from its status as a distinct 
occurrence to a step in a configured temporal structure that moves into a meaningful end-point.23 
Carr and MacIntyre, for example, argue against the possibility of coherent, distinct and 
“narrative-less” lived events. Their view gives narrative an even more fundamental role in the 
structures of human lives.24 However, neither position fails to recognize the difference between 
the two forms. We will elaborate much on the debate of the status of narrative in human lives. 
This is just to situate the discussion in a general context.  
There is a gap not only between narrative structures and that which is not of a narrative 
structure in life (e.g. symbols, “as yet untold story”25). There is a gap between the other 
narratives that we could have told about our lives and the one we actually chose to articulate. I 
might tell a great story of professional success and not tell a throbbing narrative of loneliness or 
personal anguish. I might present my life as developing logically from one point to the other 
when really the feeling is that other forces were at work. In both cases telling a narrative of one’s 
life is a process of reduction, extraction, condensation and adaptation. As we come up with a 
coherent, concise and well developed plot, for a fleeting moment before we turn to present 
ourselves as characters in an ongoing play on the stage of our life, the gap between the current 
story and the other stories, between any story and non-story, makes us pause and listen.  
Kearny defines the common function of every story as “someone telling something to 
someone about something”26. This definition recognizes the necessary setting: the author/s, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
University Press, 1990), 310 
23 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative I, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 64 
24 David Carr, Time Narrative and History. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,1986); Alasdair MacIntyre, 
After Virtue, (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1981) 
25 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative I, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 75 
26 Richard Kearney, On Stories, (London: Routledge, 2002), 5 
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audience, and the story itself.27 The word “something” points to the reified aspect of stories and 
it is exactly in the name of this aspect of stories that their structure appears in human life and at 
the same time is detaches them from human life as a flow. Aristotle defines tragedy as “an 
imitation of an action that is serious, complete and of a certain magnitude”.28 Trigger-narratives 
which operate partly as plays since their protagonists are not writing a story but rather are in the 
process of acting one out, exhibit an amalgam. Trigger-narratives follow human action in a 
complete way. They are reified into completed bundles of somethings that someone tells 
someone else about someone/s’ complete action.  
We are, as was pointed out, entangled in stories. We are passive participants of stories. 
The stories around us could be stories that frame our lives in a constant and silent manner. 
Familial, historical and cultural stories emerge from time to time to remind us how deeply they 
structure reality for us, but serve constantly as frames within which we act. There are also 
smaller stories, revolving around events that we tell and hear as we go about our days. We could 
describe our day to a spouse, or share an occurrence with a friend. This chapter touches upon the 
small and the large narratives that structure and emerges from our lives. However, in relation to 
the comparison with fiction, it concentrates on life-stories: The stories we tell about ourselves 
and/or others which revolve around the ongoing or completed action of a life of a person. In what 
follows I will develop each of the five differences between lived-narratives and fiction 
mentioned above. The concluding section (VI) will outline the peculiar nature of trigger-
narrative against this fivefold discussion. The point of the next five sections is not to develop an 
exhaustive discussion of the topics at hand. Authorship, coherence of plot and character, the 4th 
                                                
27 Carr makes the same observation. “To our concept of narrative belongs not only a progression of events but also a 
story teller and an audience to whom the story is told”, Time, Narrative and History, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press,1986), 46 
28 Aristotle, Poetics. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2006), 42 
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wall and truth claims open vast philosophical arenas the full exploration of which exceeds the 
scope of the current discussion. The next five sections outline the relevant issues at the service of 
the goal: defining trigger-narratives.  
I. Authorship  
“Real stories, in distinction from those we invent, have no author”29, says Arendt. We are 
born into a world without choosing. The time, the family our genetic, historical and moral 
contexts, are a given and a dynamic changing given at that. We leave the world most often than 
not without choice and when we make the choice to leave it is many times fraught with 
circumstances that we did not choose and/or want. The obvious response to this observation of 
our degree of authorship in life is that this is only partially true. “We are never more (and some- 
times less) than the co-authors of our own narratives”30; but we are co-authors nonetheless. We 
are authors of  “slices of life”31. We get to plan and execute as planned some of the time. And 
even in the extreme of all situations, we get to be the authors of the meanings of our lives.32 
Victor Frenkel’s Man’s Search for Meaning describes an author of meaning in a situation where 
the plot, “the sequence of events”33, is out of one’s hand. Did Sisyphus author his life story? In 
one sense no. He did not wish to become “the useless worker of hell”. But in another sense yes.  
Under his gaze and his memories the “series of unrelated actions which becomes his fate” is a 
life upon which he is, despite the gods, a master.34 We are, as Sisyphus and Frenkle, co-authors 
of our lives.  
                                                
29 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958),185 
30 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1981), 213 
31 Paul Ricoeur,  Oneself  as Another,( Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992),  162 
32 Ibid. 
33 Aristotle Poetics, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2006), 56 
34 Albert Camus. Le Mythe de Sisyphe: Essai sur L’absurde. (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), 168. My translation. 
“travailleur inutile des enfers”;  “suite d'actions sans lien qui devient son destin, cree par lui, uni sous le regard de sa 
memoire” 
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We are not only the co-authors of the great story of the meaning of life. The more 
mundane many meanings in living are also couched in narrative structured contexts. If I am 
kneading dough at a pastry making competition, my actions make sense because they emerge 
from and couched in a story that endows them with meaning in the sense of intelligibility. If, as 
I defense my PhD thesis, I knead dough, my actions raise question all of which are seeking a 
story that will locate my action in intelligible context. “Sarit is going to explain something about 
trigger-narratives with dough”. “In Sarit’s country it is a great honor to make dough as 
defending one’s dissertation”. And so on, even the conclusion that I lost my mind tells a story. If 
none of the stories fit the situation my actions spins out of intelligibility. We inhabit a ghost 
writer, interpreter and editor that translates, chooses and arranges our actions in the already 
existing web of meanings. This author is not as glorified as the author of the meaning of life 
since her task is to answer the question “what is that?” Her task is mundane, unending and daily. 
If she authors, she authors under great constraints and gets no credit. The co-author of the 
meaning of life, in contrast, answers to the more dramatic questions. The meaning of life 
responds to questions like “who am I?” or alternatively “why did/should I do that?” Be that as it 
may, the author of the meaning of life depends on the author of the meanings in living.   
The meaning of life could be lost through the experience of the many meanings in living. 
Camus and Sartre speak about these moments of absurd and nausea respectively:  
Sometimes the scenery collapses. Wake up, take the train, four hours at the factory, a 
meal, the train. Four hours of work, sleep and Monday Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, 
Friday and Saturday in monotonous pace. Most people walk this path easily. But one day 
awakens the “why?”35  
Likewise Roquentin in Sartre’s The Nausea:  
                                                
35 Albert Camus. Le Mythe de Sisyphus (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), 29. My translation.  
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I was thinking of belonging, I was telling myself that the sea belonged to the class of 
green objects, or that that green was a part of the quality of the sea. Even when I looked 
at things I was miles from dreaming that they existed; they looked like scenery to me.36 
It is from the many meanings of living that flow steadily and monotonously that suddenly the 
great meaning of life disappears, collapses as a scenery in a theater or revels itself as part of a 
foreign nature. The meanings of actions that as part of the process of living answer the question 
“what is this?” repeatedly, decrypting and decoding the world for us, vanishes.  The meaning of 
life author which asks: “why?” finds itself taking the spotlight. Camus and Sartre describe an 
abandonment and detachment that arise from saturation in the many meanings of living. It is an 
outcome of a longing to some grand answer that is lost.  It is also pointing to a need humans have 
that their lives would cohere and unite to a complete meaningful whole. The meaning of life 
quest is not necessarily to be fraught with existential angst. To give but few examples, MacIntyre 
speaks about the narrative unity of life with none of the questions concerning suicide and death. 
Arendt and Ricoeur talk about life as a project the meaning of which could be communicated in 
narrative form without the gloomy mood as a backdrop. The meanings in living, of course, have 
very little to do with longing or angst that the Existentialists describe. They are likely to admit 
that as well. If everything goes well they serve the larger meaning of our lives silently. If all goes 
not as well, the meaning of life and the meanings in living overlap partially and some of the time.  
And if all went very badly our daily existence has nothing to do with the meaning of our lives.   
Now, as we come to outline the character of the co-author in life as oppose to the author 
of fiction we can see that the author of the meaning of life is quite similar to the author of fiction 
in its aim and aspirations. This author, in accordance with our definition of narrative, is looking 
to be the only teller of the story and thus control its form. The co-author of life and the fiction 
                                                
36 Jean-Paul Sartre, Nausea, (New York: New Direction Publishing  Cooperation, 2007), 127  
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author attempt to follow the essence of human action from a beginning to end. The story should 
have some kind of resonance that is concise and, if successful, universal. However, unlike the 
author of fiction the co-author of the meaning of life is bound to the author of the meanings in 
living and to the protagonist’s point of view and temporality. These convergences translate into 
the three necessary conditions that deprive the co-author of the meaning of life from becoming a 
fully-fledged author: the condition of plurality, her temporality and life’s pure contingency.  
First, in relation to the condition of plurality: A specifically human life is a  
moment between birth and death, as long as it could be represented as a narrative and 
shared with other men.37  
The lack of authorship Arendt is addressing in the quote opening this section is the condition of 
non-sovereignty which is the outcome of the condition of plurality. Non-sovereignty, the lack of 
total authorship, is an inherent part of the human condition and all attempts to do away with it 
are attempts of stoic or otherwise resignation from the real world into “an imaginary one where 
[…] others would simply not exist”38. We are the creatures who would like to be their grand 
authors of their lives but given the fact that others like ourselves are also the authors of their 
own stories, we are co-authors in an unpredictable and highly dynamic arena. Arendt’s claim at 
the beginning of the section then is a warning from the hubris of solipsistic philosophy, not a 
condemnation of agency. Second, the option of total authorship is frustrated because of the 
specific temporality of the protagonist. The author is limited by the fact that she is also the 
heroine. She is in the time of the story and while she can project forward and backwards, she 
can only do it from her place in the present. Furthermore, the co-author/protagonist is never at a 
                                                
37 Julia Kristeva.  Hannah Arendt: Life as Narrative, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2001), 7-8. 
Emphasis in the source. 
38 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 234 
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position to end the story, nor was she ever in a position to begin it in the full sense of the word. 
Kierkegaard says:  
It is perfectly true, as philosophers say, that life must be understood backwards. But they 
forget the other proposition, that it must be lived forwards. And if one thinks over that 
proposition, it becomes more and more evident that life can never really be understood in 
time simply because at no particular moment can I find the necessary resting point from 
which to understand it—backwards39 
The fully-fledged author of the meaning of life is condemned to co-authorship by time itself. 
Finally, life is unpredictable and full of contingencies. We surprise ourselves, are surprised by 
others and could simply be found unprepared for a number of completely random reasons. Even 
within the space that one can author her life. Life might and does many times resist.  
All of the above clarifies that co-authorship in life is making the determination of 
responsibility not an easy task. The degree to which one is the author of her actions determines 
her responsibility and culpability. Entangled as we are in other stories, circumstance and 
contingency the amount to which we are the authors of an action demands the abstraction of 
narrative. This work does not develop this ethical debate. Here we are concerned with defining a 
specific narrative operation in the political arena. But, looking at the comparison that we are 
making in this chapter between lived-narratives and fiction, we might want to note that although 
the differences between fiction and life concerning responsibility seem obvious, they do not 
offer a real binary.  Of course when Crime and Punishment is concerned and a special care is 
taken to describe a murderer with intent the distance from what usually reality offers is 
substantial. However, since literature follows human action it communicates its gray areas as 
well. Was Oedipus to blame? Was Meursault in The Stranger? As was said in the opening the 
discussion taking its departure point from fiction will be developed in other chapters. Suffice is 
                                                
39 Kierkegaard’s Journal for 1843. In Bernard Williams, “Life as Narrative” European Journal of Philosophy 17.2 
2007, p.310. My emphasis.  
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to say here that if fiction is an experiment and a model from and against which we examine 
paths of action and issues of responsibility in real life, it follows that the complexity of real life 
with its limited sense of authorship figures in it as well.   
II. Plot Coherence  
Aristotle says:  
Poetry, therefore, is a more philosophical and a higher thing than history: for 
poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular40. 
Arendt says:  
 Whoever consciously aims at being ‘essential’ at leaving behind a story and an 
identity which will win ‘immortal fame’, must not only risk his life but expressly 
choose, as Achilles did, a short life and a premature death41    
Being essential or universal, “being-a-narrative”, “being a poem”, if we may, demands that we 
cease being all together. The coherence of a plot centers on two features: integrative, succinct 
content and the reification in time. Fiction attempts to follow and articulate something universal 
about life and leave it behind as an artifact for others. This in turn means that narrative must have 
clear boundaries that separate it from the flow of life and allow it to maintain itself against and 
for it. It must be reified, meaning it must have a beginning and an end.  
In a good story […] all the extraneous noise or static is cut out. That is, we the audience, 
are told by the story teller just what is necessary to ‘further the plot’. A selection is made 
of all the events and action the characters may engage in and only a small minority finds 
its way into the story. In Life, by contrast, everything is left in. All the static is there42  
And it must entertain a certain grasping-together of heterogeneous element characteristic of 
plots. The twofold demands of coherence, if filled successfully, support a verbal artifact that 
resonates diachronically and universally in human public arenas. Othello is considered to be a 
                                                
40 Aristotle, Poetics,  (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2006), 1451b5-7 
41 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 193 
42 David Carr, Time, Narrative and History, (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986), 57-8 
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successful work of art because it is timeless and could “survive” cultural translation. The play 
travels through time and locations reflecting and mirroring the crystalized human essence. One 
finds herself in awe when watching or reading such play because it is still so acute in following 
human action and because of its relevance through the ages and across cultures. How does one 
reify a universal essence from the subject matter of the life? One could not possibly be the author 
answering the demands of coherence and the protagonist at the same time. How can one stabilize 
into an integrative whole the essence / moral / meaning of my narrative against the many 
unpredictable changes life brings? Can one furnish a beginning point and end-point? Need life 
cease in order for us to make poetic sense of it?  Even if we have an Archimedean viewpoint 
(e.g. posthumously inquiring writer) will life cohere in content from birth to death?  
I am taking a small detour to address a discussion that has been occupying the backdrop 
of the conversation that is developed here and in the preceding sections. The discussion concerns 
the existential status of the author as the one responsible for unity and coherence. Are we 
essentially animals that author (to paraphrase Macintyre’s famous “story-telling animal”)? Or is 
the author’s perspective imposed on random and meaningless human actions? If we go back to 
the example of Sisyphus given in the introduction, is Sisyphus fooling himself, trying to find 
order and meaning in what is truly meaningless by nature? Or are Sisyphus’ actions inevitably 
narrative-oriented?  This work takes the latter position. It seems obvious that we can look upon 
our lives and care about where it is going and where it is coming from. These are author-oriented 
concerns that assume a protagonist looking for a plot. Asking “where is this degree / relationship 
/ job going?” Is really asking: What story is this? Who am I in this story? Do I want to create 
another story? Of course these questions also point to the possibility of living while lacking of 
narrative. They point to a desire to something that is not-yet, a quest or a loss. The status of 
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authorship and coherence in lived-narratives transpires between the desire for narrative 
coherence and the fact that life refuses to cohere and many times offer several ways they can 
cohere as.   
Narrative coherence is what we find or effect in much our experience and action, and to 
the extent that we do not, we aim for it, try to produce it, and try to restore it when it goes 
missing for whatever reason43  
As temporal finite beings with a beginning and an end and as creatures that seek 
meaning, we are condemned to author. The correlation between temporal experience of human 
existence and the activity of narrating story is not accidental. “The composition of the plot is 
grounded in our pre–understanding of the world of action”44. And this pre-understanding is 
manifested in meaningful structures, the symbolic resources and the temporal character of the 
world of action.  
Our lives are constantly interpreting themselves […] in terms of beginnings, middles and 
end […] Our existence is already to some extent pre-plotted.45  
 Our temporality weaves the past into future projects. It views the present in view of what came 
to pass and what will. Every point in time is encompassing a possible future and a certain 
perspective on the past. Our actions are directed at goals and it is always in the light of 
cumulative experience that we aim at a certain direction.  
Yet, this chapter opened with the observation of a certain violence narrative does perform 
on experience. We pause, I said, before we narrate our lives and we listen to the story as if 
someone is telling it to us.  Between the prefigured and the figured, the pre-narrated and the 
narrated, or to use Ricoeur’s terms, between mimesis1 and mimesis2, mediates the process of 
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44 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative I, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 54  
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emplotment.46 The two levels of narration differ temporally, structurally and symbolically. An 
individual event becomes a moment in a plot via integration. Narratives add beginning and end-
points. The symbolic order is based on syntagmatic rather than paradigmatic relation. There is a 
transition between the two, and in the transition something is created, the plot, and something is 
lost, the pre-plot and the many other possibilities it potentially could have materialize as.  
Human lives are not reflective at all times. We might be doing the dishes, driving, 
running. We sometimes meditate to escape thought or use repetitive actions to enter meditative-
like state. As we examine these moments, however, we can never do so outside of the glasses of 
time, symbolic structure and meaning structure. We always experience in time. Even when we 
are captured by the “fascination with the absolutely unformed”47 we are fascinated via symbols 
and through meanings. The narrative-perspective creates what Kant named possible-experience. 
Pre-figurative perspective outlines the arena of possible-(narrative)-experience. This possible-
(narrative)-experience arena could be just a small part of a wider non-narrative noumena 
existence that is, as Williams suggests, unformed. We can experience it speechlessly. But 
whenever we would want to talk about it, it will be in the form of a sequence of events that relate 
to each other in some way or another and become entangled in, vulnerable to and productive of 
stories. We can probe the extent to which human life is infected / impregnated by stories and the 
extent, limits, depths and status of the un-narrated noumena around the possible-(narrative)-
experience. As we do that, we will be telling a story about it. We have no Archimedean point to 
examine this. Every time one will turn to describe experience as unformed she will find herself 
entangled with forms. So we find ourselves answering the questions concerning narrative forms 
and human life with a compromise: One has no access to the absolutely unformed but neither are 
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we fully-fledged protagonists in a well-organized story. Life is a potential story and as such it 
can come to full fruition but it only sometimes does.  If that is so, we see narrative and we see 
the not yet formed events at the same time. There is no need for the dichotomy between order 
and disorder. “Emplotment is never the simple triumph of order”48. It is a combination of 
consonance and dissonance. It is exactly though the unpredictable that the identity of a character 
and its plot-inscribed fate emerge.49  
In our context two points are crucial: One, going back to the dichotomy between the 
author of the meanings in living and the author of the meaning of life, the possibility of 
ubiquitous presence of some level of narrative form in life pertains only to the author of the 
meanings of living.  We can easily exist without being a part of a drama that is the story of our 
life in each passing moment. I might go to the doctor for a regular check up and be absentminded 
about it. Around me are weaved the stories that support my identity, my actions, and the regular 
check-up I about to do. These stories rest silently around me helping me make sense of things. If 
at the doctor’s I learn either devastating or wonderful news the author of the meaning of life 
emerges immediately, marking the moment as this or that. Looking back on what has passed and 
arranging it to fit the moment. Looking to the future and figuring the new possibilities. Two, 
since the discussion concerning the status of narrative coherence concerns the meanings in living 
author, we can leave the question be and delimit the boundaries of our current discussion: we are 
discussing the narrative coherence perspective only in reference to the moments when our 
meaning of life author is on a quest for a narrative, or at the midst of a narrative. It is enough that 
the co-author/protagonist point of view is extremely fundamental in times of self-reflection. It is 
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sufficient that whenever one reflects on her life and the lives of others, she either sees a story in 
the making or troubled that she does not.  
Coming back to our discussion of the possibility of “being a narrative” every narrative 
endows with meaning and at the same time misses another possible meaning about life. Essential 
narrative aiming at eternal-fame might miss more since it demand monopoly on one story. In that 
sense Acheilles died twice. Once physically and he died again when the more complex and 
layered aspects of his life story were overtaken by one specific narrative of his end. But this 
ossification of one coherent whole is never a complete and done matter. The brevity produced by 
the process of condensation and extraction becomes action itself when it is reenacted,50 told 
again and understood differently. If one uses the image of Sisyphus on a flag of freedom fighters 
or in a book about the meaning of life in 20th century France, the reified coherent content of the 
dead person, becomes alive again and differently. By virtue of its intersubjective character “the 
outcome [of a narrative] is never final. […] narrative is an open ended invitation to ethical and 
poetic responsiveness”51.  
  Finally, in life we do not have the luxury of being disentangled from other narratives. 
Every Hamlet has its Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead. Every Wizard of Oz has a 
possible Witch. 52 We are always a part of several stories that crash into and out of ours in a 
manner that might be challenging to coherence of form and content. Additionally it is clear that 
the notions of beginning and ending in the sense of fiction are absent in lived-narratives. 
Beginning is “lost in the haze of early childhood” and death of course can only be recounted by 
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others.53 This, claim advanced also by Williams and Arendt assumes the necessity of the 
historian perspective. To an extent, of course, it is correct. The story emerges from an action that 
is already passed and is never separate from many other stories. Yet, in a sense it is not. As we 
said narrative is a fundamental feature of our gaze upon the world. Narrative coherence in real 
life must be seen as a frame we fit into and break out of repeatedly. Its reification is not eternal 
and is dialectically forming and collapsing as well as competing with other possible frames. This 
does not mean it is non-existent. Lived-narratives beginnings and endings are moments of life 
which we insist upon as such because we took initiative, because we met someone, because we 
saw God, because we stopped seeing God, because we got sick, or healthy and gave this or that 
meaning of a beginning, or an ending, or both. Told and written fiction narratives have first and 
last pages. Lived-narratives have declared first and last pages.  
III. Character / Protagonist / Hero  
The protagonist in Aristotle Poetics is second to the plot. It is merely implied by it.  
Tragedy is the imitation of an action; and an action implies personal agents, who 
necessarily possess certain distinctive qualities […]The plot, then, is the first principle, 
and, as it were, the soul of a tragedy; Character holds the second place54.  
Authors, much in the same way, matter even less to the plot they tell. They figure only 
marginally in the Poetics. Referred to in their personal name, they are discussed from a historical 
standpoint of documentation of the particular and not poetically. Their specific existence serves 
as an example. They do not receive the place of a principle of any order in the Poetics. Authors 
occupy a paradoxical place since they are the creators of the plot and yet are completely 
redundant to its content and the effectiveness once it is released as an artifact to the public arena. 
As in the Symposium all that playwrights can do after the creation is done is drink together and 
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let their hangover subside. Furthermore, their actual existence interrupts the relation of the 
audience/readers with the narrative:   
When we happen to meet an author and speak to him about his book we experience a 
profound disruption of the peculiar relation that we have with the author in and through 
his work. […] [T]o Read a book is to consider its author already dead and the book 
posthumous.55  
In lived-narratives, however, the protagonist/co-author, the agent, is the first principle. When we 
tell a story of someone’s life we do not tell a story in order to follow something about humanity 
in general. We tell such story in order to follow the uniqueness of the person at their midst. The 
who56. We could of course learn something about humanity from personal stories of lives but this 
is a byproduct of the main goal. When a story becomes more of a moral or a universal lesson 
about humanity it departs from the realm of lived-narratives and transferred to the realm of 
fiction. This is as we said Achilles’ second death: A that life is reified into something much more 
coherent and more essential that it could have possibly been. The co-author as well receives a 
better place than the author of fiction. The co-author only declares last pages and scenes, but she 
doesn’t really have the privilege of departing. When the co-author and the protagonist are the 
same person we have a very involved author, who runs the risk of bearing the responsibility of 
the outcomes of her chosen narrative and a very conscious protagonist whose existence in the 
time of the story includes an attempt to determine a path as if she is standing at the standpoint of 
a fiction author or even a judging fiction author. The co-author and protagonist materialized in 
one and the same person intensify each other to create an agent. 
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Now the connection between the primary position of the agent and lived-narratives   
emerges from a difficulty. On the one hand, it is impossible to verbally solidify an unequivocal 
account of the living essence of a person. Try as we may explain or outline who a person is or 
was, we end up with a list of characteristics she shares with others and an inventory of things she 
did. This intense uniqueness of lived-narratives is produced through action. This is most obvious 
in the case of romantic love. Romantic love entails acute awareness of the extreme uniqueness of 
the other. Trying to flesh out this uniqueness into words we find ourselves at a loss. To make 
matters worse, it is with words that we attach to our deeds that we announce ourselves in the 
realm of human affairs. The all-pervasive presence of conversation, MacIntyre points out  
[as] a feature of the human world […] tends to escape philosophical attention […] 
Conversational behavior is not a special son or aspect of human behavior, even though 
the forms of language-using and of human life are such that the deeds of others speak 
for them as much as do their words. For that is possible only because they are the 
deeds of those who have words.57   
Yet, it is a basic feature of our understanding of a human life that our heroines, friends, 
colleagues and loved ones are unique. If conversation cannot capture, describe and or articulate a 
living person’s essence and conversation is the most crucial part of what we consider the 
quintessential form of human communication, how do we come to know each other in our 
uniqueness?  
Action has a revelatory character. Although most of the interaction between agents 
revolves around the objective world and/or deeds that relate to the objective world, what takes 
place as persons go about their cooperative projects is a disclosure of themselves as agents to 
each other through their cumulative intentions, words and deeds. This second-order residue 
organizes itself between people in a web-like structure: somewhat intangible and lacking one 
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center yet ubiquitous and all-encompassing. In it we are not only active contributors but also 
passive listeners, sufferers and spectators of occurrences. What makes certain actions eternal is 
the fact that they are memorable. Memory is in the hand of the spectator  
who complete the story in question, and they do so through thought, thought that follows 
upon the act. This is a completion that takes place through evoked memory, without 
which there is nothing to tell. It is not the actors, but the spectators, if they are capable of 
thought and memory, who turn the polis into an organization that is creative of memory 
and/or history/histories. 58  
The actual telling of a story is a continuation of a state of narrative saturation that we are thrown 
into.59 And it is in this ubiquitous web of tellers and listeners, actors and sufferers that we are 
revealed in our unique who-ness.  
“[T]he ‘web’ of human relationships”60 allows each person to have her own existential 
“finger-print”. From the synergetic dance of suffering and acting a story of an agent slowly 
emerges as she discloses herself in speech and deed while affecting uniquely the stories of those 
around her. This revelatory aspect of action is true for both fictional and lived protagonists. 
Dostoyevsky could have summed up the character of Raskolnikov in one sentence. “Raskolnikov 
was a confused young man that committed two murders for no apparent reason and regretted it 
very much”. We would have known very little about Raskolnikov as a unique who. It is through 
the accumulation of actions and sufferings, reactions and initiatives that one slowly gets an 
image of who someone was. So it is in lived-narratives. Only here the story congeals and breaks 
repeatedly reveling a complex who that is only at times a coherent character.   
Who is this who when the lived-narrative breaks? Can there be a protagonist without the 
unifying frame of a finished or at least a stable story?  
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The life of a fictional character is necessarily something that our lives are not, a given 
whole. However coherent or incoherent in everyday terms their lives may be represented 
as being, they have a special unity that no real life can have, that the end of them is 
present at their beginning. This peculiar unity of their lives cannot help us in trying to 
find coherence in our own. It is essential to fictional lives that their wholeness is always 
already there, and essential to ours that it is not.61 
Fictional characters, Williams points out, are not temporal. In that sense they do not have a 
future or a past but a represented future and past both of which exist before we started reading 
the story. This unity of fictional characters manufactures a style from which we can imagine 
them doing other things than they are represented as doing. But how do I go about living from 
moment to moment using this model? Williams insists we cannot for the lack of style which is 
the outcome of a unified, even if not coherent, whole. He admits that one could subtly or less 
subtly imitate the repertoire of fiction62 either while one lives her life or as one reflects on a life 
that have passed. Either that, says Williams, or the case is that we impose narrative and a 
character on otherwise naturally disordered events.  
This brings back the discussion of the status of narrative in the more specific context of 
the character. It points to the interesting subject of style.  Style according to Meriam-Webster 
dictionary is:  
a particular way in which something is done, created, or performed, a particular form or 
design of something, a way of behaving or of doing things.  
It is an excellent perspective on uniqueness and character fictional or lived.  It is not clear why 
style would emanate only from a given whole though. In life one can have a sense of style “so-
far” that one uses as a guideline. One can change styles or suddenly become aware of her style or 
sense of style. We can find ourselves say “this is not something that I would do”. “I do not want 
to be the kind of person that does that”. “I suddenly realized this was something I could do”. 
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“This is the kind of person I would like to be”. These are all considerations of style and they 
emanate from a certain sense of existing wholeness, but not necessarily a completed life. One’s 
style could be a result from many elements. Some children suddenly exhibit a sense of style that 
surprises adults around them. We develop style in a patchwork manner, by comparison, past 
experiences, sheer chance in the present and projections to the future.  We express uniqueness 
and stability, the two pillars of the who, through it. Fiction authors, much in the same way, might 
not know what the style of the character they are creating is and yet possibilities would present 
themselves. The style of the character will emerge as the book is being written. Not only after. It 
could be that a style of a character becomes very clear to an author before any writing takes place 
and it dictates the narrative weaved around her. Actresses sometimes try styles on a character and 
see what “fits”. They look for what feels right. They look for something that “clicks” and defines 
the character further than the text. They cannot choose just any style. A certain gamut is opened 
with every role. One tries them on and slowly a unique style emerges. Style, my point is, whether 
in fiction or life, whether written or preformed, is a matter of a process not of a complete whole. 
Williams is right to point out to the specific sense of style that emanates from complete wholes. 
After the fact one might find that a style that was not intended emerges. However, this does not 
exhausts the ways in which style affects the ways we act.  
Williams makes another point that if followed through seems to undermine his argument. 
He suggests that other people already lived lives look like narratives to us posthumously because 
imposing fictional narratives on natural disorder 
help[s] us make sense of some larger set of events, or [receive] reassurances that there 
can be some immanent meaning, if no more, in the totality of our variously improvised 
moves from one set of circumstances to the next.63  
                                                
63 Bernard Williams, “Life as Narrative” European Journal of Philosophy 17.2 2007, .313 
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This is reminiscent of the French Existentialists debate that was discussed above. It is pointing to 
the function of narrative as world creating and organizing. If humans have this capacity and need 
to apply a narrative perspective to already lived-lives, why can’t they do the same to their own 
lives as it proceeds? If humans make sense in this way of events looking at another life from the 
outside, why can they not do the same as they live their own? Finally, the epistemological sterile 
debate about noumena and things-themselves lurks at the backdrop of Williams’ observation. If 
narrative perspective is an aspect of human perspective – in what way is it fiction and not 
natural?  
[T]he idea of a ‘mere’ or ‘pure’ sequence of isolated events […] proves to be a fiction, in 
this case a theoretical fiction: perhaps we can conceive of it, but it is not real for our 
experience. As we encounter them, even at our most passive, events are charged with the 
significance they derive from our retentions and protentions’64 
The concept of a character is challenged in the arena of real lives. But it is, as Williams suggests, 
meaning giving. As we move from one step to the next in our lives, planning ahead again and 
again in accordance to all that we did not expect, is there a reason we should not use this 
meaning giving capacity in our considerations as co-authors/protagonists?  
I turn now to the divisions between character and plot of this chapter. The division is an 
abstraction for the purposes of discussion. While it is helpful it is important at this stage to point 
to the nuances it misses.  
What is character but the determination of incident? What is incident but the illustration 
of character? What is a picture or a novel that is not of character? What else do we seek 
in it and find in it? It is an incident for a woman to stand up with her hand resting on a 
table and look out at you in a certain way;65 
                                                
64 David Carr. “Narrative And The Real World: A Narrative for Continuity”, History and Theory,  
Vol. 25, No. 2 (May, 1986), p. 122 
65 Henry James. “The Art of Fiction” Longman's Magazine 4 (September 1884).  reprinted in Partial Portraits 
(Macmillan, 1888) 
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“Characters […] are themselves plots”66 and both advance in a dialectic of discordant 
concordance. The movement of all narratives synthesizes the heterogeneous in that it is defined 
both by the unity of the story and by the reversal of fortune that are perceived as threatening this 
unity. It transforms contingency into the necessity of narrative. For example, if I recount a day in 
which I had to catch a train in order to attend a wall-street job interview that has the potential of 
changing my life professionally and financially and as I go about my day I find a deserted dog 
and commit to saving her thus ruining my outfit and missing my train. At this point the encounter 
with the dog is contingent in the sense that it is ruining the expected course of action. Later on, 
the story goes, I discover that I much rather work at a dog shelter than be at wall-street.  The 
contingency, is transformed into narrative necessity which itself always implies narrative 
contingency.67 The relation of the character to the plot emerges from the fact that the character is 
the one acting/suffering in the narrative. The concordance and dis-concordance happen to her as 
a sufferer and emerge from her as an initiator. Character and plot proceed in a joint process of 
emplotment and identification creating a narrative that answers questions concerning both: what 
happen? To/by who? And why? The narrative constructs the character and vice versa.68 While 
this connectedness is true for fictional and lived-narratives, it echoes differently. In fiction we 
learn something about life from a complete action. An essence is attempting to communicate 
through characters. In lived-narratives the who takes the spotlight. Fleeting and unique it reveals 
                                                
66  Paul Ricoeur Oneself as Another. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 143 
67  Paul Ricoeur Oneself as Another. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) ,141-2 
68 Ricoeur goes on to inscribe this discordant concordance in the dialectic of sameness (idem) and selfhood (ipse).  
Between these two poles of permanence around which personal identity revolves dialectically fictional narratives 
experiment and expose the possibility of selfhood without the support of sameness. Very briefly sameness is 
understood to be based upon lasting dispositions. Namely it follows the Aristotelian description in the Nicomacean 
Ethics. Selfhood revolves around the identity when dispositions change, or disappear. Ricoeur find its core to be 
accountability. We expect one to keep her promises regardless of her change in dispositions. This brings to light a 
different sort of identity that is mostly coexistent with sameness however cannot be equated with it. Narrative 
identity, the identity that emerges from a narrative exposes the dialectic of character between selfhood and 
sameness. In different events their centrality or lack of thereof is exposed through the initiators and sufferers. Paul 
Ricoeur Oneself as Another, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 115-168 
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itself through the plot leaving its fingerprint in the public arena for other people to remember and 
know. Of course the story of one’s life is not a given.  The synergy of discordance and 
concordance is not just circumstance interrupting a flow. It can also be interpreted as a struggle 
for narrative. Authorship in a lived-narrative is driven not only by trying to fit events into an 
existing narrative but also in trying to figure out what the narrative is about.69   
IV. The 4th wall 
Catharsis, Aristotle’s famous term describing purgation by pity and fear via art comes 
from the Greek root Cathros, meaning, clean. Catharsis purifies through feelings of pity and fear 
emerging from art. This means that Catharsis purifies through feelings of pity and fear and the 
existence of a gap between the stage and the audience, the book and a reader, the painting and 
the observer. The gap between fiction and reality is firm. The actors on stage do not die. The 
characters in a book do not materialize in our reading space. We read the news and are horrified 
with the horrors we see. We go to the theater and we are fascinated with the horrors we see.  
Only in the latter the difficult feelings of fear and pity purify. In real life they taint. The gap 
between fiction and life allows us to plunge deepest to our fears and emerge purer than before. 
Even though “[c]athartic awe stops us in our tracks, throws us of the kilter, deworlds us”70. It is 
as the quote opening this chapter suggests, safe. This break between fiction and life also allows 
for a perspective that life does not. I hear a siren in Tel-Aviv and the fear for my life trumps all 
possibility of perspective. I must smother a deep sensation of fear if I am to not terrify the child 
and dog at my care. Pity, the ability to empathize with strangers, is also afforded by this gap. We 
need not protect ourselves and we can dive into the story and into the lives of others unafraid for 
ours. Unlike our own, we could always just leave them. Fiction allows us to examine our lives, 
                                                
69 David Carr, Time, Narrative and History, (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986), 90-99 
70 Richard Kearney, On Stories, (London: Routledge, 2002), 138 
48 
 
and others’, to truly fear, and truly feel pity, but from a distance and for a limited amount of 
time. After the book, the play, the movie, we slowly come back to lived-narratives from which 
we cannot escape and in which we are only co-authors, sometimes less than that.   
What makes Cathartic experience possible is a combination of deep involvement and a 
certain distance that cannot be done away with. This amalgam of being deeply captured and 
interested in and sympathetic to the fate a certain character on the one hand and being at a  safe 
de-worlded distance on the other endows us with an ability to observe a deeply troubling 
situations with vibrating clarity that life does not entertain.  
V. Truth / Referential Claims  
Chapter 3 will take on the topic of historical vs. fictional narratives as another perspective to 
define trigger-narratives from. Lived-narratives, in virtue of being a form of history, (e.g. family 
histories, personal histories etc.), share certain characteristics with history as an academic 
discipline.  
Both history and fiction refer to human action, although they do so on the basis of two 
different referential claims. […][H]istory may articulate its referential claim in 
compliance with rules of evidence common to the whole body of science. […] But the 
very meaning of this truth-claim is itself measured by the limiting network which rules 
the conventional descriptions of the world. This is why fictional narratives may assert a 
referential claim of another kind. […] This referential claim is nothing other than the 
claim to re-describe reality according to the symbolic structures of the fiction71. 
Unless they are a part of a written biography or autobiography, lived-narratives are not expected 
to obey the academic standards of rules of evidence. One would not normally ask a person telling 
her life story for more sources of verification, to inquire into their mediating factors and seek 
competing interpretations. One would expect her nonetheless to describe things that actually 
happened and could consider certain representations as a lie if they do not correspond to events 
                                                
71 Paul Ricoeur. “Can Fictional Narratives Be True?” Analecta Husserliana. Vol 14 p.11 
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that occurred. Lived-narratives obey a softer version of history’s rules of evidence and share with 
it “the limiting network which rules the conventional descriptions of the world”.  
Fiction, describing the world as well, is not expected to obey the historical rules of 
evidence. In fact, from the outset the assumption is that imagination is allowed to create things 
that did not come to pass while using or not using things that did. Poetic license is exactly this 
permit to play with reality and/or depart from it. However, matters of plausibility do figure in 
fictional narratives in relation to the truth claims they can and must make. First, since fiction 
attempts to re-describe the world, it can do so successfully or not. Cheap romantic novels, for 
example, might fail to capture the nuances and the universal dynamics of falling in love. They 
thus also fail to resonate deeply diachronically and universally as works of art.  Second, we could 
say that a novel is true-to-life in the sense that it describes certain events as they might have 
happened72 if they were real. One could leave a book or a theatre because the narrative presented 
became “untrue” and/or “unreal”. We could claim a narrative did not end in the right place. We 
can say it ended too soon or too late.73  Indeed, if fiction writers were free from in an absolute 
way, “how could we explain the anguish and suffering of artistic creation?”74 This “un-realness” 
is a truth-claim of another order. It does not refer to realism or soundness. Fantasy narratives 
could be assessed as “very real” or “very true”. The truth claims of fiction refer to an internal 
rhythm of the fictional narrative. Fisher calls it narrative probability.  
the hanging together of the story’s formal features. [Narrative probability is] the 
perspective through which we check if the story coheres and if it has contradictions75 
                                                
72 Carr, David. “Narrative and the real world: a narrative for continuity”, History and Theory,  
Vol. 25, No. 2 (May, 1986), pp. 117 
73 Noel Caroll, “Narrative Closure” 
74 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative III, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 192 
75 Walter Fisher, “The Narrative Paradigm: An Elaboration”, 349 
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The internal constraint on novelistic creation could even be said to be “more imperious [than the 
one imposed on historians] in that it does not coincide with the external constraint of 
documentary facts”.76 There are certain limits to every fictional world. These limits emerge as 
the story progresses and their aim is to create a “vision of the world that animates the narrative 
voice”.77 The characters in a story and the plot they create and emerge from, dictate a rhythm or 
a style (as Williams pointed out earlier in this discussion). This rhythm and/or style command a 
fictional arena in which the characters can act. It means that their “realness” is not necessarily 
supported by accuracy or even probability or likelihood.78 As the story progresses a fictional 
character acting in the arena can, for example, surprise or disappoint us. The ability of a fictional 
character to create such an effect on the reader is the outcome of a rhythm that was already 
created. One cannot be surprised in the first sentence of a narrative by the behavior of a fictional 
character. One could only be surprised by the plot after a certain “normalcy” was established. 
Something was expected and these expectations were not met. This amalgam brings us back to 
Ricoeur’s synthesis of the heterogeneous. The synthesis is rule governed. It has its own “limiting 
network which rules the conventional descriptions of the world”. Cross the limits and the 
fictional world will come crashing down in untruthfulness.   
 Fiction, then, exhibit two kinds of “truthfulness”: One is external and pertains to the 
success or failure of the narrative to re-describe the world we live in in the sense of mirroring 
some truth about life. The other is internal and pertains to the plausibility of the plot and 
characters within the world that was created. The two are related to one another. For example, if 
the story’s internal rhythm does not manage to stand and resonate there is a little chance that the 
                                                
76 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative III, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 191-2 
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external referential claim would be a successful one. An obvious example for that are soap 
operas. Soap operas extend their style and rhythm until they collapse in two manners: first, their 
characters go through repeated, extreme and finally unbelievable occurrences and relationships. 
They get married, they go through complicated operations, they find new members of family, 
they lose their memory, they regain their memory and then they do it all over again with new 
characters that were added to the plot. Second, the plot is not designed to have a climax and end. 
It has repeated and similar climaxes and the assumption is that it will not have an end before it 
looses its audience which usually takes years. Without unity of form and coherence of content 
such stories say very little about life. Their internal lack of truthfulness is translated to an 
external impossibility to say anything substantial about existence. If we look at this relation from 
the other way around a lack of external truthfulness will condemn a well-made story to a level of 
diminished cultural appreciation.  A story like Cinderella, which fails to capture something about 
feminine and masculine relationships, is destined to be a fairytale, a children’s story. This is not 
necessarily because its events are super-natural. Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings is quite super-
natural, as is Blade Runner and they are both considered to be an acute mirror of human 
existence. It is the ability of the story to reflect an essence of existence that later on can be 
translated into its higher or lower cultural resonance. Fictional narratives are an amalgam of 
unpredictability and teleology.79 They unpredictably and creatively operate in a delimited and 
structured arena.   
It would be inaccurate to leave the description at that without pointing to the overlap 
between fiction and lived-narrative in regards to truth claims. Every biography struggles with the 
border of documentation and fiction and every life is an autobiography in progress. To begin 
                                                
79 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1981),216 
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with, it is hard sometimes to discern a memory from imagination when a certain amount of time 
has passed. Additionally,  
up to a point, it is possible to tell several stories based on the same events (however we 
may then give meaning to the expression: the same events)80 
Every lived-narrative, describing a life, is part fiction and every fiction no matter how fantastic 
both attempts a truth about actual life and arises from a certain social, linguistic and historical 
context. If this discussion is sketching a dividing line, it is only in order to deepen our 
understanding of overlapping spaces and their full complexity.  
VI. Trigger-narratives 
The most interesting and volatile corollary of the above discussion refers us back to the 
quote opening the chapter. Trigger-narratives are very close formally to fictional narratives yet 
they lack a 4th wall and they have historical truth claims. On the one hand trigger-narratives have 
the coherence and unity of a fiction story and on the other they call us for real and immediate 
political action. They are an amalgam that is as irresistible as it is frightening. The real is rarely 
as clear as fiction and the fictional is forever close to us as participants. Trigger-narratives offer 
real life stories a part of which we can be, stories that are made of the clear and normative matter 
of legends and myths. This is why, as the opening quote of the chapter indicates, they are unsafe. 
They are an invitation to be a part of a story that, like fiction, is both fantastic and captures 
something essential about existence. We stand, similarly to protagonist in The Never Ending 
Story, 81 between the safety of the bystander/reader and the fantastic and alarming possibility of 
taking part.   
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 Out of the three formal featured discussed in this chapter (authorship, plot, character) the 
coherence of plot and character behave in the most distinct manner when figuring in trigger-
narratives. I will begin from them and then turn to the more complex matter of authorship. As we 
said coherence of fictive narratives answer two demands: unity of the plot in the sense of 
beginning and end point and the integrative content in the sense that it is following a complete 
action of a person. Lived-narratives, we concluded, declare their beginnings and endings and 
break in and out of integrated sequences in life. Trigger-narrative exhibit both demands of fiction 
coherence. If we look at the Bouazizi case we can see clearly that we have a beginning point. It 
is in a scene at the market place and his scale is being confiscated. If we want a beginning point 
with Leef we have her decision to erect a tent in Tel-Aviv and send a Facebook status. If we look 
at Rosa Parks, we can imagine her go on the bus and sit. Now, the point is not that these people 
didn’t exist until they materialized in what became their famous scenes. Fiction characters, more 
often than not, are considered to have a history that precedes them and, sometimes, proceeds 
after the written narratives have come to an end. The point is that like fiction characters, we lose 
contact with what came before and after the protagonists of trigger-narratives. These living 
persons, the protagonists of trigger-narrative, have a sort of last page as if they are characters in a 
book or a play. At that point in time their lived-narratives are told, arranged and function as 
fiction. For example, we may have a vague idea into what Leef’s, Parks’ and Bouazizi’s life 
were before that scene but this information is neither prevalent nor common knowledge. We 
have almost no information about what happened to them after. Two of the three persons 
survived their political action and continued their lives.  One of them (Leef), lives in the same 
city as me. If I wanted to find out what she did after the Social Justice Movement ended, I could. 
But if I asked the many people that joined her in the streets in the summer of 2011 – it is likely 
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that they would not know. It is not common knowledge. These persons take on the form of 
heroines in a story with a clear beginning and they end with the story’s end even if their lived-
narratives continue. In lived-narratives we break into and out of clearer and less clear narrative 
sequence, but we never leave the scene. This brings us to the next feature that marks the 
protagonists of trigger-narratives as fictional characters: the status of character.  
As we said lived narrative disclose a who. Fiction, on the other hand, discloses a 
universal about life using a who. The protagonist in trigger-narratives is not disclosed in her 
unique who-ness. Bouazizi’s real life story and Park’s real occupation are not a big part of what 
they are remembered for. Like Achilles their life story is condensed to one narrative reflecting an 
essence.  The democratic revolution in Tunisia and the civil rights movement is what stands out 
as the real hero of the story. The protagonists facilitate the communication of a perspective on 
life (e.g. values, political agency, courage, despair). Their status is the status of fictional 
characters not only in virtue of the fact that their stories have clear beginnings and endings but 
by the virtue of the fact that they are facilitators of a deeper essence and issue than themselves. 
They come, as fictional characters do, second place.    
We can now turn to the status of the author in trigger-narratives. The main protagonist of 
trigger-narratives is an interesting hybrid. On the one hand there is a clear agent who initiates an 
action and one could say that these persons are co-authors/protagonists of their lived-narratives. 
Yet, the extent to which the protagonist takes part in the way things evolve is so disproportionate 
to the outcome that the “co” becomes almost redundant. In the discussion concerning the 
coherence of the character (section III) we mentioned extreme circumstances such at the ones 
described in Viktor Frankl’s Man’s Search for Meaning as well as Camus’ perspective on 
Sisyphus.  We quoted Ricoeur in this context and said the “co” in these situations is limited to 
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the authorship of meaning. We give meaning to radical circumstances that are not in our control. 
This kind restricted authorship does not help us describe trigger-narratives. While Frankl as 
Sisyphus give personal meanings to a situation they did not initiate and do not control. The 
protagonists of trigger-narratives did initiate the situation. Moreover, whatever personal meaning 
these persons (Leef, Bouazizi, Parks) are giving to the enormous event that took place in their 
lives, these meanings are not a part the trigger-narrative. They might be an interesting subject to 
those writing their biographies and those who read them. But this authorship of meaning does not 
take part in the trigger-narrative itself.  We do not know what Leef thought or thinks about the 
movement her action created in view of her own life story. We have no idea what Parks thought 
and of course persons that do not survive the act are experiencing the end of their lives and not 
the narratives that their action triggers. The author of meaning in lived-narratives is the author 
that gives personal meaning to extreme events not in her control. The authors of trigger-
narratives voice the non-personal meaning of an action initiated by the protagonist.  
But who is this mysterious author? We already suggested that the personal story, i.e. the 
lived-narrative of the protagonist, is not part of the trigger-narrative. Trigger-narratives mainly 
communicate an essence and do not revolve around the disclosure of their protagonists as unique 
who-ness. But who does author these narratives if not the co-author/protagonist? Trigger-
narratives are well emploted - who gives them their form? Tradition, the known patterns of 
fiction and history, offer a plethora of forms to which we relate, from which we borrow, and 
against which we narrate. In our context it seems like great powers: the media, the audience, the 
participants, the social media is authoring the trigger-narrative as it goes. Some of the media 
might try to play-down an event and others to uphold the meaning of the event.  The people in 
the streets might “correct” this or that interpretation in protest and in producing more media 
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interpretations. For example, they might say that Leef is a rich person that got paid by tycoons to 
rather than a small simple person deciding to challenge the government. The protagonist backed 
with power from the street will oppose the narrative, through demonstrations, evidence and 
interviews. The media will then try another narrative which will correspond to events better etc. 
The author that emerges from this sequence of events is a combination of intertwined great 
forces that form the events into a narrative via a confrontation process of trial and error. The 
poetic license that the author of trigger-narrative assumes involves the “forgetting” that, 
Bouazizi’s mother vehemently declares he was not a political person or that Leef grew up in one 
of Israel’s most well to do suburbs. Or that Rosa Parks was an experienced activist. The public-
discourse-author narrating via the news, the social networks, pictures, awards and prizes, 
monuments and naming of squares “fictionalizes” these stories by reducing or better yet, honing 
them to a clear normative narrative.  
It is true that the author in the case of trigger-narratives is not completely a fiction author. 
First, it is involved in the situation. Second, it does not have the god-like perspective or a free-
hand at carving the event to her desire. Third, the author shares the same temporality of the story 
and finally, the protagonist does have a say. The first three objections stand. What is important to 
note is that even if the trigger-narrative author does not parallel fiction authorship completely, it 
is still closer to it that to lived-narratives. The who comes second after the essential plot. The 
protagonist is not the author and finally the author ‘leaves’ the creation when it is done. Whoever 
the author is and the extent which it is saturated in the time of the story, it is an author that 
disappears with the end of the story as a fiction author would. The last objection concerning the 
involvement of the protagonist in the authorship, we must remember that fiction characters ‘have 
a say’ as well. In virtue of the style of the character and the rhythm of the plot, several ways to 
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advance the narrative exist, but they are all limited by a style the character dictates. If Leef 
touches upon the hearts of the masses, than stories about her tycoon connection will not hold 
water. In the same way attributing greed to Robin-Hood would destroy the story as we know it.  
Formally then, trigger-narrative exhibit the characteristics of fiction. But in their relation 
to their readers/audience these narratives refuse the first iron rule of fiction: they not only allow 
but invite the audience to join in. The 4th wall, the imperviousness of the fictional, is our license 
to join-in emotionally in fictional narratives. The fact that fiction lets us entertain a possible 
world without risking the existing world acts as a safety net, an anchor, a shield. We can be 
brave under their protection. But where are we at if the fictional enchantment from a story 
suddenly invites us to take part in the real? Once again one cannot stop turning the pages and at 
the same time wishing to shut the book closed for fear of what is to come and become of her. If 
the hero who ignites the possibility of a change has an “essential identity” emerging from 
similarly “essential” narrative, then suddenly we are all part of the fantasy. We all have a part. 
We can all be heroes and goddesses and the future of the world as its form lies in our hands. If 
indeed we summon the courage to join the narrative and not shut the book closed than enchanted 
with our heroines we jump-in to become heroines ourselves, to help them and become their fate 
or deus-ex-machina, or to avenge them and guard the world they sought, promised and helped us 
imagine possible.  
 Although trigger-narrative assumes the coherence and character status typical to fictional 
narratives, they do not allow for the experience of Catharsis. Catharsis – the process of 
purgation by fear and pity is facilitated by the gap between fiction and reality. Trigger-narratives 
do not have such gap. One is not a free theater spectator because the option of joining-in is very 
tangible. With that condemnation to choose, καθαρός, literally being clean or purged is 
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impossible. A sense of exhilaration does accompany these processes in a very clear manner.  
What the spectator is going through in these cases is not a catharsis but rather a very different 
kind of involvement. The enchantment with the hero persists as in theater; we are taken by the 
story feeling pity and fear. Yet we are not purged but burdened by this experience. We are a part 
of the picture and it is up to us to decide which part. We are burdened with co-
authorship/protagonist role. Our agency, in other words, is being tested. Are we on the part of the 
forces aiding our heroine? Or are we on the side that by action or inaction disrupts her path? 
Deprives her from the world she deems worthy? And leave her to face her calamity alone. Will 
Bouazizi’s sacrifice go unnoticed? Will Leef disappear and be remembered as the strange lady 
from the towns square or our national heroine? Would Parks refusal be just another humiliating 
moment for a woman under segregating rule? 
This call on agency is more acute than usual because of the specific form of the truth 
claims of trigger-narratives. The aim is, on the one hand, completely fantastic. An “edited” and 
well-made story is offering an opportunity to join in and drastically change the way the world 
around us works. It is the sort of offers characters in fantastic stories get: A massive change and 
a new order are propounded implicitly or explicitly. On the other hand there is complete claim 
for soundness. There is nothing of the fantasy in these fantastic offers. The aim is to change the 
world here and now. Trigger-narratives offer both the escapist utopian thrill and the promise of a 
changed reality. We can be the helper of the protagonist and take the story to its unbelievable 
happy ending. This is not a purifying experience. Rather than catharsis upheld by a gap that 
facilitates a certain detachments, trigger-narratives are an invitation for rising-up. Rather than 
καθαρός, clean, the noun appropriate is ενεργός, active. Rather than the process of catharsis, 
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purification via art, what comes to pass is the process of energasis, the process of becoming 
publicly active via politics.            
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 Chapter Two: Lived and Historical Narratives 
What is between a lived-narrative and a historical account? Are they the same thing in 
different levels of intensity? Are they two different kinds of narratives? What is the importance 
of a lived-narrative to a historical account and what is the significance of history to the 
individual? Trigger-narratives tell the story of one person in the midst of a great historical 
transformation. How are they situated between the two? The last chapter positioned trigger-
narratives in an overlapping space between fiction and lived-narratives. Trigger-narratives, we 
said, exhibit two characteristics that are closer to fiction than life: coherence of plot and status of 
character. They are similar to lived-narratives in the option of participation. Our conclusion was 
that trigger-narratives force and allure emerges from this amalgamation. They evoke the 
enchantment of fiction and release it in the field of possible action, novelty and change. The next 
step in defining trigger-narratives will narrow the gamut that stretches between lived-narratives 
and fiction. This honing brings to the fore two relationships: first the relationship between lived-
narratives and history which is the topic of this chapter and second, the relationship between 
history and fiction, which will be the topic of the next.  
Although it seems almost obvious that trigger-narratives play on the gamut that stretches 
between lived-narratives and history, the aim of this chapter is not to position trigger-narrative 
between them but rather to eliminate this space as a conceptual arena from which trigger-
narratives emerge and in which they have an effect. One could wonder why discuss this 
conceptual arena only to eliminate it. First, this specific arena seems almost natural to trigger-
narrative and an opposite claim warrants an explanation. Second, the relations between lived-
narratives, fiction, history and trigger-narrative are complex. The four categories overlap, join, 
intersect and share several characteristics. The bracketing of the space between history and 
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fiction, which will be the next step of the argument, will not be full and exhaustive if it failed to 
account for the forces that define the wider field in which this bracketed segment operates. Nor 
will such a description be able to stand the dynamics of the complex and multilayered arena in 
which events and/or narratives synergistically interact, emerge and disappear. Locating trigger-
narratives on the section of an abstracted linear line stretching from lived-narratives through 
history and culminating in fictional narratives is a helpful way to define them as a starting point. 
However, since this is a mere abstraction for the sake of definitions and clarifications it must be 
qualified and contextualized. If such a description is done against an elaboration of the network 
and the overlapping connections in which this linear line functions, the abstraction is less 
deceiving and can be  seen for what it is: an introductory aid describing one important and 
pivotal relation in an arena in which several such relations take place simultaneously.  
I. Truth  
Lived-narratives and history, as was noted in the last chapter, are next of kin. A lived-
narrative is a form of history. They are both grounded in “the desire for faithfulness”82 to the 
past. This desire to faithfulness entails similar dependency on memory, testimony and relics 
which in turn gives rise to procedures of search, narration and verification. The procedural aspect 
is clearly more formal and rigid in the case of history. But the difference between the two is not 
only a quantitative matter of intensity degrees. History and lived-narratives have two different 
objects that they desire to portray truthfully.  The underlying appeal of the testimonies at the core 
of both narratives is “I was there”, “believe me” and “if you don’t believe me ask others”.83 The 
status of testimonies and the status of the person who is testifying are different.  
                                                
82 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting. (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992), 58 
83 Ibid., 164-5  
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Historical accounts are arguably not primarily or directly about individual’s experience, 
actions and lives but only incidentally84   
In history the individual, who is considered the protagonist in lived-narratives, assumes the status 
of a witness whose testimony will be a part of a bigger story and whose heroine, in most cases, is 
not the witness. This difference stems from two senses of faithfulness to the past. In the case of 
lived-narratives but not in the case of history the faithfulness is to the understanding, recognition 
and comprehension of the particular who. The object of history, on the other hand, is the past. 
This object is more obscure than the object of lived-narratives for several reasons. First, we all 
know people and at some point in our lives want to know more people. Lacking this need to 
socialize to a substantial degree is usually a cause for some kind of medical concern. Lacking it 
to a less substantial degree is likely to cause social concern and curiosity. The past and history 
stand in a less obvious existential position. We do not call the doctor when someone does not 
know or care about history. Certain circles might look down on such a person but it is not a cause 
for social and definitely not medical concern. History, as we see it in everyday life, is not a part 
of existence in the same way other people are. It would be, however, far-fetched to claim that the 
practice of history is disconnected from individuality only because its aim is not an 
understanding of the individual. After all historians and those who read their work are all 
individuals and it is far from a rare profession or an infrequent topic of conversation. The past, 
even if it is non-personal, is socially significant to individuals.85  Why is it socially significant? 
Who or what is it that we are looking for in the case of history?   
 One possible answer is that in the case of history we are not seeking to understand others 
but ourselves, our present situation and options. History, thus understood, is a form of 
contextualizing and a wider perspective on the state of things. The desire for faithfulness to the 
                                                
84 David Carr, Time, Narrative and History, (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986), 100 
85 Ibid., 102 
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past, according to this reading, is a form of self-comprehension via comparison. It puts our 
current social practices in conjunction with other possibilities and grounds our ability to evaluate, 
judge and compare our world to other worlds. History, Ricoeur points out, exposes the 
potentiality of the present. It offers ‘imaginative variations’86 that challenge and echo the present. 
It opens the actual to the possible.  Unlike Aristotle who propounds poetry as describing “things 
that may be”, and history as “things that came to pass”,87 Ricoeur points out that the events of the 
past still stand as present challenges, warnings and guides to the existing. We both hope and fear 
repetition in history: Events of the past act both examples that we want to strive to and 
cautionary tales we want to avoid. Furthermore, this depiction of history suggests history could 
offer a form of universal ought and guidelines. It is not necessarily as Aristotle claims that 
“poetry tends to express the universal, history the particular”88. History’s particular descriptions 
could, for example, come with implied forms of the Good, the Evil, and the Just and act in the 
present as a moral and a goal.  
A corollary of these functions of self-understanding via comparison and examples is at 
the heart of history as an academic discipline with a quest for truth. The end of the 19th century 
was marked by the emerging understanding that the epistemological procedure through which 
the truth about the past could emerge does not present itself in a clear cut manner. Unlike the 
physical sciences, “no single linguistic protocol succeeded in carrying the day among the 
historians (or the social sciences in general)”.89 Rather several adequate and different ways of 
viewing history competed succeeded and failed in different audiences.  
                                                
86 Paul Ricoeur. “Can Fictional Narratives Be True?” Analecta Husserliana. Vol 14 ,16 
87 Aristotle, Poetics. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2006), 1451b5-7 
88 Ibid., 1451b5-7 
89 Hyden White. Metahistory.  (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins UP, 1973), 429 
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What was at issue throughout the nineteenth century, in history as in both art and the 
social sciences, was the form that a genuinely ‘realistic representation of historical 
reality’ ought to take.90  
The conclusion of this observation culminates with White’s assertion that the choice between the 
different forms of historical truth seeking procedures is not and cannot be scientific since they 
each provide a closed formal system that makes sense within itself. The reasons behind the 
choice of one way to analyze data reliably rather than the other could be either moral or 
aesthetic.91 To these we could add habit, fashion, career oriented reasons, financial interests and 
many other factors that are not guided by truth but by some sort of benefit. If one perspective is 
more prevalent, more easily funded and treated more seriously than others – one might adopt it 
simply because it is more advantageous.   
It is not only the choice between systems that is at the bottom line arbitrary. Within a 
certain interpretational systems several options offer themselves.  
In my view, no given theory of history is convincing or compelling to a given public 
solely on the basis of its adequacy as an ‘explanation’ of the ‘data’ contained in its 
narrative, because, in history, as in the social sciences in general, there is no way of pre-
establishing what will count as ‘datum’ and what would count as ‘theory’ by which to 
‘explain’ what the data ‘mean’.92 
“History”, in other words, “does not belong to the document but to the question posed by the 
historian”.93 The historian chooses that which is worth preserving in her eyes and this decision is 
never simply factual or objective. It is always a part of a set of cultural habits and biases as well 
                                                
90 Ibid.,432 
91 Ibid, 433 
92 Hyden White. Metahistory.  (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins UP, 1973), 429 
93 Ricoeur is arguing against the positivist hope that was invested at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of 
the 20th century in the document. The document is posed in Time and Narrative I as the opposition of the monument. 
The document unlike the monument is full of the promise of objectivity. However, Ricoeur points out in Time and 
Narrative II, “in every document there is a monument hiding” (118). The quote above (in the text) claims the same. 
In the final analysis we cannot get a truly objective account in the sense of the positivist perspective. Every historian 
deciding to take on a historical research comes already and necessarily with a set of implicit and explicit axioms and 
choices.  
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as interests and circumstances. Furthermore, history and historians belong for the most part to 
institutions: Archives, for example, are the products of institutions. The institution decides to 
conserve, and gather documentation on a certain topic for the sake of history.94  They also decide 
which historian is getting which and how much funding. Data lends itself to several narratives. 
Even the choice of questions, topics and evaluation means dictate a certain story among several 
that are possible. White is using history in order to challenge the hegemony of a certain 
prevailing practice. Our object is the process through which this prevailing practice came into 
being. This process of attempting to challenge the present with other options that were prevalent 
in the past is an attempt to reach a procedural Archimedean point of certainty in the absence of 
an actual one. The present is viewed through a wider perspective that either demystifies it or 
affirms its superiority. Of course, this procedural vantage point suffers from all the biases any 
historical research would. To begin with, it is sought in order answer a question already posed by 
a certain historian.95  
Husserl’s development of historicity is a mirror image of White’s.  Husserl seeks to 
couch the endeavor of philosophical truth-seeking, in the pre-given world it emerges from in 
order to avoid the problem of competing systems and interpretations.   
What is clearly necessary (what else could be of help here?) is that we reflect back, in a 
thorough historical and critical  fashion, in order to provide before all decisions, for 
radical self-understanding: we must inquire back into what was always sought in 
philosophy, what was continuously sought by all the philosophers and philosophies that 
have communicated with one another historically; but this must include a critical 
                                                
94 Ricoeur Time an Narrative III, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 118 
95 The subject of fiction, history and narrative will be properly addressed in the next chapter.  
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consideration of what, in respect to the goals and methods [of philosophy] is ultimate, 
original and genuine one which once seen, apodictically conquer the will.96 
History once again is used in order to better understand, inspire and control the present. As 
individuals we inherit certain perspectives “questions, goals, concepts and methods”97 that we 
needlessly take for granted.  Through history we could, Husserl hopes, not only free ourselves 
and reexamine our point of departure but also determine the best way to proceed 
methodologically.   
The meaning of documented and researched history is wider than the theoretical need for 
at least a relative point of certainty. Through the work of or predecessors we also further our 
knowledge. Scientists will avoid answering medical questions that already been answered. They 
are taught and will try to use unfinished projects of others and build upon them. We also make 
sure that we document new discoveries and keep them both safe and for the most part available. 
We do not only use history in the present. We prepare ourselves to become other people’s 
history. This activity, the activity of building on the projects of others and documenting our own 
for those who will come after us, touches upon a deeper constitutive and existential current of the 
status of history in individual lives.   
Humans organize themselves and their scientific and otherwise endeavors in relation to 
the past and the future. They do so in their daily lives but they also do so in a generational 
manner. As McIntyre’s story-telling animal for example, we are dependent on the concept of 
setting.  In order for an action or an intention to be intelligible to the agent and others, it must be 
a part of a setting.  
It is central to the notion of a setting […] that [it] has a history, a history within which the 
histories of individual agents not only are, but have to be, situated, just because without 
                                                
96 Edmund Husserl. The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1954/1970)., 17-8 
97 David Carr, Time, Narrative and History, (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986),106 
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the setting and its changes through time the history of the individual agent and his 
changes through time will be unintelligible.98  
The cohesion of a life as a story, the meaning of the actions acted, described and intended only 
make sense in a multilayered historical setting in which both personal and non-personal socio-
historical narratives play a part. A person marching with a Palestinian flag in August 2014 in 
West Jerusalem is a life–risking rebel. She maybe even considered suicidal. The same action in 
Ramallah, some 20 minutes away, is unlikely to draw significant attention. This difference owes 
itself to the ’67 war as it owes itself to the Gaza war in the summer of 2013. We are embedded in 
stories through which our actions gain meaning. Furthermore, history  
can be seen as contributing essentially to the sense, for the individual, not only for what 
he or she is doing but even more strongly of what the individual is.99  
This historical horizon could be distinct or vague, it could be opposed or continued – but it could 
not be shaken off. A Palestinian has a story she is born into as does an Israeli. What we do and 
who we are, is always also in relation to that story. Even if at times history’s role in our current 
project is less explicit - we are historical as we are social. 
Heidegger’s account of historicity elaborates on this essential status of history we relate 
to at the beginning of this section while diminishing the status of it as a profession. Heidegger’s 
concept of historizing emerges from the way in which Dasein maintains itself in self-constancy 
and clarity of vision as it stretches along between its birth and death. He names this stretching 
along the “connectedness of life” [zusammenhang des Lebens]100. It is a primordial integrating 
structure that links past, present and future for the individual. As we confront our finitude, our 
temporality becomes clearer and more tangible; the science of history is an outcome of this 
temporal dynamics in the existence of Dasein. Dasein is not temporal because it stands in history 
                                                
98 McIntyre, After Virtue 207-8 
99 David Carr, Time, Narrative and History, (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986),115 
100 Heidegger, Being and Time, (London : SCM Press, 1962), 425-8 
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but the other way around: It exists historically (authentically or not) because it is a temporal 
being. This in turn means that “seeking and acquiring knowledge of the past is only one way and 
by no means the only way of being historical in Heidegger’s sense”.101 Heidegger offers a critical 
reading of historiology as we know it today. The science of history, Heidegger argues, assumes a 
need to connect a subject to an object, in this case the history of the world around Dasein. It 
gathers and documents while forgetting that Dasein is a being who is in-the-world and for whom, 
everything, even nature, is historical.102 Historiology then is based in inauthentic historicality 
because it assumes a severed existence that is cut off from its past.   
Everyday Dasein has been dispressed […] if it wants to come to itself, it must first pull 
itself together [zusammenholen] from the dispersion and disconnectedness of the very 
things that have ‘come to pass’103  
Several questions arise with this description. Most importantly we might want to know 
what should be the status of gathering and documenting? And if this practice is inauthentic how 
do we learn and connect to the past? Heidegger refuses the predicate “past” to Da-sein. Instead 
he makes a distinction between past (Vergagen) and having-been-there (da-gewesen) attributing 
only the latter to Dasein. The point is that even when Dasein no longer exists, its inexistence is 
not the waning away of a demising object. It is a having-been-there of a specific way of being-in-
the-world concernful and in care toward the world and others. Ricoeur wonders what this 
dichotomy between past and having-been-there truly mean. Is it not the case, he asks, that we 
approach the having-been-there (da-gewesen) on the basis of remains from the past? Is not the 
whole of our ability to know something and relate to the past, in the final account, based on the 
historian’s practice? In fact, if Heidegger refuses to consider methodological problems, how can 
we arbitrate between conflicting interpretations? And how do we connect between the intimate 
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time of Dasein and the “vulgar time of everyday which the natural formalize and employ for 
calculation?”104 History, says Ricoeur, should be looked at as a creation that emerges from the 
“interweaving of the phenomenological perspective and the cosmic perspective on time”.105 The 
former perspective is constructed on the fact of our finality to which Heidegger adheres. The 
latter is an eternal passing in which humans appear and disappear. In between historical time is 
constituted via three connectors: (a) the calendar, (b) the sequence of generations and (c) the 
trace106 “through which we join not only our predecessors, contemporaries and successors but 
also the universe and cosmological time”.107 These connectors of course necessitate human 
systematic and diligent activities. Humans create the calendars, and maintain them through 
repetitive activities and documentation. They do the same with genealogies. They search for 
relics, analyze them, write, compare, comment and store. Furthering knowledge, ordering it for 
others, trying to keep it as accurate as possible – is a way of maintaining history. In other words, 
our existence finds the connection between its phenomenological present and future to the past 
through things left behind by creatures like us that died.108 Arendt who addresses the reification 
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of the world in length as part of her distinction between work and labor, points to the socio-
historical importance of the fruits of productive labor in the present and the past.  
It is the mark of all laboring that it leaves nothing behind, that the results of its effort is 
almost as quickly consumed as the effort it spent. And yet this efforts despite its futility, 
is born of great urgency and motivated by a more powerful drive than anything else, 
because life itself depends on it109  
Work, on the contrary, is marked by the fact that it “adds new objects to the human artifice”110. 
This difference has a twofold relevant sociological and historical significance. First, it gives rise 
to the “familiarity of the world, its costumes and habits of intercourse between men and things as 
well as between men and men”111. Second, it ensures the communication, durability and 
remembrance across generations of human action, speech and thought.   
In order to become worldly things that is deeds, facts and events and patterns of thoughts 
and ideas, [human action, speech and thought] must be first seen, heard and remembered 
and then transformed, reified as it were, into things – into sayings of poetry, the written 
page or printed book, into paintings or sculpture, into all sorts of records, documents and 
monuments […] Without remembrance and without the reification which remembrance 
needs for its own fulfillment […] the living activities of action, speech and thought would 
lose their reality at the end of each process and disappear as tough they never had been112  
113 
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Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace & Company. 1969), 51.  
Additionally in The Human Condition the productiveness of work could spin out of control and evolve into the 
opposite of durability. Consumer society is a society in which consumption of the product of work has become 
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The way to materialize this fundamental structure goes through the forming of calendars, the 
memory of genealogies and the quest after and analysis of traces. The science of history then, as 
a form of an elaborate self-comprehension, is deeply rooted in the currents of our temporality. 
Are lived-narratives different?  
 We can self-reflect and self-understand through lived-narratives like we can through 
history. We can be inspired by a lived-narrative. We can be moved to question our present by it. 
We could be motivated to think of truth differently because we hear a different interpretation to a 
familiar set of data or give new meanings to our own actions through the lived-narrative of the 
other. Additionally, like history, lived-narratives also answer to deep currents of our 
temporality.114 But at the center of all these possibilities stands the core of the lived-narrative 
which does not constitute the core of the historical narrative: an encounter.  History is faceless. 
At the heart of every lived-narrative there is a face.  
 What is it that we mean when we say history is faceless? Clearly history deals with 
persons and written by persons to other persons. How are such descriptions, writings and 
readings different from the lived-narrative encounter? In order to further our understanding of 
the fundamental difference between lived-narratives and history we will stretch a conceptual line 
between two kinds of philosophical accounts of encounter: Levinas’ face and Husserl’s concept 
of paring. Lived-narratives and history are situated in different positions of this conceptual line.  
 Levinas says that the encounter with the Other alone  
introduces a dimension of transcendence, and leads us to a relation totally different from 
experience in the sensible sense of the term, relative and egoist115 
                                                                                                                                                       
similar to the endless consumption of the fruits of labor: food. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 248-
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114 More about that in the next section of this chapter, “Death and Birth” 
115 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, (Pittsburg Pn: Duquesne UP: 1961), 193 
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Levinas is arguing against ego based phenomenology such as Husserl’s. Beyond the 
introspective analysis of vision and the logical deduction of the existence of the other from her 
similarity and difference to me, stands Levinas’ Other whose singularity and absolute alterity is 
revealed in speech. Levinas’ other “maintains a relation to me by discourse” breaking off the 
“solipsistic dialectic of consciousness”.116 She is not added to the body of knowledge stemming 
from the phenomenal cogito point of view. She is “the ab-solute exteriority which can present 
itself to the separate ego by the epiphany of the face”117. She is a window that maintains a 
relation to the ego via speech, a singular irreducible who.  
To manifest oneself as a face is to impose oneself above and beyond the manifested and 
purely phenomenal form […] the very straightforwardness of the face to face without the 
intermediary of any image, in one’s nudity118  
The encounter of the other is the imposition of the exteriority of the Face on interiority and 
economy of the Same. Husserl’s phenomenology, on the other hand, starts and remains in the 
interiority and economy of phenomenological consciousness. The cogito tries to win the 
existence of others and the world from and within its own domain. All objects have a necessary 
absent aspect. Consciousness is made up of the ability to “fill-in” the empty spaces via the 
process of appresentation. Husserl takes this mechanism further and describes encounters with 
others with the same dynamics. The primordial intentional structure from which Husserlian 
otherness emerges is that of anticipation. Appresentation is the ego’s expectancy of an object’s 
hidden facet by virtue of the facets it actually perceives. Proceeding from this primordial sphere 
of perceptive anticipation involves a number of levels. Since every objective description is 
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preceded by a “definition and articulation of the primordial sphere”119, this “immanent 
transcendence”120 gives rise to “secondary objective transcendence”121 of others, which emerges 
through a process that Husserl names “pairing”. Transcendental egos “pairs” (Paarung) similar 
but not identical intuitions the result of which is the experience of another transcendental ego. 
One recognizes that the body of the other is both similar and dissimilar to one’s own: its 
physicality and the way that it is animated are similar, however the other is by definition and 
always in the mode of There, while I am always in a Here mode; this experience of physical 
similarity on the one hand, and a there-ness that is essentially different from the here-ness of my 
own, on the other, results in an experience of another. One experiences another person as an 
ultimate lack: namely, the other is an initiator of anticipation that is not fulfilled in the present 
and that could never be fulfilled in the future. Much in the same way that objects are always 
absent pertaining to our limited and specific point of view, others are absent too. However, the 
experience of the other person differs from that of a physical inanimate object since no point of 
view could ever wholly penetrate and grasp the other person for me; I never experience directly 
another transcendental sphere but my own. I, consequently, derive, transfer122 and analogize123 
others from this discrepancy and on the basis of the structure of my primordial sphere.  
 Husserl makes clear that such an inference by analogy is not just a process of inference, 
but rather a direct instant grasping rooted in primordial experience of oneself which is available 
to us always. Still the disagreement about the nature of encounter between him and Levinas is 
clear. “Absolute versus relative otherness”124. Either others are a more complex form of 
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perception that are defined by being other than me. They are relative to who, what and how I 
am.125 Alternatively others are absolute alterity that cannot be subsumed by comparative or 
analogous perception.  
 It is clear that we at least also see others through regular perception that we use for 
objects. It is sadly clear we are very capable of treating others as things as well. It is possible and 
prevalent. It is also possible (and hopeful) that underlying this perceptual activity is a more 
primordial encounter of absolute alterity accompanied by a call upon our responsibility. It is 
even clearer that this is not a question that has a definite answer. What stands out in our context 
is two conceptual ways of looking at encounters. I do not want to claim that lived-narrative is 
what Levinas had in mind when he spoke of discourse. Or go into the detail of Husserl’s paring 
in the context of professional history. Such a discussion far exceeds the scope of this chapter and 
work. What Levinas’ face and Husserl’s paired other offer here is two different atmospheres and 
directions against which we can see the differences between lived-narrative and history more 
clearly. When a lived-narrative is told a person in its infinite uniqueness and fragility emerges. 
One can see a person every day in a work environment through one’s regular perception and 
never have a clue who that person is. A moment comes and she tells one of her possible lived-
narratives and what is disclosed and exposed in partial or fuller amount is a vulnerable who. 
Telling such a lived-narrative of a colleague to another without the permission of the person, for 
example, is likely carry a sense of betrayal. This is telling. The lived-narrative need not be 
                                                
125 Richard Kearney. Strangers, Gods and Monsters: Interpreting Otherness. (London, UK: Routledgem 2003), 19. 
Being troubled by the ethical question of the ability to tell the difference between a stranger and a monster Kearney 
offers a third way of interpreting otherness. In his diacritical hermeneutics Kearney suggests a third way between the 
romantic hermeneutics of the same and the radical hermeneutics of the other. At the heart of this reading of 
otherness is the concept of the carnal which eschews the binary we are demonstrating here with Husserl and 
Levinas.  
It is not knowledge, in the purely cognitive or theoretical attitude […] but it is some kind of savvy 
nonetheless. Sense as primal interpretation, reading between the lines of skin and flesh. (“What is 
Diacritical Hermeneutics?” Journal of Applied Hermeneutics, (2011), 1-14) 
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extreme or shameful for unauthorized sharing to be considered problematic. One could tell 
another that Sarit Larry used to be a religious Jew, a teaching Fellow at BC and an actress. None 
is a secret in the age of Google. My lived-narrative, however, by virtue of being the story of my 
life, my fingerprint, exposes me in my absolute singular vulnerable existence. Perception alone 
cannot bring about such an encounter. “The word”, as Levinas says, “is a window”.126 Of course 
perception is crucial. We learn a lot about people from the way they appear to us visually. 
Sometimes, as we hear a lived-narrative our amazement stems from the mere fact that we already 
told ourselves a completely different story about this person simply from the way they looked. 
The point is not that others are completely opaque until we hear their lived-narratives. They are 
clearly not. The point is that the peak of understanding who a person was or is, transpired in her 
lived-narrative.    
 Historians sit in archives and read testimonies of others. Alternatively, they look at relics 
to construct and conjure, to “fill-in” the missing gaps in the aim of producing a new body of 
knowledge. Is this an encounter with the absolute other? On the one hand we would like to say 
that it is because it involves a lived-narrative at least in the case of testimony. It is also “through 
some transfer from Same to Other, in empathy and imagination, that the Other that is foreign to 
me is brought closer”127.  One reads the story of a refugee in Smyrna and might have a clearer 
idea of her who. However, this possibility is incidental in the case of historical narratives: The 
aim of the historian’s narrative does not end with a single testimony. The testimony is one block 
in a bigger picture. This is true about relics as well. We might care to know about the who they 
belonged to but their historical value comes from a different place. “The specific character of the 
past which makes it something historical”, says Heidegger, 
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127 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative III, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 184 
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does not lie in […] transience which continues even during the Being-present-at-hand of 
the equipment in the museum […] What is ‘past’? Nothing else than that world within 
which they belonged to a context of equipment and were encountered as ready-at-hand 
and used by the concernful Dasein who was-in-the-world128.  
Historians are engaged in a search for a world not a face. Their entities are anonymous.129 
Testimonies and relics has a role of equipment even if they incidentally make one summon the 
possible who that they once were. History, as we said, is no doubt understood in relation to the 
individual in an essential way. However, the person whose testimony the historian reads, or 
whose pot is looked at, is an abstraction or a reified testimony. It is no longer the living story of 
an experience that is told so that a life could be known, or spared, or pitied. It is ossified into a 
building block in a description of or an argument about a world. This historical procedure begins 
with the lived memory, then communicated via testimony, goes through the archived document 
and reaches its “end” as a documentary proof for a certain depiction of evets.130  Such a process 
of translation entails a twofold transformation of loss. First, a historical “fact” supported by 
documentary evidence is a story uprooted from the continuity of the “conscious life of the 
witness”131 in a service of a certain question in the mind of the historian. Second, unlike the 
personal appropriation of a testimony given in ordinary conversation and in a certain time in a 
context of a life, the archived testimony belongs in the final account to no one, is addressed to 
whoever and could be looked for whenever. There is no sense of disclosure, exposure and trust. 
If we return briefly to the conceptual line that we stretched between Levinas’ and Husserl’s 
concept of encounter, the distinct procedures of verification that both lived and historical 
narratives necessitate become clearer. Historians are “Husserlians” method-wise. They “fill in” 
the gap in a process much like appresentation and the others in this process are of the same order 
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as other things. Lived-narratives are more “Levinasin” in nature. At the center of their depiction 
stands an Other in her fully fledged uniqueness and vulnerability. This other does not share the 
same status with other things in the world. It is assigned the most primordial status possible and 
it is assigned this status exclusively.  
The Husserlian and Levinasin tendencies of historical and lived-narrative respectively 
need not be taken too far. They are but general trajectories. Like history, lived-narratives have a 
structure and they are made out of details arranged in a certain sequence. Like history which 
moves further and further away “increasing [its] absence along the length of the memorial 
chain”132, lived -narratives battle against forgetting with relics and documents. This battle 
materializes in history as the ever developing practice of professional documentation. The fact 
that lived-narratives are not normally subject to such a process of verification is not to say that 
they are not subject to such a process at all. Although the truth that we are looking for is not a 
scientific truth about the structure and dynamics of a certain world but rather a revelatory truth of 
a singular person, it is still a certain kind of truth and it entails a certain kind of referential 
relationship to reality.  
The US press recently had a case of a lived-narrative that was challenged publically. It is 
worthwhile to look at our reaction to it as an example to the structures of our expectation with 
respect to lived-narratives procedure of verification. When Professor Rachel Dolezal’s lived-
narrative was substantially contradicted by relevant others, in this case her Caucasian biological 
parents who claimed she was falsely presenting herself as a biological African American, her 
lived-narrative as an African American woman was challenged on the basis of the rules of 
evidence. It was challenged to the extent she had to resign as head of Spokane National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (N.A.A.C.P) chapter. Shortly after her 
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78 
 
resignation Professor Rachel Dolezal claimed in an interview that her lived-narrative is true. She 
didn’t suggest that her biological parents lied.133 “Are you”, asked the interviewer, “an African 
American woman?” “I identify as black”, Professor Rachel Dolezal answered. “When did you 
start deceiving people and telling them you are black?” “Well” Professor Rachel Dolezal 
continues, “I do take exception to that [wording] […] It’s a little more complex than me 
identifying as black or answering a question are you black or white?” Professor Dolezal then 
shared her experience as a child drawing herself as an African American rather than Caucasian. 
On the one hand it is clear that evidence do play a role in the process of verification of a lived-
narrative. The story is interesting because the lived-narrative is factually contradicted or at least 
challenged. However, it is also clear that the evidence matter in a way that differs from how one 
would use it in following a story from the perspective of professional history. Nobody but 
Professor Rachel Dolezal will determine who she is. What we are seeking as she speaks is her 
story behind the interesting and contradictory sets of facts. The facts and her narration present us 
with a story: She identifies as black. She is biologically Caucasian. The process of verification in 
the case of lived-narratives is not so much a process that seeks to determine if Professor Rachel 
Dolezal is correct in her identification or biology. That would not make sense.  The facts align 
and organize into a process of clarification and the weight that is given to her experience, point 
of view and interpretation is much greater than the place any serious historian could ever give an 
object of examination. This distinct procedure of clarification is central to lived-narratives 
because their aim is not the aim of historians. It is the cohesion, coherence and outline of life 
path. Prof. Rachel Dolezal lost her job in what seems like a dispute about identity and 
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transparency. But the truthfulness of her experience is untouched by this professional judgement. 
If anything it makes one rethink her assumptions about racial identity.  
It is worthwhile to note that the processes of clarification and historical professional 
verification can be applied to the same narrative. If, for example, we read a lived-narrative of a 
person that passed, our approach to it, Husserlian or Levinasian, determines its character.  Oscar 
Wilde’s last years, for example, could either be looked at historically and reconstruct in detail the 
world in which homosexuality is a crime. Or it could be look at as a lived-narrative and portray 
Oscar Wilde as never before in his suffering and religious transformation. Such choice of 
approaches is also possible in the case of less dramatic stories. Every lived-narrative could be 
made into the building block of a world-constructing perspective. Every such world is built from 
the contents whos and at the expense of their particular visibility.  
Although the focus of lived and historical narrative is different and their claims for truth 
are different, their procedures have similar features: Like history lived-narratives can rely on 
testimonies, and non-testimonial evidence. Both kinds have a generational relation to what came 
before them and will remain after them. Relics and testimonies play a similar role in lived-
narratives. First, relics play a part in the narration of a lived-narrative of a person that has passed 
away. Second, within lived-narratives that are told by their protagonists, relics can bring to life 
and into narrative things from the past we forgot or repressed. For example, relics can help us 
verify claims. Show us where are memory betrayed us.  They can assist in supporting assertions 
and making them more tangible for the listener. Pictures, documents, cups, pots, a present we 
received, a note we wrote to someone else a long time ago - all the things that we suddenly re-
encounter as we move from one apartment to another or as we clean the house or renovate it, 
remind us of our own past and can have an effect on our lived-narratives. Such moments of 
80 
 
remembrance could challenge the present much in the way Ricoeur suggests history does. Relics 
can remind us of lost or achieved dreams, capabilities, fears, moments of courage or regret. In 
other words they can challenge or affirm the present.  
Lived-narratives, centered on the particularity of the person, are not an island. The stories 
we tell about ourselves are already embedded in a tradition that is cultural and linguistic. We 
emerge from and against it in both ways of generational communication. We receive the story of 
our belonging and we react to it. Being like our mothers, unlike them; like our sisters, unlike 
them; being like the former generation and unlike it. Among other things of our lived-narrative 
co-authorship we are seeking to make sure that our narrative will be right or better or good.  
Narrating means that we attempt to distill a form from the flow of events. Although one could 
make the point that lived experience and action are lacking the point of view of the reflective 
narrator what White would call the ironic narrator, even in the most basic and passive Husserlian 
phenomenological experience  
the present is not something to which we are confined in isolation from the future and the 
past […]the present is only possible for us if it is framed and set off against a retained 
past and protentially envisaged future 134  
All we need to do in order to feel this to be true in all of it palpability is think of persons 
that have a short-term memory loss. Their detached short-term memory makes their experience 
substantially different. Our lived narratives, our “faces”, endlessly unique as they are, are a part 
of a world. More often than not lives-narratives carry the hope that our life, unlike or like those 
before us or exactly like those before us. However, the world we are seeking in the case of lived-
narratives is not a world constructed around the question “what kind of a world was it?” rather it 
is a world constructed around the question “whose world was/is it?” or better yet “who was/is at 
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the center of this world?” It is a world put together, arranged and crystalized around a face. 
There is another crucial way in which lived-narratives are fundamentally different from history. 
“The brevity of human life” says Ricoeur, “stands out against the immensity of indefinite 
chronological time”.135 To this difference we turn now: The meaning and weight of birth and 
death in lived and historical narratives.   
 II. Death and Birth136 
Lived-narratives, we said break in and out of coherent and unified “slices of life” and 
declare their beginnings and endings. History books and oral accounts do the same. Their 
declarations are written and like lived-narratives they are a part of a larger chain of events that 
stays out of the story told. Yet, unlike lived-narratives that ultimately are stories with a radical 
beginnings of births and the final endings of deaths, history is the  
great story without beginning and end. […] History ultimately becomes the storybook of 
mankind, with many actors and speakers and yet without any tangible authors137.  
What is the meaning of birth and death in lived-narratives and what is the meaning of their 
particular absence in the case of history?138  The absence of death gives history a fantastic status 
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136 This part of the chapter is predominantly discussing the existential meaning and weight of the fact of death rather 
than birth. In that sense this subtitle could be deceiving. The reason for this dissonance between the title and the 
content of the next ten pages is twofold: first, birth is not an event in the past that we remember and thus can narrate. 
We are born into the stories of our births and they are many times part of our narratives but they are a part in which 
we cannot take an active part practically.  It is true that  
birth is not and never is something past in the sense of something no longer present-at-hand; and death 
is just as far from having the kind of Being of something still outstanding, not yet present-at-hand but 
coming along” Heidegger, Being and Time (London : SCM Press, 1962), 426  
However, even if I choose to tell the story of my life in relation to my birth, the actual story will begin with a later 
action and meaning this random fact had on my life as adult. Of course, most times we have no say in how and/or 
when our Death will happen.  However, unlike our birth it dictates anticipation and fear which in turn dictate a 
distinctly human attitude and rhythm. (The Greek gods for example are defined by the fact that they are immortal. 
This is enough to make them not human. The fact that they are being born does not make them less godly). Since 
this discussion centers on attitude and rhythm in lived narratives and history, Being-toward-death figures in it more 
dominantly. Second, I could not name this section simply “Death” since birth does play a part in the rhythm of a 
lived narrative. In fact Being-toward-death points to Being-toward-birth and includes a comprehensive point of view 
on one’s finitude. Being-toward-birth is addresses in footnotes throughout this section. 
137 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958),184. My emphasis.  
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of immortality. “[H]istory is the history of mortals. But death is also thereby superseded”.139 It is 
in the quest of immortality that humans enter the political. “The polis was supposed to multiply 
the occasion to win ‘immortal fame’”.140 We can see the same notion in Kant’s “Idea for a 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent” where the fulfillment of the human species could 
only achieve through a generational sequence and perspective. Yet, of course death cannot be 
ignored in history. The meaning of history revolved around the lives of mortals for whom the 
fact of death is of monumental importance.141 In fact, the very human desire to win immortal 
fame through action in history is the outcome and an indicator of the crucial role death plays in 
our lives.  
Let us outline the role the fact of death play in the case of lived-narrative and deduce the 
implications of its absence in the case of history. Heidegger describes the condition of Being-
toward-death as a primordial and essential ontological structure of Dasein.142 This means that 
even if Dasein never thought of death, it is still comported toward it. The self of everyday life, 
the they-self, gives approval to cover-up the true effect of Being-toward-death by tempting us 
toward tranquilization and evasion. Meaning we could possibly encounter the deaths of others 
but still manage to tranquilize the shocking effect of the certainty and unpredictability of the fact 
                                                                                                                                                       
138 Another question that obviously emerges from this distinction is: Can we speak of a story at all if a beginning and 
an end are lacking? This question will be central in Chapter Three which will look at the overlapping space between 
fiction and history. 
139 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative III, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 115 
140 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958),197 
141 Carr claims in this context that the actual fear of death, Being-toward-death is a part of communal existence as 
well. Every community, he claims, has to deal “not only with possible external threats of destruction but also with 
its own centrifugal tendency to fragment”. “Narrative and The Real World: A Narrative for Continuity”, History and 
Theory, 25. 2 (May, 1986), 117. In what follows it will become very clear that Being-toward-death is peculiarly 
individual in certain crucial respects. The fear of possible communal disintegration is different from the certain, 
absolute and necessary fact of one’s impending death.  
142 Heidegger speaks of the effects of the fact of birth as entailed by Being-toward-death. Death says Heidegger, is 
not the only end of life. Life has two ends.  
Only that entity which is 'between' birth and death presents the whole which we have been seeking. 
[…]Not only' has Being-towards-the~beginning remained unnoticed; but so too, and above all, has the 
way in which Dasein stretches along between birth and death. The 'connectedness of life', in which 
Dasein somehow maintains itself constancy Being and Time, (London : SCM Press, 1962), 425 
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of our own impending end. Since “proximally and for the most part the Self is lost in the “they’” 
(Das man),143 this sedated state is our most prevalent mode of existence. It is a state of fleeting 
from an anguishing but important and fecund primordial structure, of falling prey, to 
inauthenticity. The they is manifested in idle-talk which expresses  
the way things have been publically constituted […] does not permit the courage to have 
Angst about death144 
Authentic Being-toward-death, on the other hand, starts from being the opposite of the 
perspective of the they. Being-toward-death cannot evade, cover-up or participate in any other 
form of flight and reinterpretation the they might offer in order to avoid Angst. In fact it makes 
manifest Dasein’s power to wrench itself from the they. This in turn reveals both the lostness of 
the they-Self. It also brings to the fore the power of Dasein. In the face of its certain finitude 
Dasein’s potentiality and power are clearly manifested: Dasein can choose authenticity. Second, 
Being-toward-death is a possibility of Dasein’s Being. It is not a ready-at-hand or present-at-
hand encounter. Dasein is comported toward this “most extreme possibility of its existence”145 
not in a state of awaiting expectation (Erwarten) which is oriented to the actualization of the 
possibility of death. That would amount to leaning toward the actualization of for one’s own 
demise – a suicidal tendency and orientation. Being-toward-death as a possibility of Dasein is 
comported toward in anticipation (Vorlaufen). Anticipation which brings Dasein closest to the 
possibility of impossibility makes clear one’s “ownmost and uttermost potentiality for Being – 
that is to say, the possibility of authentic existence”.146This anticipation has four formal aspects 
all of which ground the finitude and mortality of Dasein as the horizon from which it receives it 
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146 Heidegger, Being and Time, (London : SCM Press, 1962),307 
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freedom to act and be whole. First, Being-toward-death is nonrelational. It belongs to Dasein in 
an undifferentiated way and grasps it as an individual. Second, Being-toward-death is not-to-be-
outstripped. It is imminent. It defines us as finite and in that allows us to grasp the “whole-
potentiality-for-Being”.147 In Being-toward-Death authentically we see the whole of Dasein in 
advance. Third, it is certain in a primordial sense which does not emerge from other cases of 
deaths encountered. It is a certainty that does not belong to the “order of degrees of evidence 
about things objectively present”148 but rather to what Carr calls “the intimate time of Dasein”149 
and finally it is indefinite. One does not know when this certain, not to be by passed, ownmost 
occurrence will take place. This closeness and certainty radically mixed with unpredictability 
translates into a constant threat which results in Angst.  
Authentic and inauthentic Being-toward-death have a great impact on one’s lived-
narrative. Lived-narratives, as broken and patchwork as they sometimes are, all have a unifying 
form that is radical and final: we become suddenly completely alive and at some point we 
absolutely stop being alive. This fact, and the evasion or angst that comes with it dictates a 
certain temporal structure that produces a rhythm of a life. One can decide to live very intensely 
so that one accomplishes all that she wished for. Alternatively, one could decide to get out of the 
rat-race and enjoy each moment as it comes with no plan to accomplish. Both options and the 
many shades of grey in between are a form of reaction to the certainty of one’s finality.150 And 
this kind of urgency and rhythm is absent from historical accounts. This is not to say urgency in 
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148 Heidegger, Being and Time, (London : SCM Press, 1962),244 
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general is absent but only that the urgency that emanates from the fact of one’s definite 
immanent and unexpected death is absent in historical accounts as a driving and central force. 
Albert Camus describes this particular absurd urgency in striking poetic precision: 
[For] two living persons the world gives the same amount of experiences. We must be 
aware of that. To feel your life and your rebellion, your freedom as much as you can 
means to live as much as you can […] the only obstacle […] is premature death151.  
 However, not all lived-narratives are told by their protagonists. Some lived-narratives are 
told about others while the person is alive and some after her passing. Such narratives that seek 
to encounter the who-ness of a person seem free from the urgency of Being-toward-death. In 
such cases it is not the narrator’s death that drives the story. Indeed the non-relational aspect of 
Being-toward-death  
reveals the fact that any being-together-with what is taken care of and any being-with the 
others fails when one own potentiality of being is at stake.152  
This statement is dramatic in the context of Being and Time since Heidegger describes human 
existence as essentially with others and ascribes plurality a primordial and intrinsic status of 
human existence. It is also dramatic in the context of this discussion because if indeed Being-
toward-death is an isolating form of Being that trumps Being-with, than history and lived-
narratives told by others are divided in an irreconcilable way from lived-narrative told by their 
protagonists. In this awakening, in a certain important and fundamental way, a person is alone. 
And it is thus only that person who is alone that could really tell her lived-narrative. The division 
with history seems fair enough. History is written by the many and it is not oriented by the 
experience of Being-toward-death. Yet the divide within the category of lived-narrative is more 
alarming. Are lived-narratives that are told by others a different kind of narrative? In the context 
of the current discussion it is important to answer this question if we want to fully understand the 
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nature of lived-narratives. Lived-narratives could be told from several different perspectives: 
divided broadly we have the possibility of either first or third person perspectives. The latter 
could be further divided to posthumous accounts or accounts that relate to a living person. This 
amounts to three formal cases of lived-narratives.153 The closest form of a lived-narrative a 
historical account is the posthumous biography.154  
What is it that makes a story a lived-narrative? Is it simply the aloneness of Being-
toward-death crystalized around a narrating protagonist? What is our relation in this context to 
others that narrate lives? What is the relation of Being-toward-death to such narration?  We 
already mentioned the tension in Being and Time between the amount to which other people are 
central to existence and the sense of aloneness that Being-toward-death brings about. In what 
follows we will use Heidegger’s Being-with and Being-toward-death as a perspective through 
which we untangle this relationship and clarify the nature of lived-narratives vis-à-vis their 
various possible narrators.  
 Heidegger’s Being-with is a part of a more basic and comprehensive understanding 
concerning Dasein: Being-in-the-world. “In clarifying Being-in-the-world”, Heidegger says, 
we have shown that the bare subject without a world never ‘is’ proximally, nor is it ever 
given. And so in the end an isolated ‘I’ without Others is just as far from being 
proximally given155  
Dasein as part as its Being-in-the-world, encounters other entities such as itself which are not 
thing-like and thus neither present-at-hand nor ready-at-hand. Dasein’s world, as a consequence, 
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widens with the introduction of other Daseins to contain yet another kind of entity and with it 
another way of Being. The distinction between the encounter of things and Daseins revolves 
around a new kind of Being-in which Heidegger in the context of Being-with is naming 
solicitude (Fürsorge). Heidegger then juxtaposes solicitude to concern (Besorgen) which is the 
parallel kind of Dasein’s Being-in towards non-Dasein-like entities.156 In the context of this 
chapter there is an existential difference between the historian perspective which makes a world 
from things and the lived-narrative narrator whose description of herself or encounter with 
another revolves around a particular who. Only the latter is based in solicitude. The former which 
is building a world in a process that reifies testimonies into relics, is of course not without a 
comportment of being-with. Being-with is a primordial way of existence. However, being-with is 
not the subject matter and/or the aim of the modern practice of history.157 This is exactly 
Heidegger’s complaint about history as a science. It starts from a divided position which misses 
the point. Dasein is in the world. We have already discussed in length the importance of the 
science of history and its dividedness in materializing and substantiating the Dasein’s historicity. 
Be that as it may, the product of this science, historical narratives, is indeed different from the 
more intimate historical narrative of a life.    
Heidegger goes about establishing his account of Being-with and offers three descriptive 
ways that point to the way Dasein is not. First, Being-with is explicitly not emerging from the 
self-other dichotomy. Dasein does not relate to others as those who are defined by not being her. 
                                                
156 Solicitude (Fürsorge), care (Sorge) and concern (Besorgen) are etymologically connected to each other in a 
manner wholly lost in translation. Yet, if we are to understand solicitude as juxtaposed to concern within the 
limitations of translation we can do so through the help of antonyms. Solicitude’s antonym is negligence. Concern’s 
antonym is closer to indifference. Solicitude as an essential existential of Dasein means that one could either be 
attentive or negligent towards another Dasein, but one can never be simply wholly indifferent to it in the way one 
can be toward things. 
157 Heidegger would object to this description on the ground an authentic version of historiology should emerge 
from Dasein’s primordial connectedness of life and being-in-the-world. It should not be the gathering of reified 
matter. History in this discussion- refers to the profession of history as it is practiced today. Namely the rebuilding 
of a world from gathered and organized reified testimonies and relics.  
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Rather, the others are to be understood as “those from whom, for the most part, one does not 
distinguish oneself – those among whom one is too”.158 Being-with is a mode of togetherness or 
sharing. “The world”,159 Heidegger says, “is always the one that I share with Others”160. Second, 
Being-with is not to be confused with empathy. Empathy is the result of Dasein’s Being-with, 
not a result of its own relation to itself (as Husserl might suggest) or a result of something 
external to it that disturbs or surprises its economy (as Levinas might suggest). In short, Dasein’s 
Being-towards-itself is not, according to Heidegger, the more primordial source of its Being-
towards-others. Rather “Being towards Others [is] an autonomous, irreducible relationship of 
Being” 161 which constitutes Dasein’s existence. Finally, Being-with is not contingent on ontic 
existence or communication with other Daseins. Rather it is an essential property of Being-in-
the-world and as such, even when alone, Dasein is oriented towards other Daseins in a mode of 
solicitude. When Dasein pass each other by they are oriented towards each other through the 
unique structure of Being-with. The mode of Being-with in unfriendly or what we might call 
“indifferent” is simply a deficient mode of solicitude.  
This brings us back to the relation between Being-toward-death and Being-with. 
Solicitude in its non-deficient mode could be either authentic or inauthentic. I.e. it can either 
relieve the other from the trouble of care by leaping-in162 (einspringen) in her place, or it can put 
the other in the proper relation to her own sense of care in leaping ahead (ihm vorausspringt). 
Solicitude in its positive mode either induces forgetfulness on the part of the other and, in that 
sense relief, or it bring forth awareness and in that sense authenticity. Heidegger’s concept of 
                                                
158 Heidegger, Being and Time, (London : SCM Press, 1962),154 
159 Heidegger gives four senses of the word world. Two of which he uses extensively: world without quotation 
marks designates “wherein a factical dasein as such can be said to ‘live’”’ world with quotation marks designates 
simply the totality of entities that can be present-at-hand (namely, not Dasein), 93 
160 Ibid.,155. My Italics. 
161 Ibid.,162   
162 Ibid., p.158 
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sharing between several Daseins is very far reaching: nothing less than Dasein’s own Being is to 
be receives from the other in authentic solicitude.  
[T]he Other leaps ahead (ihm vorausspringt) […] not in order to take away his ‘care’ (as 
the inauthentic solicitude would do s.l.) but rather to give it back to him authentically as 
such for the first time […] This kind of solicitude pertains essentially to authentic care 
[…] it helps the other to become transparent to himself in his care and to become free for 
it 163   
And here we return to the shocking effect of another’s death. One could receive her very 
ownmost from another Dasein and this within the economy of Being and Time directs us to 
Being-towards-death which pushed Dasein to hand itself down to itself. The height of Being-with 
then is the handing of the other to her death. Paradoxically we hand the Other to that which is 
un-sharable. My death indeed cannot be taken away from me in my singularity, but it can be 
given to me from another.  It could be handed to me. I could be awakened by another to the 
meaning of my Being. I can be directed towards it. Handing one to her own death is exactly the 
recognition of uniqueness that corresponds to this grasp on Being. One could even venture to 
say, that it is exactly our wish to become one with the other and the inability to do so that 
exemplifies the Being-with in all of its tension.  
Lived-narratives are always oriented toward death regardless of who the narrator is. The 
narrator of a lived-narrative is confronted with the kind of comportment that Being-with entails 
in a substantially more direct way than any historian. A person’s life and endeavor is to be 
described, arranged and contemplated. This could result in authentic or inauthentic solicitude. 
Either the description of another’s life relieves me from care or it brings me to contemplate my 
own Being-toward-death in an authentic way. But while history is concerned with the things that 
made the worlds, reifying testimonies in the service of larger descriptions and arguments, lived-
                                                
163 Ibid., 158-9 
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narratives in virtue of their who-oriented structure are never allowed to venture so far on the 
gamut that stretches between inauthentic and authentic being-with. They are at the heart of the 
encounter with the other in her singularity. This position also points to the fact that every lived-
narrative, be the narrator the protagonist or a stranger, is always moving to the rhythm of Being-
toward-death. First, the narrative itself, a narrative of a life dictated the necessary rhythm of 
Being-toward-death. If one told me a story of a life that did not end with the death of a person, I 
am likely to ask “and where is she now?” the lived-narrative only truly ends with death. If 
someone tells me a seventy years old woman it taking swimming lessons or a seven year old girl 
is doing the very same action, I hear different rhythms of life in these stories because I know 
being seven years old and being seventy years old are different positions vis-à-vis being-toward-
death. This might make these two actions resonate very differently. Second, since the narrator is 
necessarily also comported authentically or not towards death and authentically or not toward the 
other, she is either relieves of the feeling of Being-toward-death or confronting it. She cannot 
completely avoid it. The rhythm of a lived-narrative of a person is always one that responds to 
finitude. 
III. Trigger Narratives 
It seems clear that trigger-narratives are not lived-narratives. Trigger-narratives center on 
the protagonist in a very different manner than lives-narratives and their Being-toward-death 
urgency and rhythm is far from acute, fundamental or central. If we ask the educated reader to 
tell us what came to be of Leef, Parks or Bouzizi without going to Wikipedia first, chances are 
they would have little to no idea.  What do we know of Parks as a person? What do we know of 
her death? What do we know of her childhood? What do we know about Bouazizi? Do we know 
what Leef is doing these days? These lacunas are not accidental. The protagonist of a trigger-
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narrative serves a greater goal. Her particular whoness is not a big part of the story. We could 
open Wikipedia and find that Parks is a child for divorces parents and that her ancestry includes 
Irish decent. That already in 1944 she arranged a very large campaign of equal justice. We could 
find out many interesting details about Leef and Bouazizi as well and learn as we piece them 
together who they are or were respectively. The point is that all of that readily available 
information is not part of the trigger-narrative that we know. In fact the story works better 
without this personal information of a life. In the next chapter we will take this claim further to 
argue that this uprooted aspect of trigger-narratives from their lived contexts is indeed part of 
what makes them work. We prefer our trigger-narrative protagonists detached from their real life 
contexts.  
The rhythm of trigger-narratives, as a consequence, does not answer to the rhythm of 
finitude in the same way lived-narrative do. Unless the death of the protagonist of a trigger-
narrative was a part of the event that triggered social change, we are unlikely to know when and 
how they died. We are unlikely to know if their life projects aligned with their dreams and 
expectations. We are as unlikely to know whether or not the protagonist of trigger-narrative lived 
authentically free toward her death or not. None of the many details that make a story of a person 
a lived-narrative is a crucial part a trigger-narrative.   
Are trigger-narratives a form of history then? This is a complex answer and it will be 
addressed partly here and to a greater extent in the following chapter. Here we would just point 
that trigger-narrative are, to an extent, historical accounts. We are presented with a narrative that 
has a substantial effect on many lives and is documented formally. The events that we are 
discussing are mentioned in many historical courses, conferences and books in universities and 
colleges around the globe. However, two things stand out and differentiate them from what one 
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would normally expect from a historical account: first, trigger-narratives form quickly and 
spread widely. In their initial form they are far from systematic historical accounts. These are 
short stories that portray a weak protagonist acting spontaneously and bravely. It is in this form 
that they affect their surrounding so astonishingly and in this form that they enter history. The 
story could later be amended, corrected and described in the systematic historical way. Yet, this 
analysis would have to include the original version of the story which acted as a trigger and this 
fundamental kernel could not possibly be further away from a historical account. These are short, 
un-researched narratives that do not elaborate on their contexts or aim to adhere to any rules of 
academic evidence. They create a heroine that gives the feeling that she spontaneously sprang 
into action and changed the world. Second, this narrative kernel can be destroyed by the practice 
of history. History dismantles it. Learning Parks was an activist disappoints us. Most of the 
details that would put Leef and Bouazizi in context might disappoint us. The gamut that would 
leave the story as effective as it is in its original form is very narrow. Trigger-narratives portray 
non-powerful and uncalculated heroines that decided to do a deed against all odds and 
triumphed. Their fragility and courage is what calls on us to act. Their vulnerability in the face of 
greater powers enrages us, urges us to do something, pushes up to join. A simple person wakes 
up one day and decides to change the world. This person does not have any great powers behind 
her but she does not care. She goes out of the door of her house and to the street, the bus, the city 
square, against the prevailing order just the same. It is her lack of power and planning 
amalgamated with the danger and courage that makes the story alluring in the first place.  
Like with a fiction character, we get deeply entangled for a brief time with these 
protagonists. We suspend our disbelief. We suddenly care deeply about them. We worry for 
them. We identify and sympathize. Unlike real persons though this interest is short lived and 
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limited to a “slice of life”. They are context-less creatures that flicker, change the world and 
disappear.  We do not assume to truly know who they are or were and more often than not we 
forget about their endeavors once we reach the last page of “the story”.  
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Chapter Three: History and Fiction 
It is not completely accurate, as suggested in the last chapter that history is faceless. 
History has its heroines and heroes. It has its villains. True, the faces that history raises or 
condemns may appear in a manner that is different from the way that they would appear in their 
lived-narratives. History only deals with individuals to the extent that their actions were 
important for their society and/or significant to more global developments and processes. It is not 
concerned with the unique who-ness of its heroes and villains. When Ghandi, for example, writes 
his autobiography he starts it with his great grandfather and ends the book before he becomes 
Mahatma Ghandi. The story we all know of him as a historical figure, is not part of the story he 
tells of his life. Ghandi could have of course written an autobiography that illuminates his life in 
a manner that does include his time in India as Mahatma Ghandi. But even if a lived-narrative of 
a known historical figure does overlap greatly or even completely with their time as public 
figures – we, as readers, entertain two different perspectives when we address lived or historical 
narratives of individuals. The light illuminating the professional story of a public figure’s 
previous engagements, achievements and work is not the same as the light that looms from a 
narrative aiming to bring to the fore her lived-narrative. The latter is revolving around who she 
was the former around what she did in and for her community. No doubt in order to understand 
who a person is we many times recount what they did but the endeavors relevant to lived-
narratives are wider and the weight we are likely to give to the experience of the protagonist is 
substantially greater. It matters a lot to the lived-narrative of Bashar al-Assad, for example, that 
he planned to be an ophthalmologist and not the president of Syria. If we are interested in his 
lived-narrative, we might want to answer questions that refer to his feelings towards the turn of 
events that made him president. Was it a good thing for him? Did it frustrate his wishes to be a 
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doctor? Will he return to medicine after his career as the president of Syria? All of this matters 
little to his role as a historical figure. Be his personal feelings and aspirations as they may, in his 
time Syria violently fell apart. We might consider his wishes in order to account for his failing. 
Maybe he did not succeed as a president because he did not really want to be one. We might, in 
other words, use personal information to account for historical explanations. But we are unlikely 
to bring them up as ways to deeply comprehend Assad and who he is. Such information in any 
event would be anecdotal in any historical account.  If Ghandi would have said that his most 
important moment and turning point was some night in 1932 when he adopted a dog, it would 
not bear any significance to his status as one of the greatest historical leaders of civil 
disobedience and the liberator of India. A mentioning of such fact in a historical context might 
put the seriousness of the work, and the discerning skills of the writer in question. Lived and 
historical narratives of the same person are not only different in their perspectives, their span is 
different. A story of a lived-narrative is never fully told until death comes. This is not true of 
historical figures. We can hear a full story of a historical figure and death, assuming it took 
place, need not come up as an essential part of the story. It is only essential to historical accounts 
if the death occurs mid the public-career/action or has socio-political reasons. Finally, lived and 
historical accounts of the same person could be contradictory or stand in tension with one 
another. Not all conceptions of the historical character are indeed in complete congruence with 
the character’s actual lived experience, self-understanding and even ambitions.  
Saying all that and pointing to the fundamental difference between the narratives of 
historical figures and their possible lived-narratives, historical narratives are still many times the 
stories of those individuals that stepped into the public arena and made a difference. Even if their 
existential uniqueness is not the center of their public narrative, a part of it, is. This part renders 
96 
 
history more complex in comparison to trigger-narrative protagonists. History does crystalize 
around the faces of heroines and heroes, winners and losers, those who were tragically wrong in 
their prediction and those who in retrospect are viewed and judged as astonishingly clairvoyant. 
Every community knows the story of its heroines’ rising to power, of their great or deplorable, 
expected or unexpected, successful of failed attempts, deeds, initiations and effects. How, if at 
all, are the protagonists of trigger-narratives different from the many heroic faces that punctuate 
history? If as we said in Chapter One of this work trigger-narratives, as fiction, disclose a 
universal about life using a character, to what extent is that different from the stories of the faces 
of history? Is there a difference between a historical account centering on a character and the 
stories at the heart of our current discussion? Why, if at all, would Leef, Bouazizi, Parks and 
other similar characters merit their own term? 
I. Reading, Writing, (Narrative) Participating 
The Narrative Turn in the late 1960s marked the academic establishment of an alternative 
answer to the scientific desire in the field of history and other fields to describe the human world 
through law governed behavior similar to the way the natural sciences describe the behavior of 
non-human objects. This development owes itself to Dilthey’s project of systematizing the 
human sciences (Geisteswissenschafte) and differentiating them from the natural sciences 
(Naturwissenschaft). The differentiation hinges on the distinction between explanation 
(erklären), understanding (verstehen) and interpretation (auslegung), mutually exclusive 
processes and perspectives through which one can achieve scientific objectivity. Dilthey’s 
terminology defines explanation as a derivative of the natural sciences that was used mainly by 
positivist historians with aim of making history closer to the natural sciences. Interpretation, on 
the other hand, is defined as an operation that belongs to understanding. Understanding is the 
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process that describes other mental lives through the manifestations of their signs “in sensory 
events, gestures, words, and actions”164. Dilthey, who, treated history as a subdivision of 
psychology165 defines interpretation as an activity belonging to understanding which uses a 
particular such manifestation of the human mental life: “those residues of human reality 
preserved in written form”166. In fact, as Ricoeur points out, interpretation understood in 
Dilthey’s terms uses at least two manifestations of the human mental life: writing and reading.167 
Every writer aims at a reader. Every reader, reads a writer. Writing and reading are of a 
particular interest in our context because there are the main and most central rout of 
communication for both history and fiction. Before we answer the question comparing historical 
figures to the protagonists of trigger-narratives, we must answer a question concerning the 
difference in the modes of communication of trigger-narrative as oppose to history and fiction. 
Trigger-narratives revolve around actual political change, action and participation. How are 
narratives related to such political changes and how, more specifically, are trigger-narrative 
related? Trigger-narratives, as their name suggests, trigger (action via) narrative. The action at 
the center of which they stand, as the introduction to this work points out, is rapid and intense. 
Can we speak of narrative formation in such quick unwritten and unmolded transformations? If 
so, what is the nature of this dynamic? How does it allow for narrative formation? And how does 
the rapidly formed narrative operates as a trigger?      
Interpreting Dilthey’s concept of interpretation, Ricoeur offers dialectical relationship 
between explanation and interpretation. Ricoeur suggests the process of explanation is rooted in 
                                                
164 Wilhelm Dilthey. “The Rise of Hermeneutics”.  New Literary History: On Interpretation: 3.2 (Winter) 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1972), 231 
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166 Ibid.,  233 
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linguistics and not in the natural sciences. As a consequence explanation should not be seen as 
coming from an epistemological attitude which is essentially foreign to the human sciences and 
their texts. Rather explanation is simply a mode of internal structural analysis which in the case 
of written texts treats them as closed systems rather than referential creations aiming at an 
external world of objects and subjects.  
[I]t is always possible to abstract systems from processes and to relate these systems 
whether phonological, lexical, or syntactical-to units which are merely defined by the 
opposition with other units of the same system168  
We could analyze internally all symbolic systems and there is thus no need to insist on Dilthey’s 
dichotomy. The human and the natural sciences are separate in their expectation for different 
outcomes from their analytical processes. The former aims at educated probability and the 
outcomes of its logical procedures are never certain in the empirical sciences meaning of the 
term. It simply points to the more probable and plausible interpretation; the latter aims at 
certainty.169 But both kinds of sciences engage in processes explaining. The case of the text, by 
virtue of the separation between meaning (that the texts allows and invites) and intention (that 
the author might have had) facilitates according to Ricoeur a dialectic between explanation and 
interpretation. The two qualify one another. Since all texts are open to several readings and yet 
we would not want to claim all readings are plausible, a process of validation centered upon 
probability and plausibility could be applied to texts. Could communist manifesto be read and 
                                                
168 Paul Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text”. New Literary History,  5.1 
(Autumn,1973), 111 
169 MacIntyre defines the differences in generalization between the generalization of the social sciences and those of 
the natural sciences in three aspects: (1) the social sciences generalizations can exist with counter examples without 
being refuted by them; (2) the social sciences generalizations have no scope modifiers and universal qualifiers. 
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(Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1981), 88-106. If we apply this to Ricoeur’s point about the logic of 
probability in the interpretation of text then clearly we validate a certain interpretation but do not stand in a position 
of refutation of the other. It is more a competition of probability. We certainly cannot offer a rule that will be 
applicable to all texts or even more specifically to any text but the one we are analyzing at the moment.   
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understood as a recipe for pumpkin pie? Could it be applied of the suffragist feminist movement? 
“[T]he validation of an interpretation applied to [a text] may be said, with complete legitimacy, 
to give a scientific knowledge of the text”.170 Such validation process circumscribes a gamut or 
better yet an arena in which several plausible interpretations of text can compete, negotiate and 
influence each other. It additionally rejects unlikely interpretations.    
Changing the direction and advancing from explanation to understanding, all formal 
analysis without the final recourse to the wider possible meanings of the text as a referential 
piece is missing the essence of the activity of writing and reading altogether. Interpretation is a 
meaning giving process of many possible readers all of which fulfill the text in bringing it back 
to discourse. This point is crucial for the purpose of understanding narrative in the field of action. 
Ricoeur makes two opposing yet complementing moves in his analysis of explanation and 
understanding texts. On the one hand he recognizes that there is a suspense entailed by a text. If 
we compare reading and writing to a conversation, than textual narratives separate the 
interlocutors from one another: The writer does not have a reader in front of her when she writes 
and the reader does not take part in the process to writing. The two are eclipsed from one another 
as they are uprooted from the circumstantial world around them. The text in that sense and at that 
stage and moment is worldless. It is lacking the temporality of subjectivity, the temporality of 
otherness, and abstracted from being an event which could only transpire in a world amongst 
interlocuters.171  But here exactly lies the power of the text. A text can transcend and travel in 
time and space. It can be reactivated and enacted by its interpreters and explainers. The text is an 
invitation for a generational communal discourse as older interpretations meet new ones 
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opposing them, transforming them of adopting them anew. Reading the written is not just an 
abstraction, it is an act of “emancipation from the situational context, [thanks to which] discourse 
can develop nonostensive references which we called a ‘world’”.172 It is an invitation to action as 
the words of other times echo in the present, challenging it to change, disintegrate, mature or 
invent itself anew.  
 Ricouer’s text calls for action and communal discourse. The text is a reification of speech 
that is specifically not an ossification. It is not a thing that exists within life or outside of it. It is 
not a mere perspective through which we understand or mold the reality in which we acted 
already. Rather the text fulfills its potential when it configures and refigures in a spiral 
movement of abstraction and concretization, advancing away from the realm of action and then 
towards it. The text is at its most advanced stage when it mobilizes, challenges, enrages and 
ignites our imagination with the possibilities of other worlds.  Ricoeur formulates this action 
oriented aspect of texts in his cycle of mimesis. Narratives abstract and form a separated textual 
entity that could be considered and understood through the internal and worldless science of 
semiotics targeting only the internal laws of the text while in the next moment  
it is the task of hermeneutics […] to reconstruct the set of operations by which a work 
lifts itself above the opaque depths of living, acting and suffering, to be given by an 
author to readers who receive it and thereby change their acting173     
Texts according this reading are at the very heart of participation. The text’s physicality, 
mobility and wordllesness make it into a travelling kernel of discourse around which ripples and 
circles of interpretations undulate. But this reading of Ricoeur is specifically speaking of written 
historical and fictional texts. Even when Ricoeur applies this analysis of text to action, his object 
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of examination is the written document and/or record “rescuing” the action from its own fleeting 
nature.  
An action leaves a ‘trace’ it makes its ‘mark’ when it contributes to the emergence of 
such patterns which become the documents of human action.174   
This is of course true and it is a point Arendt makes from a different perspective when she speaks 
of the fleeting nature of action. 
Acting and speaking men need the help of homo-faber in his highest capacity. That is, 
the help of the artist, of poets and historiographers, of monuments builders or writers 
because without them the only product of their activity, the story they enact and tell, 
would not survive at all175 
Both Arendt and Ricoeur are speaking of events that have had the time to become the object of 
prolonged, organized and institutionalized analysis. Of course such an analysis does not simply 
record in the sense of supplying chronicles. Every account chooses the actions and battles it 
deems important. So the “rescuing” is far from an objective process and “rescue” might not be an 
illuminating enough word for the process of scribing.  But more importantly to our context, it is 
leaving out the status of impromptu oral narratives and shorter “texts” that are less organized or 
even stable as documents or monuments.176  How does the conceptualizing of the historical and 
fictional texts as a call for action apply to political action and participation before it had the 
chance to congeal into a well formed narrated manuscript?  
Carr suggests that actions, not necessarily political action, unfold in temporal phases that 
are conceptually, psychologically and physically inseparable. Additionally, these inseparable 
phases normally gravitate towards narrative form in their temporal development. Carr gives the 
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example of a tennis player aiming to hit a tennis ball describing the interdependent phases are 
specifically “not a series of sub-actions”.177 An action’s phases are future oriented, they aim at a 
goal. This, Carr admits, is reminiscent of Husserl’s description of time consciousness describing 
the temporality of action “not [as a] sequence but a configured sequence”178 in which every 
moment of the present is constituted by the past and the future.  Yet, he adds three caveats that 
differentiate the temporality of action from that of experience: first, the phenomenological view 
on experience is oriented more towards the passive observer than the active agent. Second, 
although the phenomenological perspective takes it departure point from the Cartesian cogito, 
Husserl’s phenomenological descriptions assumes the language and perception of a third person 
detached viewer. Action unfolds differently:  
When I am at the midst of it the future completion of my action is not something that I 
predict on the basis of available evidence, nor is it a mere expectation that springs to 
mind by habitual association. But even less is it a mere representation, the entertaining of 
a possibility. Terms like prediction and expectation at least convey the fact that we are 
‘ontologically committed’ to the occurrence of the future state, But they do not capture 
the obvious fact that this future occurrence is something that I effect.179  
As agents we aim to bring about the future. The future of action differs from the future of 
Heidegger’s Being-toward-Death, for example, because the coming about of the future of an 
action is exactly not a necessary fact of existence. The materialization of an action depends on us 
at least in part. The occupation of the horizon of the agent, regardless of the success or failure of 
her actions, is completely saturated in achieving the actions’ end. This brings us to the third 
difference Carr points to between his view and Husserl’s. The horizon of action is futuristic; its 
background is formed by the present and the past. Husserl’s phenomenology, on the other hand, 
emphasizes the present against the background of the past and the future. The inseparatebleness, 
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kernel-like form of the phases of the temporality of action is dependent on this futuristic 
orientation. An action starts by aiming at a goal and goes through phases all of which are 
involved with achieving it.  
 There is a difference between being in the midst of an action and describing it phase by 
phase and giving an account of an action that has already come to pass. The latter is the 
quintessential ironic position of the historian. The former is the quintessential position of the 
fiction writer. Any historical record (document or monument) is missing the temporality of “still-
unfolding”. A recorded action no longer aims anywhere; it documents past aiming.  A record 
only becomes an action when it is read to or by others in reference a new reality. In such 
occasions the text once again is unfolding in the present while gravitating to a specific yet 
unknown future. We might record, document and make this new reactivation of text into an new 
academic or fictional texts but once again historical documentation is Benjamin’s Angel of 
History: “his face is turned toward the past” propelled into the into the future “to which his back 
is turned”.180 A fiction writer however, plans for a specific future of the plot but is always to a 
certain extent uncertain how and if she will get there. We are bracketing the writers of tragedies 
in Ancient Greece reenacting myths the end of which is already known. We are speaking of the 
modern sense of authorship that is a synergy of planning and re-planning against a certain aim 
one starts with. The fiction writer is hanged in the midst with her characters. Weaving events as 
she is generating them she is advancing forward. The difference we are pointing to is equivalent 
to the difference between telling one’s own lived-narrative as oppose to narrating the life of a 
person that has already passed away. The temporality around trigger-narratives operates more 
                                                
180 Walter Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History” Iluminations. (NY: Shockem, 1968), 256-7 
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like fiction writing. A certain event, a short181 bundle of temporality containing a meaning, that 
already has come to pass, is released into the public arena like a text calling for action. In this 
sense it might seem that we have a historical glance since we are narrating something that has 
come to pass. But the initial story operates as an invitation to more phases that are still to come. 
It is calling for more of the narrative. We, the bystanders, are looking at it as potential 
participants and as authors as well. What story will it be? Is this the beginning of the democratic 
revolution of Tunisia? Is this the beginning of what will be known as the great police massacre 
of Tunisia? As we join, refuse to join, or contemplate joining we narrate in the dark without the 
privilege of the ironic historical glance. Hindsight is not only the ability to truly judge the past 
from a point in the future. It is also the ability to project to the future what we hope and aim that 
our present action would be.  
We live out our lives, both individually and in our relationships with each other, 
in the light of certain conceptions of a possible shared future, a future in which 
certain possibilities beckon us forward and others repel us.182   
For example, when I was part of the political movement V15 trying to change the government in 
Israel in 2015, we imagined the end of our campaign many times over. We imagined all our hard 
work would pay off, that this would be a change in the Israeli left at long last. The ironic 
storyteller narrating the story from an actual hindsight point of view in the future knows now that 
all of this was doomed to fail. However, from a participatory point in the present, the future and 
the story our present payed in this future was an essential part of the whole endeavor. It seems 
fair to suggest all persons participating in a political movement (triggered or not by a trigger-
                                                
181 Carr points out that the structure of a narrative is harder to detect in longer sequences or lived narratives. “when 
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narrative) experience something similar. As one chooses to join those opposing segregation the 
hope is the possible future. In fact, it is most likely fair to suggest that failure and success 
synergistically play in the activist consciousness. The narrator of potentiality is more acute in the 
case of action since “the very essence of action is to strive to overcome [the unforeseen] by 
foreseeing as much as possible”.183 Fear of a story in which our political actions are futile urges 
us to look for more members, more support, more headlines etc. In other words, it urges us to 
solicit wider, more variant and deeper action. The possibility of success helps us maintain 
courage and energy in the arduous and many times dangerous process. We narrate what our 
actions would be remembered as. We act against the possible narration of our opponents. The 
perspective that gravitated towards the “no yet” is crucial in our description because what we are 
trying to follow is the manner in which trigger-narratives enlist action.  It is not the only 
perspective one can assume when looking at these events though. 
When Carr refers to short term events like the Israeli-Arab ’67 war that lasted six days he 
attributes their importance to the meaning they are later given by the community as turning-point 
events.184  Ricoeur treats such events in a similar way:  
those events that a historical community holds to be significant because it sees in them an 
origin, a return to its beginnings, these events which are said to be ‘epoch-making’ draw 
their specific meaning from their capacity to found or reinforce the community’s 
consciousness of its identity, its narrative identity, as well as the identity of its members. 
These events generate feelings of considerable ethical intensity, whether this be fervent 
commemoration or some manifestation of loathing or indignation, or of regret or 
compassion, or even the call for forgiveness185 
We entertain both perspectives in the description of trigger-narratives. These are narratives that 
feel like a founding event as they unfold. Something possibly very big it taking place and the 
                                                
183 David Carr, Time, Narrative and History, (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986),60 
184 Ibid., 167 
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participants are aware of that. But these are still founding events in a “not-yet” status. They are 
founding events to be.  
 There is another step we must attend to before we proceed. The temporality of action like 
written and read texts is encompassed in bundles.186 How are these bundles similar to narratives? 
Surely simply the structure of beginning, middle and end is not enough. A stone falling or 
thrown has such a temporality. It is not necessarily a story. Not even the fact that action are 
organized and aligned with a futural aim is enough to make a narrative. If we concede with 
Hardy that narrative is “a primary act of mind transferred to art from life”187 since fiction is a 
form of analyzing “the narrative forms of ordinary life”188 where or when is it that experience is 
finally figured into a narrative? This question stokes the debate about the status of narrative vis-
à-vis experience. Carr, attributing narrative a constitutive status within action mentions five 
temporal structures of action that are closely aligned to narrative structures: (1) means-end, (2) 
suspense-resolution, (3) problem solving, (4) departure-arrival and (5) departure-return. Events 
he claims are organized in similarity around such process that also make most narratives. We 
might break out of a narrative or lose it but our balanced and more normal comprehension of 
ourselves and others goes through narrative structure that is deeply inscribed in action itself. 
MacIntyre, as we already noted, demonstrated the manner in which intelligibility is dependent on 
setting which he equates with narrative.  Mink, on the other hand, suggests that narrative is one 
of three systems of comprehension: theoretical, categorieal and configurational. All three 
                                                
186 Mink points out that this wholeness of action is one of the conditions of understanding and is part of mathematics 
and logical inference as well, “History and Fiction as Modes of Comprehension”. New Literary History - History 
and Fiction 1.3, (Spring, 1970), 548 
187 Barbara Hardy, “Towards a Poetics of Fiction:  An Approach through Narrative”.  Novel: A Forum on Fiction. 2. 
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systems of comprehension organize experience in meaningful bundles. “Comprehension is an 
individual act of seeing-things-together”.189 Configuration arranges it in narrative form which he 
describes as a “single and concrete complex of relationships”.190 Unlike Hardy’s suggestion that 
stories take their structure from life, Mink insists that “stories are not lived but told” and that we 
do not dream or think in narrative but “tell stories which weave together the separate images of 
recollection”.191 All of this is to outline very generally a debate around the extent to which 
narrative is dependent on words and necessary for a coherent and intelligible experience.192 It 
seems futile to me to attempt to solve this debate or even insist on its nuances and niceties.  The 
temporality of action is closely linked to narrative and all thinkers agree that we could break in 
and out of narrative coherence. Of course we experience at least part of love, pain and hate 
without narrative structures. We find ourselves speechless in life. We can be in ineffable awe. 
We find words do not capture the experiences we have been through. Poetry, for example, is a 
configurational way in which we organize words in non-narrative structures so that they capture 
all the experiences or aspects of experience that narrative fails to capture. The ineffable in our 
life points to an accessible possibility of experiencing before, after and beyond words. But our 
lives would be complete chaos if these moments were the major part of our experience. These 
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192 This debate is transpiring against Danto’s claim that attends to action in a manner that is more fragmented.  His 
description centers on actions’ performative aspect in an attempt to distill the meaning of volition.  
We do not turn, as it were, an inner wheel in order, through some elaborate transmission of 
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directly. But then neither am I in my mind the way a pilot is in a ship. Or rather, I sometimes 
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Actions”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 2.2 (April, 1965), 148b  
Since our discussion is not ethical but rather follows the dynamics of a certain kind of narrative in the political 
arena, the discussion between views such as Danto and the narrative epistemologists is not crucial. We are not 
concerned with the most basic parts of experience and the extent to which they do or not belong to a narrative. We 
are concerned with more complex experiences where narrative is already obviously involved.   
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are moment when we grasp for narratives, loose ourselves, sink or soar in ecstasy or agony. 
What comes after these moments, are words. And words are human and in time. Their structures, 
even if not always, much of the time aligns with narrative. And so narrative is an organic and 
crucial part of acting and understanding. It is an inherent and central part of experiencing. 
Describing action and experience outside of narrative might be possible but it will take 
substantial effort which in itself proves the point of the centrality of narrative. That in itself is 
evidence enough for narrative’s status and weight.  
 If we agree that actions even more than general experiences are organized in a 
temporality that aligns with narrative, we must now ask ourselves what about communal action. 
We will not want to engage in the question concerning the phases of this transition. Meaning 
question such as ‘how does experience advance from the first person perspective to the plurality 
of a community?’ are left out of this discussion.  The reason for this bracketing is that such a 
question entails a long discussion of the primary status of the cogito. This, if done seriously, 
would divert us a great deal from the subject of inquiry. Additionally, the outcome of such an 
inquiry is not necessarily consequential for our work. Our concern is with the already given 
community not the “caged” cogito attempting to retrieve others and the world. In this sense this 
work consults phenomenology for the purposes of description but it is not a work of 
phenomenology. We seek to understand a particular process that occurs in the public arena in 
which it is a given that individuals already act together and experience themselves as part of 
several communities.193 
                                                
193 This is the reason that Schutz is not part of this work although it is clear that an application of his perspective on 
trigger narrative would make a very interesting perspective. Bottici puts the Cartesian problem in the context of the 
social imaginary beautifully:  
If we start from the idea that imagination is in primis an individual faculty, the problem emerges 
of determining the way in which it can be shaped by the social context. If we begin from the 
concept of social imaginary understood as context, the problem is how to account for the free 
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 The communal actions we are addressing here are rapid and intense. Their eruption is 
quick, enlists deep involvement and spreads wide across the community changing traditional 
power balances.  “A community exists wherever a narrative account exists of a we, which has a 
continuous existence through its experiences and activities”.194 Community members are born 
into stories. They tell and receive stories from one another. They are all the authors and the 
readers as they are of course the protagonists being born into some of the communal narratives. 
Comparing a community to an individual Carr claims that groups, like individuals, deal with 
death when they entertain the possibility of their disintegration and fragmentation.  
The prospective death of a community, like the death of the individual, is usually an open 
eventuality of uncertain date.195  
This observation juxtaposing the narrative temporality of individual life to the temporality of 
communal action might be a good way to outline the latter.  Being-toward-death, as we said in 
the last chapter, throws one into her ownmost in a manner that is almost completely isolating. 
One’s demise is somehow very unlike the demise of others and when it is similar it is a matter of 
deep and intimate love. The rhythm of lived-narrative answers to the ticking clock of our 
impending radical ending. It seems problematic at least to a certain extent to compare it to the 
death of a community if only for the fact that it is possible and even probable that one’s 
community would predate one’s birth and proceed after her death. A community moves to a 
specific but different rhythm than an individual life. Carr is correct in saying that a group is 
moving, among other things, in accordance with the danger and possibility of its disintegration. 
However, unlike death this disintegration is usually transformative rather than a random and 
radical sense of ending. Communities divide. Communities change and become other than one 
                                                                                                                                                       
imagination of individuals. There are no easy ways out of this problem. “The Politics of 
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anticipated, wanted or dreamed. Communities disappear but their members continue to carry the 
experience of belonging to them and at lease have the possibility of joining or forming new 
Communities. Even if we take the horrid case of the genocide in Ruanda, we can see a 
transformation in a community from one thing to another. Post-Apartheid South-Africa is 
another dramatic example. Communities transform. They don’t die and if they do completely 
disappear, their members don’t necessarily disappear with them.  Additionally, unlike an 
individual life the fight against disintegration in the case of a community is not futile. Member of 
communities can and many times do believe that they will never disintegrate although it is likely 
that they do not entertain the possibility of not dying. All of this is not insistence on niceties. The 
absolute certainty of death is what dictates the existential rhythm of an individual life. Life 
would look different if we could seriously self-maintain against death or conceive of possibly 
living many generations if we just tried harder or were lucky or both. All of these options are 
exactly what death does not offer. Death is the impossibility of continuity. It is not the end of one 
phase. It is not an end of a stronger or weaker communal gathering. It is an end of someone. The 
rhythm it dictates, as a result, is not similar to the rhythm communities move to. Communities 
self-maintain through stories, institutions, sometimes even through change. They do so towards 
the horizon of the possibility of survival. Individuals self-maintain through stories, routine and 
even through change. But they do so against the impossibility of surviving. The story of my life 
could only be so long, so wide and so varied. The story of a community could always become, 
and many times is believed to be the story of the empire that will last forever.  
Communities, then, are not angst-ridden like authentic individuals could become. What 
about communal action? Formally, as we said the temporality of action aims to the future that it 
is acting to achieve. Namely, in the final account a communal action (as individual action) is 
111 
 
aiming for its end and additionally is bringing it about. The end is exactly not an external, 
random event which time of transpiring is unknown. It is the aim posited by the group (or the 
individual) and all temporality is aimed at achieving it. Like an individual action a communal 
action, in principle, is final; it is aiming at an end. It also similarly answers the narrative 
structures enumerated in the previous section (means-end, suspense release, problem solving, 
and departure-arrival/return). This should not be a surprise communal action is part of human 
temporality even if it is not parallel to individual temporality. Unlike most individual actions, 
however, communal action many times announces the end of a community with its achievement. 
The suffragist movement ended when it achieved its end. The civil right movement ended when 
it achieved its end. Anti-war movements end when they achieve their ends. Communal ends 
entail many times the end of a communal structure because communities, unlike individuals, are 
many times constructed and revolve around such aims. This is not true always of course. Many 
communities center on identity and thus, just like an individual, do not end but rather produce a 
series of communal actions that contribute to their identities. Additionally, individual actions that 
come to an end could mean the end of a life. One could imagine an author feeling her life ended 
when she finished her long desired book. One could even imagine her actual biological ending 
because of a lost purpose. However, the end of an individual life in such circumstances is 
dramatic as it is rare. The end of a goal oriented community reaching its end is very different. 
Most times – it is perceived as a success. Of course even communities that revolve around 
deeply layered identities rather than a specific goal are never angst-ridden like individuals. Their 
actions transpire in an arena that can outlast its members and definitely can reasonably hope to 
do that. If they fail, they can try again and not think about time in the same way that an 
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individuals would. If they succeed, their ability to translate this success to further achievements 
is likewise not limited by death in a similar way an individual life is.  
Communal actions, like individual actions, then are narrative-like kernels. Can such 
kernels that are unwritten, short lived and abrupt travel like written texts via space and time call 
for action? After Bouazizi’s self-immolation and subsequent death several other such cases 
happened in neighboring countries. In Algeria, four men self-immolated in the span of two 
months. This was irregular and reached the news immediately. Many others attempted and 
failed.196 In Israel on the one year anniversary to the Social Justice Movement Moshe Silman 
self-immolated where the first tent of Leef was erected the year before.197 He dies six days later. 
A month after Bouazizi’s self-immolation an Egyptian man self-immolated and five additional 
attempts famously transpired in Tahrir square in Cairo.198  The name Arab Spring that was the 
first name popularly used in reference to the Arab Uprisings is telling enough. A certain season, 
a sharing of an atmosphere, declared itself in the Middle East and North Africa and later on, in 
different shapes and forms, globally.  Bouazizi’s act was a short term action. He protested 
publicly about his humiliation knowing most probably that his act of protest is unlikely to end 
well for him. In such cases, the narrative structure is easily detected. Means-end and tension-
resolution synergistically play on the temporal phases aiming to reach the goal of radical political 
protest. Was the action/narrative of Bouazizi travelling like a text to other places and political 
contexts?  
 On the one hand, we have a bundle of action-phases organized in narrative form, 
containing a hero, a tension, and beginning and a tragic/heroic end. This is a breathtaking 
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narrative without any connection to what ensued after the self-immolation. Additionally, the 
narrative/event “traveled” globally via many media channels formal and informal. Facebook, 
Tweeter, the news, phones and YouTube all played a role in narrating the drama repeatedly. On 
the other hand, this event is different from a text refiguring reality because although it is a closed 
bundle of action it is not just that. The fact that the narrative is revolving around an action that 
has just transpired and the fact that the wrong was not corrected – calls on the listener not only 
to start action anew, it calls her for more action – it calls her to join. The story, the “text” is not 
only an illumination of reality from a new perspective although doubtless it is also that. The 
initial event stands as a story in itself. In its travelling and calling for action it is offering itself as 
a first phase in a bigger story, a story of participation and massive change.      
 The structure of the travelling kernel of trigger-narratives has specific features that are 
the outcome of the rapid, non-academic, process through which it is disseminated. We will use 
research of oral traditions as a conceptual backdrop for the sake of our description. The oral 
traditions managed to maintain a corpus of narrative work by using “mnemonic patterns shaped 
for readymade oral recurrence”.199 Primary oral tradition in which narratives were transmitted 
over generations in societies where writing was not present suggests these mnemonic patterns 
were necessary both for the purpose of memory and for the purpose of facilitating a performance. 
It allowed for a delay that a performer can use by repeating available structures and upon which 
she could more easily invent the story anew and improvise. This is true not only of narration but 
orality in general. 
Oral habits of thought and expression are essentially interweaving with each other, 
deeply repetitive, built on formulaic expression, commonplaces, and epithets200  
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New creations are building on traditional, familiar images as well as stylistic and formal 
structures.201 Later research suggests further nuanced explanation with the concept superimposed 
narrative “grammar” that operated on the grammar of the spoken language.202 Both versions, 
however, describe a synergy between repetitiveness and novelty: structures of style, content and 
form acting as frames and paths that allow for both novelty and transmission of known “pieces” 
of tradition. The cultures and events we are addressing here are not primary oral in any sense of 
the word. However, these events do exhibit a tendency toward an information flow that is not 
archived, formally researched or deeply edited because these are rapid events that unfold without 
the time span that would allow one to create a corpus of work behind them. The Social Justice 
Movement and the Arab Uprisings were both called Facebook revolutions because, among other 
things, they used social media to communicate their messages. The texts of social media are of 
course written but to reach a substantial amount of people and communicate the same narrative 
they must be short, clear and repetitive. One has to convey a succinct and appealing call for 
action which, if successful, is shared and discussed by millions. This could be seen as either a 
process of figuration, since an event in life is made into a story. It could also be interpreted as a 
process of re-figuration in which an event which already became a story calls for action. 
Configuration and re-figuration happen at the same time condensing Ricouer’s cycle of mimesis 
and turning it rapidly again and again. The rapid processes of mimesis are configuring and 
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refiguring, guessing and validating over and over again over the span of a day. Slowly the story 
is honed down to its most effective form.  
 The condensation of the mimetic cycle is not only temporal (in the sense that it is rapid 
and repetitive) and formal (in the sense that in it cycle of mimesis is condensed), it is also a 
matter of size. The content of the story itself is condensed.  There is no time or interest in 
accuracy of the initial event. What is saved is the enraging element calling for action repeated 
again and again until it is made into a kernel of information flowing in conversations, the 
newspapers, the news and the social media. Like oral tradition, the needs of the moment edit, 
condense and redistribute the narrative. Rosa Parks’ case is similar although the technology of 
the time was of course very different. At the night of her arrest December 1, 1955 the Women's 
Political Council (WPC) which was led at the time by Jo Robinson produced over 35,000 
handbills on mimeograph machine and distributed them by volunteers over the weekend. The 
flayer was 215 words. Too long for Tweeter, not to long for Facebook but definitely not long 
enough to go into historical details.203 Much like Facebook the texts are used in a manner that 
assists a quick and clear transmission. Why, for example, would a leaflet calling for action on 
December 1, 1955 read  
Another woman has been arrested and thrown in jail because she refused to get up out of 
her seat on the bus for a white person to sit down204  
and not  
“a political activist with an impressive past in organizing and with many connections in the was 
arrested tonight. Her action is known to the strongest leaders of the segregated community and 
they are planning to use it to start their already planned political protest by boycott?”   
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 What version is more enraging? A simple woman was treated unjustly or a well-
connected political activist decided to rebel? Parks is commonly described as a seamstress that 
wanted a seat because she was tired after a long day at work. In fact she is commonly described 
as old as well. This description is so prevalent that in her autobiography Parks finds the need to 
correct it: 
People always say that I didn’t give up my seat because I was tired, but that isn’t true. I 
was not tired physically, or no more tired than I usually was at the end of a working day. 
I was not old, although some people have an image of me as being old then. I was forty-
two. No, the only tired I was, was tired of giving in. 205 
Parks’ story is usually told without her background as the elected secretary of the local chapter of 
and secretary of the local chapter of the N.A.A.C.P who organized the Committee for Equal 
Justice for Mrs. Recy Taylor. The leaflet at the night of her arrest read “another woman” 
although the person standing behind the production of the leaflet was Jo Robinson, the head of 
the Woman’s Political Council who most probably knew Parks’ political background. This is not 
to suggest that she lied. Parks was indeed another woman who was arrested of course. It is to 
point out that the narrative of this sort is honed into a narrative formula the heart of which is that 
an enraging injustice has been done.  
 “In Tunisia, Act of One Fruit Vendor Sparks Wave of Revolution Through Arab World” 
goes the headline in the Washington Post.206 “Mohamed Bouazizi: A Fruit Seller's Legacy to the 
Arab People” pronounces CNN.207  In The Guardian Mohammed Bouazizi is “The Dutiful Son 
Whose Death Changed Tunisia's Fate”.208 And finally in Al-Jazeera we read about the “The 
Tragic Life of a Street Vendor”.209  Who is Mouhammed Bouazizi? He is just a guy. He is the 
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fruit seller, the street vendor, the dutiful son. He is someone we could meet, know and be. This 
kind of vocabulary dominates the narratives of Leef as well. Leef for example is portrayed by 
supportive media as a film student living in a rented apartment in Tel-Aviv. Negative media 
portrayed her as the rich girl.210 Her power came from being like everybody else. Opposition to 
her tried (unsuccessfully) to brand her as raised from the common woman and man.  
 The sociologist William Gamson, who describes social movements from the point of 
view of the participant,211 calls such an enraging kernel a “hot cognition”. Hot cognitions are one 
part of the injustice component is social movements. The second part is an “adversarial we”.212 
The honing into an enraging kernel of a call for action describes an ordinary person, just like you 
and me, who has come across an outrageous injustice.  As in the oral tradition a certain 
condensation by and for the sake of repetition comes into play as the short texts are being 
distributed. The elements that are quintessential for the call for action stay. It is quintessential to 
these stories that their protagonists are regular people.  
Let us engage in a thought experiment: Does the fact that Parks was actually an 
experienced activist with some experienced and powerful people around her changes the way we 
feel about the narrative? On the one hand, looking some sixty years back, it might not. Parks was 
successful. But it seems like story’s allure as an enraging kernel is affected by such information. 
It is reasonable to assume there is a reason some details are less commonly known. We are more 
likely to be outraged by the story of the simple seamstress that just suddenly had enough.  We 
                                                
210 “Watch the Villa in Kfar-Shmaryahu that Dafpne Leef Grew Up In”. Globes: Israel’s Business Arena.  Real 
Estate. My translation. 8 September 2011 
] "ףיל ינפד הלדג הב והירמש רפכב הליווה וז :ואידיווב ופצ"סבולג ךא ,הייחש תכירבב דיוצמ אל םנמא" ףיל . ,תוכרעה יפל ,הווש2-2.5 
."רלוד ןוילימ[  
“Leef: It Is Easy For Others To Say That I Am A Daughter Of A Tycoon. Money From My Taxes Funds Talkbacks 
About Me”, TheMarker Online, (Tel-Aviv: Amos Schocken. 29 June 2012). My Translation.  
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211 Hank Johnston , John A. Noakes . Frames of Protest: Social Movements and the Framing Perspective, (Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers , 2005), 6 
212 Gamson. Talking Politics, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992 ), 177 
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are enraged by the injustice of the system to the weak. We are also in awe with the spontaneity of 
the action. We would hate to learn this was preplanned meticulously months ahead. (This is not 
to suggest that it was. It is very reasonable to believe that it was not planned). The awe that the 
spontaneity inspires us with belongs to a greater discussion that is developed in chapter five.  We 
are moved by the story of Leef the poor film-student over the rich-girl narrative. We feel we 
might be or know people like her. Her injustice is ours as well. Joining her would be considered 
joining one of our own, or the just and weak. It would be a disappointment to find out, for 
example and this is just an example which aims to be purely demonstrative, that Buazizi’s was 
having an aggressive unfortunate hallucination that ended with self-immolation. We prefer the 
story of the simple man who consciously is doing a deed of immense courage in the face of 
brutal systematic injustice. We prefer it not only because it is true; we prefer it because somehow 
the simplicity, accessibility and everydayness of these protagonists and of the spontaneous 
unplanned aspect of their action is essential and crucial to the force of their narratives. David 
must be a simple man succeeding against all odds and without the help of planning or great 
powers. He cannot be the experienced well-armed and calculated warrior if we want the story to 
work.   
 Returning to our initial question, we can now start discerning the difference between a 
historical figure and a protagonist of trigger-narrative. To begin with the creation of a “hot 
cognition” via personal story of the character plays a smaller role if at all in historical figures. It 
is not of crucial importance to us that the great historical figure had experiences injustice. It is 
important to us that she recognized it exists and acts to change it on behalf of us. In fact we 
might be happy to know Ghandi went to law school. If he was rich, even better that he decided to 
dedicate his life to his less fortunate fellow women and men. The political figure need not be 
119 
 
every wo/man and she need not be unskilled or spontaneous. The more skilled she is, the happier 
we are as followers. She can be spontaneous from time to time but mostly we would like her to 
be able to break new ground in a manner that is calculated, skilled, thought through and 
successful. Historical figures can have a past history as weak persons, but they are not weak 
when they come into power or when they try to elicit our support. If Parks would run for 
elections and someone would describe her as an old seamstress, it is unlikely to help her solicit a 
constituency.     
It is possible, of course, that protagonists of trigger-narratives will become fully fledged 
politicians or leaders. If they survive their act, there is no reason why the protagonist of a given 
trigger-narrative would not become a formal, semi-formal or informal leader for years to come. 
The point of this analysis is not to claim that the two are mutually exclusive but that 
symbolically they entertain two different sets of tacit demands and expectation from their 
audiences. The protagonists of trigger-narratives are the spontaneous, unskilled, simple rebels 
that symbolize in their very bodies and experience an enraging injustice. The historical figure 
gravitates towards the skilled, calculated person. If they portray themselves as simple, it is rare 
that this simplicity reveals them as weak in the face of the system.  Historical leaders’ 
experiences with past injustice are most commonly portrayed as a part of a story that made them 
who they are today. Ghandi’s incident in the train is South Africa was a founding personal 
moment that made him into a leader. It is a moment in the past from which a moral and a public 
who is distilled. It is not a moment in which carnal sacrifice against all odds and without any 
planning takes place.    
II. History and Fiction : Modes of Engagement  
120 
 
That history and fiction are different in the entities they describe, their aims, procedures 
and kinds of objectivity they answer to was already discussed. Historians validate and answer the 
rules of evidence, their work as a consequence can be judged according to a set of procedures 
which usually has much to do with documentation. Fiction, as we said communicates a universal 
through world, and of course can use documents but that is not a necessary condition or a 
prevalent practice. Most importantly its sense of truth does not depend on documentation and 
verification. Nonetheless, the ontological and epistemological structures of history and fiction 
render them inseparable in a relationship that is not always happy and/or harmonious. The 
inherent absence of history’s object: the past, entails the presence of the imaginary. The striving 
of the science of history to describe the past as it really was is challenged by this necessary 
presence. Paradoxically, if one is to describe the past as it really was, one must use imaginative 
narratives. In fact the ability to describe the past rests on the ability of every fiction writer to 
describe another point of view than her own. “Historical intelligence”, says Ricoeur,   
is rooted in the capacity of the subject to transport itself onto an alien psychic life […] 
The past is what I would have seen, what I would have witnessed, if I had been there, just 
as the other side of things is what I would see if I were looking at them from the side 
from which you are looking at them213 
Accuracy of historical description passes through imagination and thus fiction is an inherent part 
of history whether we ascribe narrative the status of imposed distortion leading us to historical 
skepticism214 or claim that narrative is a complex window from which any human 
comprehension, historical included, may or even must arise.  
                                                
213 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative III, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 185 
214 Skepticism is not the only danger in narrative history. Kearney enumerates seven pitfalls that narrative must 
attempt to avoid. Five of them are connected to using narrative in historical descriptions: (1) becoming a master 
narrative missing nuances and forcing events into a preconceived and inflexible  frame; (2) relativity; (3) banalizing 
through the pornography of the spectacle; (4) reducing an event to the sublime by removing its narrative from time 
via – for example – refusing to compare it to anything; (5) self-referential explanation without any truth claims on 
the world. On Stories, (London: Routledge, 2002), 67-8  
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Much of the  discussion distinguishing history from fiction does not concern the present 
chapter and work because we are dealing with accounts that are not yet systematically analyzed 
but rather disseminated in short version that are exactly not academic history. What we will 
emphasize in this final and short part of the chapter is rather the different mind sets history and 
fiction entail and demand. Our aim is to show that the mindset entertained by the participants and 
bystanders of trigger-narrative events leans substantially towards the fictional. This 
understanding also paves the way to the last chapter dealing with mythology.  
Sometimes the way to understand an era goes through a story of an individual fiction or 
testimonial. “Fiction gives eyes to the horrified narrator”215 it allows general feelings of horror or 
admiration to crystalize around a single story that echoes the cry of triumph or defeat. Much in 
the same way the awful meaning of genocide and the astonished awe at slaves liberated are 
sometimes best reached when a single emblematic story is being told. “Either one counts the 
cadavers or one tells the story of the victims. Between these options lies a historical 
explanation.”216 Either we give a documented account or we tell a story of several personal 
accounts from which a world emerges. Some events, says Kearney “cannot be met […] without 
the aid of testimonial narrative”.217 Their horror or goodness is too great. Individual stories do 
not facilitate understanding alone. Testimonies, religious biblical sources, myths all “provide 
phronesis with exemplary paradigms by which to measure, judge, and act”.218 Narration of 
individual stories in history, fiction and their combination in epic myths facilitates a certain 
openness that makes the text not only accessible but normative.  
                                                
215 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative III, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 188 
216 Ibid. 
217 Richard Kearney, On Stories, (London: Routledge, 2002), 67 
218 Kearney “What Is Diacritical Hermeneutics?” Journal of Applied Hermeneutics, 2011: 2 
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A history book could be read as a novel but is does necessitate a change in mode of 
reading. Such a reading would entail a different reader-narrative-voice pact. Historians, like 
philosophers, “address themselves to distrustful readers.”219  However,  
Before a literary work […] we are humble, open, active yet porous. Before philosophical 
work, […] we are active, controlling aiming to leave no flank undefended and no 
mystery dispelled220  
How do we read the narratives inscribes in the initial event of trigger-narratives and how do we 
read what follows? Are we distrustful readers or is it a moment of mistrust suspension? The odds 
against the protagonist in trigger-narratives are great. In fact the gap between her resources and 
experience and the system she is opposing is made wider by the honing process of the initial 
event. The protagonist everydayness and lack of resources is an essential part of the story that is 
being emphasized and at times exaggerated. The gap between her and the oppressing system is 
part of what makes this story a “hot cognition”. What is breath taking and inspiring about the 
trigger-narrative event is exactly the irrationality of its protagonist. Why not just get up on the 
segregated bus at the end of a long day? Why not just go home from the market at the end of 
quarrel with a policewoman? Why sleep in the cockroach ridden streets of Tel-Aviv and not 
move to a smaller apartment with more roommates? The actions taken by the protagonists of 
trigger-narratives do not make sense. They rebel against the order of the existing world against 
all odds and at a great personal price. We do not follow them because it makes sense. We do not 
watch them because like history readers we read all the facts and agreed their position is valid. 
We join them because we are inspired to rebel against all odds. We join because we want to 
stand by and with them.  We refuse to live in a world where the weak are unheard. We join 
because their courage awakens ours and with the courage a great feeling of potency, 
                                                
219 Paul Ricoeur Time and Narrative I, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984),  176 
220 Martha Nussbaum. Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature. (New York: Oxford  
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relentlessness and solidarity. The energy that a trigger-narrative releases is a creative energy. It 
puts on the agenda the incredible unwavering demand to create of a new order, nothing smaller. 
This is the reason, we claim, that trigger-narrative are made of the matter of myths. Their essence 
is a new world creating.  
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 Chapter Four: Scope   
In the last three chapters we defined trigger-narratives against the possibility of other 
narratives that are not strictly political. Lived-narratives, fiction and academic history all touch 
on political issues and can function as political material but this is not their main or declared 
function. We now turn to examine the concept of trigger-narrative against narratives that operate 
strictly in the socio-political arena. The sociologist William Gamson trifurcated political 
narrative into meta, issue and personal narratives221 all of which operate in the political. This of 
course not the only way to approach a mapping of narrative in the political arena but it extremely 
pertinent to our discussion  because one of the main features of trigger-narratives is that there is a 
substantial gap between the apparent “size” of the story and the “size” of the effect that it creates. 
As the introduction to this work points out, the vocabulary around such events is fascinated with 
their relatively small beginning: a spark, a virus, one fruit vendor, one simple old seamstress. The 
smallness comes both in the form of the fact that the commencements of the events is attributed 
to one action done by one person and in addition by the description of this person as relatively 
lacking in social connections and power. On the other hand, the change that these events come to 
aim for and at times achieve is monumental. The changing of a regime and the end of a 
segregating culture are nothing short of a creation of new orders. The amazement that is reflected 
in the non-academic texts describing these events as they unfold refers to this gap in “size” 
between what started as an event that could have been nonconsequential and ended as a 
beginning of a new world or a frustrated wish for one. The amalgamation of how close the 
beginning of a world creation is to the action of one simple person and the magnitude of such a 
creation is one aspect of what is so breathtaking in trigger-narratives. 
                                                
221William Gamson. “Political Discourse and Collective Action", From Structure to Action: Social Movement 
Participation across Cultures. (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press,1988), 219-44. 
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In what follows I examine this gap in size and follow its nuances. This chapter 
demonstrates how trigger-narratives align, echo and overlap with each of the three kinds of 
political narratives (i.e. meta-, issue and personal), on the one hand, but cannot be subsumed 
under either fully, on the other.      
I. Metanarrative  
Meta-narratives, which are known also as master and grad-narratives222, are accounts which 
embed 
the events [they make] sense of within some understanding of the general drift of history. 
This in turn is intimately linked with a certain view of the gamut of human 
motivations.223 
These narratives guide the way a community might decipher, interpret and understand events that 
occur to its members personally or communally. I might understand my secularity not only as a 
personal deep feeling of the heart but as a part of a shift in the metanarrative from the 1500’s to 
the 20th century in which I was born. Metanarratives are responsible for interpretation of 
historical events and situations as well. I could interpret Palestinian national longing as a threat 
to my existence or as a process similar to the process Zionists were going through in the 18th 
century in Europe, namely as part of nationalism and Enlightenment. I could, of course, interpret 
the situation as both a threat and recognize the similarity and the two processes.  The two views 
are not mutually exclusive. They point to the multilayered arena of meaning in which human 
lives unfold. Such layers can and do influence each other in many ways. I can come to feel less 
threatened if I recognize the similarity and I can become argumentative against the similarity 
because I feel extremely threatened.  The point is that metanarratives circumscribe political 
                                                
222 For the sake of cohesion I will use the term metanarratives throughout the chapter. In quoted lines I will quote 
verbatim.    
223 Charles Taylor. A Secular Age. (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007),  818. 
Footnote #27 
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arenas, eras and localities providing contexts, pointing to goals, possibilities, obstacles, dangers, 
opportunities, and desirable/undesirable values and behaviors.  
Metanarratives, for the most part, work tacitly. They are an undercurrent that could be 
articulated but typically works as a given background to understanding, actions and events.  This 
is part of their effectiveness and force. Metanarratives operate like the element in which we live.  
Like air, they are as essential as they are taken for granted. They are as invisible as they are 
ubiquitous. We see the world through metanarratives as if there is no mediating structure. As a 
consequence, for the most part, they do not appear as narratives at all and they remain 
uncontested. Metanarratives seem natural. The norms of one’s society seem obvious and 
necessary. “Of course women should not vote”; “of course without slavery the economy would 
collapse” etc. Only through the perspective of time and successful struggles do we come to see 
how artificial and unnecessary some of our long held beliefs are. Vegans might claim today that 
eating meat and dairy will look just as outdated, wrong, and artificial as slavery and non-
universal suffrage. An action that the great majority takes part in daily almost thoughtlessly and 
might seem absolutely incredible through the prism of time, makes complete sense within a 
metanarrative that supports it. Metanarratives feel so natural that any opposition to them is bound 
to look a little strange at first. This ubiquitous status and the unquestionable naturalness it entails 
allows metanarratives to be both very wide and deeply rooted culturally which is the reason that 
“meta”, “master” and “grand” are appropriate adjectives. Metanarratives “crops up 
everywhere”.224 One can find them dictating the content of educational books, the creation of 
academic faculties, the size and funding of such faculties, national holidays, names of streets, 
kindergarten songs, national hymns, movies, television shows, the distribution of social rights 
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etc. Their work is slow, continuous and steady and when they shift they bring with them a new 
perspective on existence and with it a new order.  
 Implicit by nature, metanarratives are not always presented in the articulated form of 
regular stories. They can come in the form of a shared and upheld value. For example, 
Enlightenment stories of progress are not a well-organized story like Hamlet. We do not have in 
metanarratives one protagonist going through a personal process. Yet Enlightenment’s story of 
progress has a narrative structure that we (in the West) could most probably recite with 
interchanging nonhuman protagonists if we were asked. Enlightenment story (some would say 
“myth”225) is that of a step forward from darkness to light, from illusion to truth from childhood 
to maturity. The word “progress” stands as a reference point to a story that takes on different 
contents in Western culture. This, for example, can be the story of scientific advance: “Once we 
believed childishly in spirits but today after a lot of hard work we all know the truth is with 
science”. Or “once we used to believe in God but Freud showed the idea of God is in truth an 
inner projection of the idea of the father within every one of us”. Without much regard for 
chronology Plato’s antipathy towards poets may find itself embodying this very narrative 
anachronistically: “Plato preferred bright sharp reason to dark emotional art. Socrates preferred 
the truth of rational dialogue to the manipulation of rhetoric”. And so forth. All these stories and 
we can point to many more have a common underlying metanarrative. When we say “progress” 
we tacitly refer to all these stories the best part of which we know not because we decided to do a 
PhD in the humanities. We are exposed to the metanarrative of progress long before we go on to 
higher education. We learn about science in preschool education and about other different and 
darker times. We see this implied narrative in films, TV series and books. We finally put 
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theoretical argument to match this pretheoretical climate if we go to college or university, but 
this is an affirmation of what has already been tacitly recited many times over. What the word 
“progress” does is bring to life, echo and accentuate the many of stories we are all imbued and 
entangled in all of which answer to the same narrative “mothership”. Progress is a code for a 
specific metanarrative of a certain historical thrust. “Once upon a time, long ago, it was dark and 
irrational but then along came Newton, Descartes and friends and there was light.”226  
Why would it matter that a world view such as we described above will be in a form of a 
story and not in the form of an argument, an explanation or a fully-fledged theory? One reason is 
that as we already said we approach stories in a different manner. Their inner coherence captures 
us and we are unguarded when we are part of a story or readers of a story. We might look for its 
truthfulness, but this will not be in the form of argumentative search. A story awakens a 
perspective that seeks coherence in the structure of plot, the development of the characters and 
the way in which the unfolding events are tied together. Granted, metanarratives are not fiction. 
First, in the most literal sense they are exactly not written by an acknowledged author but rather 
circumscribe arenas silently and anonymously. If metanarratives are to be “natural”, one of the 
things they must avoid having is an author that “makes” them. This would render them an 
artifice. Second, unlike fiction metanarrative must have referential claims which can be 
weakened by the application of the rules of evidence. The fact that they are known pre-
theoretically does not mean that metanarratives are impervious to theoretical refutation. It only 
means that their ubiquitous existence is not an outcome of argumentation.227 The Marxist 
                                                
226 I am paraphrasing Alexander Pope”s famous poem: 
Nature and Nature”s Laws lay hid in Night:  
God said, “Let Newton be!” and all was light 
227 To go even further Charles Taylor suggest that sometimes theories change the metanarrative of a community. 
Comparing the American Revolution to the French Taylor points out that the former was much less traumatic 
because it was connected to “existing practice of popular election of assemblies; whereas in the other case, the 
inability to “translate” the same principle into a stable and agreed set of practices was an immense source of conflict 
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metanarrative, for example, is a critical analysis of an existing capitalist metanarrative. This last 
fact is where metanarratives resemble fiction: we are born into metanarratives and in that sense 
we accept them in an agreement similar to the one we assume when a story is being told. We are 
open to believe and accept what is given. Metanarratives are given to us as the sky, the air, our 
family and the language we are born into. We accept them uncritically as we would nature itself. 
In addition, metanarrative disseminate and multiply into countless stories. This is the way that 
they become known to us pre-theoretically. Their abstract form is materialized over and over 
again as stories that are inscribed in the actions, interpretations and decisions that make up our 
world, inculcated in the structures of our comprehension.  
Recent experimental data demonstrated that narratives deliver a point via the experience 
of absorption  
audiences suspend their proclivity to counter argue, to raise doubts about the veracity or 
relevance of the information they are hearing. They truly suspend disbelief, and they do 
so in a way that has lasting effects. The attitudinal change brought about by stories tends 
to persist or even increase over time228  
We are, in other words less likely to argue against a story because we are in a different mode of 
reception. Narratives, which both evoke emotional activity and represent it, deliver a point 
bypassing, at least in part, our critical perspective. The kind of rationality that they encompass 
operates via the principle of identification rather than of deliberation. Rather than oppose value 
to fact, imagination to intellect emotions to reason “and so on. Stories are the enactment of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
and uncertainty for more than a century. But in both these great events, there was some awareness of the historical 
primacy of theory, which is central to the modern idea of a “revolution”, whereby we set out to remake our political 
life according to agreed principles. This “constructivism” has become a central feature of modern political culture”. 
Charles Taylor, A Secular Age,(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007),  176 
228 Francesca Polletta and Pang Ching Bobby Che. “Narrative and Social Movements”, The Oxford Handbook of 
Cultural Sociology. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012), 491 
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whole mind in concert with itself”.229 This tendency to prefer cohesion and flow is at the same 
stroke a tendency to move away from analysis.  Nussbaum goes as far as saying that stories go so 
deep in this capacity to catch us unguarded that they structure the way in which we experience 
and come to know our own emotions. The intellectual and more specifically the philosophical 
western tradition, Nussbaum suggests, propounds that self-knowledge could be attained by a 
scientific analytical method.  But the knowledge of emotions is of a different epistemological 
order which is both pre-theoretical and deeply rooted in the singularity. On the one hand,    
the full story of love – its intermittences, its rhythms of pain and avoidance – can be 
comprehended only by a reflection that observes the specifically human temporality of 
desire and habit, which proceeds by its own laws of felt duration230   
Yet in the final account, Nussbaum points out, emotions are only fully comprehended through 
the structures of stories. Even if we all have similar basic emotions their structure and resonance 
in our cultures is different. Anger, for example, might be tolerated in Israel in ways it will not in 
the UK. Love is expressed in different ways in different cultures. What is shameful differs. What 
is expected differs. Look at the different ways the French people and persons living in the US 
react to the infidelities of their presidents. Adopting the French narrative we might the US 
reaction is almost hysterical in its graveness and intensity. Looking at it the other way around 
from the US narrative perspective, the French reaction might seem indifferent and irresponsible 
at best if not promiscuous. And so as we learn the many stories that reflect the metanarrative of 
our society we learn how to direct and structure our feelings.    
A child does not learn it’s society’s conception of love or of anger from sitting in an 
ethics class. It learns them long before any classes […] one of the child’s most pervasive 
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and powerful ways of learning its society’s values and structures is through stories it 
hears and learns to tell231     
A consequence of the characterization of metanarratives as deeply rooted and widely 
spread unchallenged structures that materialize in the form of myriad stories with a similar 
message, is that a shift in this structure can bring with it a substantial change in the order of 
things. In his A Secular Age Charles Taylor suggests, for example, that a shift in a metanarrative 
is what made non-belief a thinkable option and even a default option.232 Rather than explain 
away the change as an effect caused by scientific advance, or democratic ideas, Taylor suggests 
the metanarrative changed bringing with it a host of new possibilities and practices part of which 
changed the form of belief and some of which made it possible to live fully without religion. 
This is an excellent example of how deep and wide changes in metanarratives resonate 
culturally. A change in a metanarrative brings within a monumental change that goes as deep as 
faith and the conception of what would make the best life. The “social imaginary” of modernity, 
Taylor points out, suggests that the best life is no longer dependent necessarily on a transcendent 
existence. Life could be experienced fully and meaningfully immanently delegating the 
transcendent to a position of one option among many others.  
Metanarratives, then, are productive. They turn into the source of theoretical 
developments. The new metanarrative that Taylor describes completely changed, for example, 
the way we think about the self. The “immanent frame”, namely the metanarrative suggesting the 
fullness of life could be experienced without a resort to a transcendent, replaced the  
porous self by the buffered self, for whom it comes to seem axiomatic that all thought, 
feeling and purpose, all the features we normally can ascribe to agents, must be in minds, 
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which are distinct from the “outer” world. The buffered self begins to find the idea of 
spirits, moral forces, causal powers with a purposive bent, close to incomprehensible.233  
The buffered self for example saw the emergence of the science of psychology as well as the 
elaboration of ego phenomenology.  New vocabularies emerge.  “This is not me”, “you have to 
find the real you”, “it is all in your head” are all examples of a turn inward where everything 
could be found.  Further emphasis on practices of self-control, self-love and self-enhancement 
start to emerge as new kinds of therapies answering a certain conception of a good life. Schools 
teach children about figures that found their vocations and maximized their potentiality. People 
who “made it” are those who in addition to other things “listened to their hearts” and “followed 
their dream”. A shift in a metanarrative is a climate change that touches on many existing aspects 
of life as well as creating new aspects, needs and practices.   
The epistemological debate around metanarratives parallels the same debate around other 
kinds of narrative. On one end we can find the claims that metanarratives are an artificial 
manipulation imposed on reality. And on the other hand there is the view according to which 
metanarratives are deeply embedded in the human ability to understand herself, others and to act 
in the world. The former view is famously defended by Lyotard who sees the difference between 
the postmodern and the modern conditions as resting on tension between universality and 
multiplicity and thus between the metanarratives of the past and the multiplicity of narratives 
with no grandness in the present. When Enlightenments’ metanarratives aiming at universal truth 
and cosmopolitan justice lose their credibility, what one is left with, according to Lyotard, is a 
proliferation of games. Deconstructing the metanarratives of totality and closure, Lyotard 
references Wittgenstein’s famous conception of language-games in which new forms of 
linguistic dynamics are always created and always will be created. Each game with its own 
                                                
233 Ibid. 
133 
 
intrinsic set of rules is a new story that slowly emerges to find its place in relation to other 
stories. The narrative of emancipation dethrones science from its elevated status and opens the 
way into a perspective in which all endeavors are a certain kind of game. There is a multiplicity 
of systems that overlap, become tangent and communicate with each other in many ways. New 
languages are always added to old ones answering family resemblance definitions and their 
fuzzy dynamic borders. “[M]achine games, matrics game theory, new systems of musical 
notation systems of non-denotative logic”234 are all new games in which people creatively play 
with each other. Because metanarratives fail to recognize their own relativity and vulnerability to 
the local circumstances and discourses, the arguments goes, they soon become obsolete.  
This is of course quite true. Metanarratives strength may come from the fact that they are 
“simply there” unquestioned. However, their weakness comes from the very same place. Once 
articulated, they can be argued against.  According to Lyotard a recognition of their relativity 
would mean that metanarratives lose their “meta-ness” to become simply narratives. What 
emerges in turn would be a political arena that is characterized by novelty and multiplicity and a 
dismantling of the aspirations and claims for diachronic and universal understanding of our 
meta-context. Yet how much is the fact that we have a perspective on metanarratives as 
changeable and context dependent really mean that they are obsolete? As we saw in previous 
chapters our ability to understand ourselves, our actions, others and the world around us is 
meaningless without context. MacIntyre claims this context goes very far. I quote him in length 
because his explanation is extraordinarily fitting:  
We cannot […] characterize behavior independently of intentions, and we cannot 
characterize intentions independently of the settings which make those intentions 
intelligible both to agents themselves and to others. I use the word ‘setting’ here as a 
relatively inclusive term. A social setting may be an institution, it may be what I have 
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called a practice, or it may be a milieu of some other human kind [..] a setting has a 
history, a history within which the histories of individual agents not only are, but have to 
be, situated, just because without the setting and its changes through time the history of 
the individual agent and his changes through time will be unintelligible.235  
When I decide to use or not use the word “husband” in relation to my better half I rely and echo 
an the institution of marriage and with it a metanarrative in which romantic relations, gender 
issues, financial agreements and oppression play a role as a background. We can oppose these 
narratives as oppressive and manipulative, but our opposing action could only be understood and 
is only intelligible in reference to them. Actions as well and decision making is “ruled by matters 
of history, biography, culture, character”.236 Much in the same Taylor suggests that  
far from being passé, […]master narratives are essential to our thinking. We all wield 
them, including those who claim to repudiate them. We need to be lucid about what we 
are doing, and ready to debate the ones we’re relying on. Attempting to repudiate them 
just obfuscates matters.237 
But it is not only for the sake of prescription and debating that metanarratives are crucial. Some 
practices are remnants of other times. Some practices and meanings are novel. Even before we 
act and debate to simply understand where we are we must understand our current socio-political 
arena in relations to other socio-political arenas.  
understanding our society requires that we take a cut through time –as one takes a cut 
through a rock to find that some strata are older than others. Views coexist with those 
which arose after in reaction to them.238 
In order simply decipher one’s position within the socio-political arena metanarratives are 
crucial. How can I be a progressive or a conservative? How can a person or a movement be a 
head of their time or outdated? If the strata of the political arena in which they and others define 
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them is not referring to the new and the old metanarratives of this arena. Moreover a community, 
like an individual, entails a certain identity which is an object or an event extended over time. 
“The unity of experience […] must be produced by projective and retrospective grasp”.239 Even 
if our metanarrative is simply an aggregate of several sociopolitical games, as Lyotard would 
have it, there would be a certain stability to this aggregate that would define the given 
community and in effect operate as its metanarrative. Finally, the conceptual attack against 
metanarrative has the same structure of a shift in a metanarrative. One metanarrative is replaced 
with another. The postmodern condition changed practices, invented a vocabulary and started, 
just like a metanarrative, to define and “read” events through a certain perceptive conceives as 
neutral, necessary and even natural. In other words, this erosion of the status unifying narratives 
is itself a unifying metanarrative.  
It is clear from the above description that the changes that followed Parks’, Leef’s and 
Bouazizi’s deeds were of the “meta” kind. They were similar to the effects of metanarratives in 
two ways: first, as we said in the introduction to this work there is a gap of content between the 
deed and the effect. The rebellions against bus segregation, police brutality and housing prices 
became movements about civil rights, democracy and social justice. I will elaborate more on the 
nature of this gap in content in the final chapter. Here suffice is to say that the goals of these 
movement soon become the creation of a new and better order. A change in the bus regulation in 
Montgomery, Alabama would not have been enough. An apology from a policewoman or even 
the chief of the local police at Sidi Bouzid would not have satisfied the freedom seeking citizens 
of Tunisia. The actual change in the sociopolitical agenda that took place did not satisfy the 
people in the streets of Israel many of which consider the Social Justice Movement a failure. A 
whole new world needed to be created in which such practices not only the triggering practice 
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cannot take place. The triggering-practice operates as a symbol of a wrong political order. It is 
serving as an example, an emblem, an inspiration. Second, the effect is simply very wide and 
deep reaching. It is an effect that ends up defining an arena and changing it tacitly and explicitly 
in many if not all aspects of human socio-political lives. It seems almost redundant to flesh out 
the wideness and depths of democratic revolutions. Obviously such events define the peoples and 
provide a sense of identity, moral campus and solidarity. What the civil rights movement did to 
the US also does not need a deep analysis as to its wideness and depth. The Social Justice 
Movement in Israel is an interesting and complex case in this respect. To put it briefly, local 
discourse in Israel changed radically since 2011 but the Israeli Social Justice Movement is 
widely articulated as a failure.240 It is revered as a wonderful beginning, almost at times a 
glorious past that people are dreaming of reawakening.  This reaction is interesting because, as 
we said, the summer of 2011 changed the political discourse in Israel drastically.241 It had effects 
on the Israeli public arena which could be observed in the Knesset, the press, in the flourishing 
of new and vibrant social-justice oriented organizations and in the financial corporate Israeli 
discourse as well.242 Israel was dominated by security debates that left all economic and social 
concerns marginalized. The summer of 2011 changed the debate in a fundamental way that 
facilitated a new focus on financial gaps, social services and political corruption and which, 
against all odds, continues to take the center of the arena four years later. But the Israeli Social 
Justice movement did not manage to change the world in a final and fundamental way like the 
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US civil rights movement of the democratic revolution of Tunisia and that makes it a failed 
attempt in the eyes of many of its participants and supports as well as amongst its opponents. 
This is very telling and extremely helpful in understanding the nature of this event. The hope and 
the implicit goal was nothing less than a new order. It wasn’t a struggle aiming at a nuanced 
change, expressing general rage and frustration. It was aiming at creating a new world and 
anything less, is a disappointment. One of the very hyperbolic activists in the Israeli Social 
Justice Movement describes the hope during the summer of 2011. It can serve as an example to 
the sense of a new beginning that captures the hearts of the protesters:  
[What is happening in Rothschild Boulevard (Tel-Aviv s.l.) is unprecedented not only 
nationally but even planet-wise. A new society. A new language. New politics. A being 
that achieves self-understanding. From time to time I still hear people speaking in the old 
clichés of the Left. It enters in one ear and exists on the other. They have not heard the 
news: a new civilization has begun] 243  
Indeed in that sense the Social Justice Movement gloriously failed. Of course not all participants 
in the streets were as hyperbolic in their expectations, but the hope was a radical and substantial 
change of a different order. 
Although trigger-narratives have an expected effect of metanarratives, they are obviously 
not metanarrative in any other way. They are anything but an implicit narrative form that 
emerges in many aspects of life. Trigger-narratives offer an articulated narrative about an action 
that was done by a very specific protagonist. In fact the protagonist is central to the narrative and 
becomes the very symbol of the change. Trigger-narratives are only similar to metanarratives in 
the effect they aim at and sometimes succeed in making.      
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II. Issue Narratives 
Since we took diacritical hermeneutics advice and “extended horizontally across 
disciplines”244 we should pause shortly at this point and say a word about the context of the 
trifurcation of political narratives that we borrowed from the field of sociology so that it is clear 
how we are using Gamson’s sociological format and how exactly it is located vis-à-vis the 
background material of our argument. Gamson’s trifurcation is a part of a theoretical perspective 
called frame-analysis which emerged in reaction to both structural sociological theories of 
participation and later Anglo-American theories generally referred to as resource-mobilization. 
We will briefly outline the conceptual developments leading to frame-analysis and point to the 
position of issue narratives within this context. The reason that I am doing this here, and not at 
the beginning of the chapter, is that metanarratives are well accounted for in the field of 
philosophy. This extensive treatment in both fields is additionally quite similar and it makes for a 
smooth and almost obvious interdisciplinary discussion. Issue narratives, perhaps because they 
are case-oriented and deeply depend of qualitative and quantitative research,245 are less a subject 
matter of philosophical debates and thus they require both an elaboration and a contextualization.   
Systematically inquiring into the moment of joining and deciding to politically participate 
in a social movement, sociology came across several conundrums that dictated shifts in its 
analytical perspectives over the decades. Sidney Tarrow points to four schools in recent studies 
of collective action and social movements: (a) the position that focuses on grievances which 
stems from social structures as responsible for mobilization; (b) resource mobilization theorists 
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which concentrated on cost-benefit analysis, leadership and formal organization; (c) framing and 
collective identity theories that focused on the sources of consensus in a movement; and finally 
(d)  political process theories that focus on the political opportunities and constraints that 
structure contentious politics. Our interest lies with the third school which focuses on the power 
of framing an issue or a situation within a compelling narrative.246 In what follows we will 
outline its conceptual emergence. This outline is not intended as a comprehensive and in depth 
analysis of recent developments in the social sciences. This is not a work in sociology. Its aim is 
to create a conceptually accurate narrative, accessible to philosophers and other non-social 
scientists that will explain why and how the concepts of frame-analysis that I am using in this 
chapter are appropriate to this work of philosophy.  
Structural grievance as a source of mobilization is of course echoing Marx’s position that 
assumed a revolution would take place when grievance reaches a certain point. We can see 
similar philosophical views in Plato’s Republic where regimes are said to change as a result of an 
inherent flaw in the political order. A certain upbringing of the younger generation (Timocracy, 
Oligarchy, Democracy, Tyranny etc.) necessarily creates a grievance which leads finally to 
unrest and a change of regime.247 Kant, much in the same, way saw unrest as an inherent 
possibility of government and political behavior generally. In his case this inherent behavior was 
harnessed to the idea of progress.  
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The means that nature uses to bring about the development of all of man’s capacities is 
the antagonism among them in society, as far as in the end this antagonism is the cause of 
law-governed order society.248  
The hope is, and we should stress that Kant’s essay speaks of history that “may be possible”249 
rather than attempts a proof, that a universal perfect civil society is the necessary and inherent 
outcome of the senselessly violent struggles of humans. So crisis and perfect resolution is 
inscribed in the order of things. Aristotle and Locke, on the other hand, are examples for another 
perspective of structural grievance. They saw uprisings as a sign of social malfunction. Political 
rigidness of a regime is likely to stir up an uprising and unrest according to Aristotle.250 For 
Locke, similarly, every just society in which a legitimate power turns on its people, breaks an 
original contract and is thus no longer owed obedience. In fact such a breach of trust means they 
government entered into a state of war with the people.251 The point of the matter is that these 
thinkers, sociologists and philosophers alike, describe participation as a reaction to a grievance, 
inherent in the flawed structure of society or alternatively pointing to a malfunction in an 
otherwise potentially perfect political structure.   
Yet, history shows that serious grievances many times go without any uprising. 
Americans did not rebel after the economic collapse that saw the beginning of the Great 
Depression in 1929. Theoretical attempts to find a corollary relation between grievances such as 
unemployment, bread prices and uprisings fail to provide any clear correlation. Especially 
glaring is the fact that much scholarly effort before the Arab Uprising aimed at inquiring into and 
explaining how authoritarian regimes in the Maghreb and around it seem so stable.252 None 
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predicted the uprisings. It takes more than grievance to spark participation and even more than 
that to inspire sustained participation. After all the proletariat movement did not just erupt. It was 
organized. Developments in the field of sociology, inspired by economics, the Civil Rights 
Movement and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement,253 took a pragmatic turn emphasizing the 
perspective of organization and professional deliberation. This theoretical development which 
was named resource-mobilization by MaCarthy and Zald became “a dominant background 
paradigm for sociologists studying social movements in the early 1980’s”.254 Its philosophical 
counterparts would be utilitarianism.255  Resource mobilization depicted participation as 
dependent on formal organization and cost-benefit analysis. However, it left out emotional 
components, grievances and informal organization.  
Participation in social movements is many times very costly to the participants and it is 
not at all clear that they advocate for benefits they would directly enjoy.256 It is sometimes 
incredibly costly to sleep outdoors and miss many days of work while advocating for a cause 
such as cheaper housing. It was flat out dangerous to protest in Egypt. In addition many times 
social movements are joined by members that do not belong to the grieved group. Think about 
the opposition to the Vietnam War and the meaning the My Lai Massacre had on it, for example, 
or the effect of the picture of Phan Thi Kim Phuc on the US public. Protest and social movement 
mobilization cannot be attributed solely to the infringements on the rights belonging to the 
members of the protesting groups. They are more complex and many times the rage and 
mobilizing anger relates to an injustice that is not suffered by the protesters or even their 
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supporters. We could of course claim that there are moral benefits for those participating. The 
participants benefit in the sense that they feel and act morally. However, since some of these 
protesters stand in the face of violent police and sometimes army, such a claim would stretch the 
word “benefit” to a point in which it becomes hollow. People are willing to pay substantial prices 
to stand together for aims that are not always strictly or directly their own. They also might 
consider “the offer of an exciting, risky, and possibly beneficial campaign of collective action”257 
a benefit and not a cost simply because it offers an escape or a change in their desperation. 
Indeed both the structural sociological analysis and the resource mobilization approach play 
down the complexity entailed by the question of movement participation. Frame-analysis centers 
on the different meanings people attach to their decision to join a social movement. It is, I would 
like to claim, a sort of sociological hermeneutical turn which is the reason that I found it 
pertinent and fitting as a framework for this chapter and generally this work. According to frame-
analysis it takes more than the existence of structural grievance, cost-benefit calculation and 
leadership organization to bring about participation in a social movement. It takes embedding or 
framing the issue in a compelling story.  
Frame-analysis entered the field of sociology in the 1980’s in response to resource 
mobilization neglect of the “psychological processes” involved in the decision to participate.258 It 
focused on the dynamic of “ideational elements”259 of Social Movements which are responsible, 
among other things, for their meaning production as a mobilizing function. Work on narrative 
has challenged the belief that money, interest and power are the only or even main resources in 
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the success of mobilization efforts. It further suggests that the success of certain narratives over 
others might be related to their relation to their wider context. Namely that certain narratives fit 
and/or tap into long held beliefs and thus might resonate more effectively with certain 
audiences.260 This echoes hermeneutics understanding of the contextual nature of action and 
knowledge. The two frameworks are also similar in their understanding of such contexts as 
interwoven and overlapping. The framing process depends for its success on several internal and 
external factors: Narrative probability that was mentioned in Chapter One, and pertains to the 
inner coherence of the narrative’s elements. Narrative fidelity,261 borrowed by frame analysis 
from Fisher,262  pertains to the resonance of the suggested frame with existing cultural narrations 
such as stories, myths and folk tales.  It means that a story “rings true with the stories [persons] 
know to be true in their lives”.263 And this ringing-true runs the gamut of resonating with 
personal stories and everyday life experiences as well as aligning with metanarratives we all live 
in, familiar fiction plotlines and the political issues circulating the arena at the time. Failure to 
resonate, align, mirror and/or rearrange these structures is likely to render a story unbelievable, 
strange and even unintelligible. Read in this way it was not just the potential participant listening 
to the stories about Leef were calculating if joining or opposing was more profitable for them nor 
where they suddenly just fed up in a linear process of grievance with an inevitable revolutionary 
end. Both views are somewhat mechanistic. Leef’s story, from the frame-analysis’ perspective, 
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rang-true and resonated with other narratives that were circulating in the arena. It framed several 
grievances together through an appealing point of view. The description of Leef as a spoiled rich 
girl was at attempt to frame the Social Justice movement as marginal, spoilt, unrealistic and 
unjust. The frame advanced by supporters of the movement stressed the social and economic 
neglect in Israel and it resonated better.  
Issue narratives, as their name suggest, center on an issue. Public housing, nuclear power 
and the misconduct of local police are famous examples of such narratives. They are the center 
of frame-analysis’ work on mobilization and participation. These are the narratives around which 
collective action is likely to congeal. Issue narratives are a clear form of criticism of the state of 
things and if effective contain a suggested course of action. They operate within the arena of 
metanarratives, many times draw from them and function as “battleground[s] for converting 
potential into action”.264 If metanarratives guide our general understanding and interpretational 
trajectory tacitly, issue narratives or frames are explicit and they interpret a series of events as 
part of an ongoing occurrence of the same problem. So, for example, if a homeless woman dies 
in the street during a snowstorm and the issue of public-housing is on the agenda, her death 
might be interpreted as another part of the public-housing narrative.  “Here is why we need 
available public housing” a newspaper headline or a politician driving the issue might say. This 
would make sense in a political arena that sees the state as responsible to its weak and poor. The 
same event might echo completely different in a political arena that pushes for less government 
intervention. “Here is why we should cut welfare and make our poor work” is another possible 
framing. The death of a homeless woman could be framed to challenge long held beliefs but this 
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is not an easy task. Not echoing the general “ideational climate” might render a story marginal, 
strange, unbelievable and even nonsensical.  
Issue frames do not have to come as a clear cut story. There are other ways to frame an 
issue such as arguments and exhortations. Once again this distinction pushes to the fore the 
question concerning the status of narrative in human discourse. Is every form of human discourse 
in the final account narrative? Or is narrative one form of human discourse among others?  
Possibly,  
even frames rendered in […] other discursive forms […] make sense in terms of familiar 
narratives. Such narratives may constitute a backdrop of understanding against which 
logical arguments have meaning.265  
We, once again, need not decide between the status of narrative as necessary to human 
understanding and epistemology on the one hand, and narrative as simply a very pervasive form 
of human communication, on the other. The fact that it is necessary most of the time and present 
almost everywhere is enough for the purposes of this discussion. Issue frames work within an 
arena of a larger metanarrative and in relation to other issue narratives. They are more likely to 
work as mobilizers if they manage to resonate creatively the already existing frames and are 
unlikely to gather momentum if they are completely detached from the existing socio-political 
stories.   
Thinking about our three protagonists we can clearly see that they have centered on a 
mobilizing issues. Housing, police brutality and bus segregation are all specific issues that 
indeed were contextualized and echoed concerns circulating in the arena. Rosa Parks’ refusal to 
get up was not the first in the preceding twelve months or even decade. As we pointed out in the 
introduction, Claudette Colvin, a member of the N.A.A.C.P youth Council where Parks worked 
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as a secretary, refused the very same demand at the beginning of March that year. Cleary there 
was a conscious effort to use the issue of the bus policy to raise awareness of wider issues of 
segregation and the uneven distribution of civil rights in the US. Using Claudette’s story was 
considered as an option, but passed over because she seemed less composed in character.266 The 
point of the matter is that Parks’ action happened in a framed context. It would have looked 
differently in an arena where no preparation on the topic was present before. The case 
illuminated and materialized the issue into a course of possible collective action. Leef was acting 
in a context sensitive to her issue even if it wasn’t farmed as consciously as the bus boycott of 
Montgomery, Alabama was. Generally the financial burden on the middle class in Israel 
intensified and the gaps between the rich and the poor widen substantially in the decades 
before.267 As we said before worse grievances came and went in the world with no protest at all 
and Israel itself was under this burden for decades characterized by tacit consent or at least 
indifferent and lack of belief in the possibility of change. More specifically several months 
before July 2011 popular opposition was raised in regards to prices of certain food products in 
Israel. Of course Leef was also acting within the context created by Bouazizi, the Arab Uprisings 
and European popular protests.268 But even when prior framing is not clearly available, like in 
the case of Tunisia what is clear and relevant to our context is that trigger-narratives like issue-
narratives are case-oriented and that their mobilizing force is related to an issue that resonates in 
their arenas. At least they are so at the beginning.  
Unlike issue narratives, trigger-narratives have a protagonist the story of which is crucial 
and deeply connected to the movement itself. The protagonists of trigger-narratives are not 
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persons to whom something terrible happened. Namely, they are not just that. These persons are 
person to whom something terrible had happened and they stood up against it in radical and 
costly public protest. The protagonists of trigger-narrative have a heroic air about them. This is 
why it is crucial to portray them as lacking in connections and planning. They protest radically 
and without the safety-net almost every self-preserving human being would demand for herself. 
Let us recall the case of Phan Thi Kim Phuc once again. Her picture shocked the US public and 
people around the globe. It is clear that a mobilizing narrative regarding the state of things 
crystalized around the image of her running in terror. Is she a trigger-narrative protagonist? Phan 
Thi Kim Phuc is the ultimate victim in the picture. She is very young, horrified, physically 
exposed and severely hurt. This is not to say that she is a victim in her life as a whole. She is a 
recognized heroic activist and a founder of Kim Phúc Foundation for child war victims around 
the world. This only to point out that the specific picture with this horrifying event depicts her as 
the ultimate victim just like the drowned Syrian three year old boy, Aylan, on the shores of 
Greece 2015 exposed him. Their position in the narrative of these specific images is defined by 
the fact that they had nothing to do with their predicament. They are children. They are innocent 
and irresponsible for their fate by definition. The adults around them are and the adults around 
them, including the ones looking at the picture at the time, failed horribly. Something horrifying 
happened to these children. They are shockingly innocent, vulnerable, hurt and they demanded 
our protection. The protagonists of trigger-narratives, on the other hand, activated a choice in the 
face of their predicament and their choice rebelled against the world they live in. It rebelled 
against an order. Their personal agency is at the heart of the story. The lack of personal choice is 
at the heart of the Vietnamese and the Syrian stories. Imagine for example that Time Magazine 
would name Aylan as Person of the Year. This is likely to arouse surprise or even anger. Aylan 
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and Kim Phuc are not conceived in this particular instance as agents who did something but as 
someone that something was done to. The word “conceived” is crucial here. Let’s imagine that 
Bouazizi feels that he was coerced into self-immolation. We still conceive of him as an initiator 
of a radical act of protest and in the name of this initiation we name him Person of the Year. Had 
Bouazizi been nine years old his act would have been interpreted as a disaster not a protest of a 
hero insisting on a different world. It might be that Bouazizi did not mean to protest the world he 
lived in. We do not know. What is important in this context are not his intensions so much but 
that popular news interpreted his action as such a rebellion and declared him the symbol of the 
democratic revolution in Tunisia. We usually do not act like the protagonists of trigger-narrative 
when we encounter a great power that is abusive. We move aside. We pay the rent. We buy a 
new scale. We get up and let the white woman sit. They chose to step up and face the great 
power that was impinging on their space. In their insistence they awaken the possibility of 
resistance in other hearts, and the rage towards the system in continuation to this very possibility. 
Issues, no doubt, are at the center of trigger narratives as well but a certain awe is reserved to 
their protagonists that goes beyond the issue and possibly serves as part of the fuel of the much 
larger response that trigger-narratives bring about.   
Recall the gap in content we pointed to at the beginning of this work. True, this chapter 
elaborates on the gap in size which is also mentioned in the first pages of this work, but it is 
appropriate that we say a word about the gap in content as well here before we tend to the fuller 
analysis of this topic in the next chapter. Trigger-narratives begin with an issue but their claim 
transforms ambitiously into the demand and resolve to change the order of things. The issue in 
trigger-narratives is deeply connected to an act done by a protagonist in response to an injustice. 
Trigger-narrative can be a part of an issue framed. Rosa Parks and Daphne Leef were no doubt 
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also that. Namely, their action was done in an arena that already started to circle around the 
issues that finally erupted in protest. The fact that they are a part of such a process should not 
diminish them as trigger-narratives. Trigger-narratives begin from an issue and sometimes a 
well-framed or a semi-framed issue, but very soon their issue becomes another topic among 
other topics.  These are not the stories of scales, police abuse and rent. In that sense they are not 
really issue narratives. These are the stories of democracy, civil rights and social justice. The 
leap in content is extraordinary. It is amalgamated with the fact that the protagonist of trigger-
narratives remains the symbol the movement although her act was centered on another and 
smaller issue.  
Let us use the development of the similarities and differences between issue-narratives 
and trigger-narratives to go a step further and push the definition of trigger-narratives against 
similar competing narratives. Every big event could be said to have started with a relatively 
smaller event. If we go back in time enough wouldn’t every political occurrence have a moment 
of triggering? The beginning of World War I, for example, was triggered by an assassination. 
The fall of Constantinople could be chalked down to the inventor of the fire canon, or better yet 
the invention of gunpowder centuries earlier in China. Without Guttenberg introduction of 
movable type the protestant reformation might not have happened269 etc. All big events start 
somewhere smaller. However, trigger-narratives as we defined them so far have particular 
characteristics. They are centered on a protagonist that is not powerful. It is essential to the 
action of the protagonist that it is conceived as spontaneous. They grow from their issue to 
become movements that demand a new order of things. Their protagonist remains their symbol 
despite their shift in topic. Who remembers the names of the assassins of the prince of Hungary 
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in 1914? Who can forget who Bouazizi, Leef and Parks are? These protests tend to operate in a 
manner that draws inspiration from the protagonist and her act, rather than traces it back as its 
final cause. Additionally, the act that these protagonists perform is clearly a longshot. It is almost 
a poetic protest in front of immense, obtuse and many times cruel powers. A tent. Self-
immolation in front of the city hall. Refusing to get up on the bus. These are not stories of 
persons storming the police station, targeting a powerful person so that they can change the 
course of history. These are symbolic acts in the sense that they are rebelling against the state of 
things in ways that are far from practical. To summarize briefly our entanglement in stories 
means that trigger-narratives are not island which indeed they are not. Trigger-narratives operate 
within metanarrative circumscribed arenas and they are many times part of a framing process 
that has been going on before their appearance and the beginning of the political transformation. 
Unlike any beginning these beginnings come at the form of a story with an unlikely and 
courageous protagonist to which people then join. These narratives quickly become a call for a 
new order of things. Yet although events far exceed the content and size of the event that 
triggered them, the protagonists of trigger-narrative nonetheless remains the undying symbol of 
the political transformation that erupted in their wake.   
III. Personal Narrative / Political Testimonies 
“There is a crucial difference”, Kearney says,  
between the ‘little narratives’ of the vanquished and the ‘Grand Narratives’ of the 
victors270 
We remember the latter through rituals and commemoration ceremonies and take them as a given 
proved and established fact. While the former, personal stories of experiences that do not have 
the status of a given, stand at a more vulnerable position epistemologically. We wonder if they 
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are true in a manner we are less likely to do with more familiar and established narratives. We 
might want to inquire into the reliability of the speaker and check if the stories they tell match 
other things we know about the time in question. Before probing into this difference in status we 
should clarify in what ways narratives are “little”. Kearney’s account implies two senses in 
which we might describe a narrative as “little”. First, there are simply the stories that do not gain 
the political support and institutionalization that competing narratives did achieve. For example, 
the Nakba, the story of the Palestinian disaster of 1948 stood for many years, and still stands, in a 
disadvantage position in comparison to the metanarrative of Israeli independence and to 
Zionism. The Nakba is not officially commemorated on a national level. It is contested regularly 
and it is not part of the history taught in classes.  This means that although the “size” of the 
stories is similar, namely they are both founding narratives of nations, their position is very 
different. One of them has a wider and “bigger” presence in the relevant political arenas and the 
other has a narrower and “smaller” presence in these arenas. Among other things, this means it is 
more vulnerable to forgetfulness.  A second meaning of “little narratives” is simply stories of 
singular persons, written or spoken eye-witness testimonies. These are available at least in two 
forms that are relevant here. On the one hand, we could read or hear such accounts as lived-
narratives. I could hear my grandfather telling me about his experience as Jewish man in 1940 
Romania. It is unlikely that I will, in such a context, feel the need to validate the facts. When at 
some point after I heard the story I will come across a picture of him walking the streets of 
Bucharest wearing a yellow star, I am unlikely to think of the picture as validation of his story. It 
would be but another medium through which the story I already know becomes thicker and more 
tangible. The question of validity, in other words, does not take the center of the stage with lived 
narratives since the epistemological status of “little narratives” told as lived-narratives centers on 
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the experience of the protagonist. Verification is not irrelevant of course but it becomes 
necessary only in extreme situations. Kearney’s discussion points to a second sense of “little 
stories”: Personal stories that aim to portray the story of the vanquished.  If the question 
concerning the “little narratives” is “how do personal stories operate in the socio-political 
arena?” the question of reliability, validity and soundness becomes much more pressing. The 
stories of the vanquished, since they are not as institutionalized and could be widely 
marginalized and regularly contested, rely more heavily on testimonies. Of course every 
historical narrative, in the final account, relies on testimony. As Ricoeur points out testimony is 
“the irreducible category of our relation to the past”.271 At the end of the day testimony is at the 
basis of grand and little narratives. Yet, two things make testimony more crucial to “little 
narratives”. First, we tend to forget or play-down testimony as a basis in the case of accepted 
metanarratives and on the other hand, we tend to emphasize e importance of testimonies with 
less familiar alternative metanarratives. So we might wonder if we should believe the testimonies 
of Palestinians describing their dispossession but become less severe epistemologically with the 
testimonies that describe the same event from an Israeli standpoint. Or we might do the opposite 
if we come from a different metanarrative. We awaken our critical faculties with the “little 
narrative” that are unsupported by an accepted metanarrative and we are at the risk of not waking 
those faculties up with established metanarratives and the testimonies that ground them. We 
already spoke of the “climate” like effect of grand narratives. This is an unfriendly climate to the 
stories of the vanquished. Second, as was already noted, metanarratives tend to have monuments, 
commemoration sites archives etc. metanarratives, in other words, rely on an established system 
that keeps the narrative present. This system could have been based on testimonies but it does 
not rely on them anymore. The system exists regardless and without need to resort to testimony 
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for affirmation. In this way, for example, the testimonies of holocaust survivors in Israel are not 
recounted in order to stress the validity of the fact that the holocaust happened. One is unlikely to 
meet someone in Israel that thinks differently. The holocaust and its horrendous historical facts 
are well inculcated in the cultural and political institutions. Such testimonies are told as a form of 
a ritual of paying respects to survivors and victims. Their status as they are being told in this 
context in which they are a part of a grand narrative is not constitutive. It has become over the 
years ceremonial. Testimonies supporting narratives that do not enjoy this “meta” status and the 
system that sustains it function differently. They appear in the arena without a support of a 
system and may seem strange, unintelligible and simply unbelievable. If they are contesting an 
existing narrative then the system of the metanarrative is likely to resist them. If as an Israeli I 
want to learn about the Nakba, testimonies are crucial and they are not crucial in a ceremonial 
manner. As a reader I am likely to ask myself if they are true and if indeed I am convinced, my 
current metanarrative might be severely complicated.  
How does this dynamic of challenging a metanarrative via personal narratives work?  
Namely,  
How do we move from micro-narratives of multiple singular testimonies to certain 
quasi-universal narratives 272  
The answer is already contained in the question. Only multiple singular testimonies can make a 
metanarrative or an issue narrative realign, break or transform. This multiplicity is one way 
among others to reach validity of course. Validity which as Kearney suggests could be achieved 
through an examination of consistency, coherence, credibility of witnesses, validation of facts 
and other relevant and pertinent aspects, is also supported by multiplicity. In the most direct 
manner, if many people tell the story of dispossession it is harder to claim this was an invention. 
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Faking such a big event would take a substantial coordination and organization on the side of the 
persons giving testimony. But validity is not the only factor that counts when little narrative are 
to contest issue or metanarratives. Soundness and validity are as relevant to testimonies given in 
contexts which are neither strictly historical nor chiefly political. A police officer looking into a 
testimony about a parking ticket would check for the similar aspects of reliability and coherence 
in her quest for validity and soundness. The way to counter a metanarrative is not always about 
the validity of the fact really taking place. Many times the battle between the systemized 
metanarrative and the marginalized little stories are about the meaning we attach to occurrences 
we all agree took place. As we pointed out in the first part of this chapter metanarratives are the 
perspectives through which we interpret events. Little narratives might be testimonies offering a 
new interpretation of events. In that case having many of them empowers them not because they 
cannot be contradicted but simply because they are shared by many. Numbers count in the 
political arena as Arendt points out. Power  
belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together. 
When we say about someone that he is ‘in power’ we actually refer to his being 
empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name273 
 Little narratives gain power when they are shared by a group of people.  Multiplicity in this case 
is an insistence of a group in society about a certain meaning of the state of things. Let us look at 
the suffragist movement for example. There was no argument about the state of things but only 
about the meaning of it. If enough women insisted that being banned from the right to vote is 
experienced as a grave injustice, they can challenge the more prevalent metanarrative that 
claimed that it was not. This meaning giving function of multiplicity is true also when we speak 
of “little narratives” that refer to a contested reality. For example, if enough people share their 
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testimonies about the Nakbah, it is not only validity that we hear from their repeated “little 
stories”. We also hear their power as a group, demanding and insisting that looking into the 
Nakbah is crucial. That letting the subject of the Palestinian dispossession go without a 
consideration and respect is an injustice.  
The trifurcation we are basing this chapter on emphasized the mobilizing role of 
narratives. The presence of a personal story, a testimony, as a mobilizer in the political arena 
revolves not only on its validity as the ultimate window to what was. It also relies on its ability to 
be shared, echoed and to resonate with multiple persons that together can gather and hold the 
power to describe and challenge the state of things. Personal stories can become a part of or a 
challenge to a wider concern, either a metanarrative, or an issue narrative. Such affirmation and 
status are achieved through repetition. The same story told over and over again by different 
people having the same experience in the political arena can and does many times result in a 
political outcome. Many stories of police brutality against minorities make us look at singular 
incidents through a socio-political perspective and recognize the origin and context in which 
these incidents occur. Repetition can make one testimony into a political issue because it touches 
both on the topic of validity and soundness and makes visible a concern of a segment of society 
facilitating a powerful critique.   
The power of testimony does come from its singularity. We hear this person’s story and 
we come to see a world through it. However, its power is the power of similarity and reference. 
When one sets to give her political testimony she is tacitly saying: I was part of many more. 
Testimony draws its power from singularity within plurality. Let us go back to the news item we 
discussed in chapter two concerning Rachel Dolezal.  Would her testimony be stronger or 
weaker if she had said “I am not alone. There are many like me. I am the first to speak out but I 
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represent a wider phenomenon”. Surely, she would have been treated differently. We would care 
less if there was only one slave to free, one battered woman to save, one Palestinian to liberate 
from Israeli occupation. The size of the aggrieved group is crucial in the same way that the size 
of a demonstration is crucial. Viewed in this way testimony is an attempt to empower the weak 
by making them into community and inviting others, supporters or those who share similar 
experiences to be part of the community so that its impact, its power will grow to be more 
substantial. A testimony that does not succeed in pointing out to a socio-political concern might 
end up as marginal if not simply odd. This is what happened to Prof. Rachel Dolezal. She 
obviously had an interesting and aggravating experience with racial identity but to her 
misfortune not enough others share her grievance and so her power is not great. If 30,000 
persons identifying as other than the race they were born into would have stepped forward we 
and the institutions around are almost certain to have looked on the matter quite differently.  We 
might have eventually pushed for a law forbidding employers to ask employees what their 
biological race was and definitely forbids them to hold any prejudice against people who 
contested their biological racial orientation. Racial orientation, we might say in such a scenario is 
a private matter and should not be part of a professional arena. 
This description of the power of repetition should be qualified. One could also fail to see 
the political context in her personal account because of meta and issue narratives she dwells in. 
For example, if we are in a capitalist socio-political context that sees the state as not responsible 
for its poor, than one’s personal story of poverty even if told with other similar stories repeating 
similar circumstances might fail to congeal into a wider socio-political understanding.274 
Gathering groups together to challenge what we described earlier in this chapter as invisible as 
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the air we breathe is not easy. People might not see what the point is. The state of things seems 
natural to the dwellers even if they are hurt by it and attempts that suggest otherwise many times 
seem completely outlandish before (and of course if) they become a reality. The power of 
repetition is central to the effectivity of “little narratives”. It is by no means sufficient. 275    
 If we succeeded in establishing the crucial status of repetition in the function of personal 
stories as mobilizers in the political arena we could now ask what kind of repetition we can see 
in trigger-narratives. Strangely enough trigger-narratives on the one hand look very much like a 
personal story of a testimony. The protagonists are rebelling in their actions against something 
that happened to them personally. However, it is clear that their power is not emanating from 
repetition as one might expect. These are not the stories of many people who had their scales 
taken. While it might be the case that all protesters in the civil right movement suffered from 
segregated buses, the movement was not fueled from repeated stories of similar experience but 
actually ignored such previous stories. Nor was rent the main experience cited in the social 
justice movement. What was repeated and shared was something else: first the trigger-narrative 
is repeated over and over again. The same story of the same person is repeated in the political 
arena, rather than many stories on the same grievance. Second, there is a repetition of a certain 
frustration with many aspects of the state of things that erupts. People repeat the many 
grievances of monarchies and dictatorships, the lack of civil rights and the lack of social justice. 
The repetition takes place on a more general and far wider level than the story at its conception.      
IV. Conclusion 
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Trigger Narratives, as is already clear from the above analysis align with different aspects of 
each of the three forms of narratives that we describe above. Like metanarratives they 
circumscribe a whole socio-political arena affecting many issues and aiming to create a certain 
“world” in the image of their idea. Like issue-narratives trigger-narratives clearly open with a 
specific and articulated socio-political grievance. They mobilize around an issue. And finally like 
personal narratives, trigger-narratives are grounded in personal occurrences. Already the fact that 
they take part in all three kinds of narratives makes clear they are none of the three. A 
metanarrative is never a personal narrative. It could materialize in personal narratives and issue 
narratives, but it cannot be a part the very same story. Metanarratives by nature are somewhat 
abstract and relate to values or larger historical occurrences. Issue-narratives can and do align 
with other issues at times. They circulate the socio-political arena mobilizing action which 
sometimes groups together several concerns. Yet such narratives do not have one protagonist 
initiating them in a manner that makes this protagonist a symbol. Nor do they normally exceed 
the content of their issue by such a margin to call for a new order. Finally, personal-stories rely 
on repetition to gather momentum and credibility. Trigger-narratives gather their momentum 
from being small and singular. While personal stories of battered women will repeat similar 
patterns, trigger-narratives stand at the center of a great occurrence pretty much alone.  
Additionally, trigger-narratives touch on the personal in a lionizing, demonizing and glorifying 
ways. The protagonists of trigger-narratives are admired, named “person of the year”, and 
idolized. They become a small story about the deed of one person attempting to create a new 
world. They become, in other words, a sort of political fairytale.  
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The last four chapters pointed out in several perspectives what trigger-narratives are not. It is 
time to advance from this position into a discussion that outlines what they might be: incredible 
political fairytales with arduous path and a sometimes a fabulously good ending.   
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Chapter Five: Mythical Eruption 
 
If I did my argumentative work well we should know at this stage what trigger-narratives 
are not. Trigger-narratives are not lived-narratives since they tend to miss the real who-ness of 
their protagonists. They do not revolve around a historical protagonist since they limit their 
protagonists to one event and portray them as specifically not calculated and/or power seeking. 
They are not fiction in the ordinary sense of the word because they do not have a writer or fourth 
wall. They are not metanarratives. Trigger-narratives are explicit and spring from an articulated 
singular accounts rather than form an all-encompassing general sub-current narrative. They 
cannot be categorized as issue-narratives: trigger-narratives sometimes elicit a response on 
various issues and generally instill a bigger and more comprehensive expectation for change than 
issue-narrative. They aim at a new order. What are trigger-narratives then? It seems fair to 
suggest that sharing partially in each of these forms of narratives is in itself a definition that 
carries substantial amount of content. If it is true that trigger-narratives are not metanarratives, it 
is also true that trigger-narratives have the effect of metanarratives. They circumscribe a new 
sociopolitical arena. Trigger-narratives are not lived-narratives. However, they are a part of a 
lived-narrative. We know that they do have an issue at their core. We could say, at this point of 
the argument, that trigger-narratives share in several existing concepts yet fail to be fully and 
meaningfully subsumed under any of them. This kind of definition would label them as a hybrid 
concept that exists in the margins and overlapping spaces of other concepts of narratives. It could 
be enough to justify our new coining. It is not enough, however, in order to understand the 
phenomena at hand in a manner that allows it to be more than the sum, or the eclectic collection, 
of parts of other concepts.   
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Indeed this concluding chapter, unlike the four before it, is not about justification. This is 
a chapter aiming to outline a new positive direction through which we could attend to our newly 
defined narratives. Our argument in this chapter will not rely on elimination but rather on a 
framework that will help us understand these events as conceptual wholes. As the title of this 
chapter suggests this framework is mythology. Understanding trigger-narrative through the 
concept of mythology sheds a unifying light on the many different characteristics we enumerated 
so far. It is most probably true that mythology is not the only framework possible for a unifying 
explanation of trigger-narratives. The last four chapters and this concluding chapter are all an 
invitation for further nuanced and attentive elaborations on these and other similar events. 
Mythology is, however, a perspective that attends to what I think is at the heart of these 
occurrences. It touched both on their awe-inspiring content and on their ‘big-bang’ structure. In 
this chapter we attach this sense of awe mingled with radical surprise to an ancient tradition of 
fantastic stories of beginnings.  
The working hypothesis of this chapter is that there are mythical elements in the events 
that circle trigger-narratives. Trigger-narratives elicit a reaction that ignites a cosmogenic 
passion, a sense of sociopolitical creative omnipotence. These are events that are fueled by three 
specific features that are central to mythological narratives: (a) a great battle with monstrous 
forces; (b) world creation and finally (c) an air of the fantastic. We begin with a discussion of the 
definition of myth, the status of myth in contemporary times and cosmogony. We then proceed 
with a philosophical discussion of monstrosity, ritual and awe. Our understanding of trigger-
narratives, I claim, could be deepened and widen if they are viewed as mythical eruptions.  
I. Defining Myth  
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Philosophy has been trying to reassess and rectify its relationship with mythology in 
contemporary times. The juxtaposition of reason to sacred logos on the one hand, and 
Enlightenment’s scientific logos on the other, made way for a fecund and nuanced approaches 
and depictions of myths that treat them as one form of communication and comprehension 
among others.  
Myth is now seen […] as a legitimate dimension of human expression instead of that 
first step in evolution from mythos to logos276    
This is not to say that the traditional Western caution and disdain with mythology is obsolete. 
The word “myth” is still used academically and colloquially in a pejorative sense alongside other 
more balanced uses. The Oxford Dictionary gives four meanings to the word “myth” only one of 
them refers to traditional stories. The other three revolve around the words “fictive”, 
“exaggerated” and “false”.277  Taylor is quoted in this work calling Enlightenment metanarrative 
of progress a myth.278 We are unlikely to call a biblical holy-story a myth because a myth might 
be received as a judgement about the soundness of the bible, and thus perceived as an insult.  
Bottici’s claim, for example, is that treatment of political myth philosophically fails to offer a 
fully-fledged framework for myths as a fundamental form of comprehension, communication 
and action but rather subsume it under unprecise concepts such as narratives and symbolism. Her 
suggestion is that this caution, this “terminological demythologizing”,279 is the product of an 
association of totalitarian regimes with the political devastating power of a-rational elements.280 
Ricoeur agrees that we cannot be naïve anymore when approaching myth. “Myth willalways be 
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with us”, Ricoeur says, “but we must always approach it critically.”281 Finally, almost every 
academic account of myth opens with an acknowledgement of this pejorative sense and phobic-
ridden history that surrounds discussions of myths. It is clear though that there is an academic 
development that moves away from the patronizing and fearful stance into a more analytical 
viewpoint which depicts myth as a legitimate, valuable and relevant participant in the 
sociopolitical arena today.   
If we were asked to impromptu come up with a mythological narrative, it is reasonable to 
assume that several possible and quite diverse accounts would come to mind. Anything from 
Genesis to Aristophanes’ speech in the Symposium might present itself to those imbued in the 
Western tradition. It is clear that even within one general cultural context the accounts we might 
give of myths are likely to be different from one another and perhaps come from various periods 
as well as several linguistic and cultural sources and forms. How do we organize the conceptual 
plethora that accompanies the word mythology? The sociologist Percy S. Cohen identifies seven 
research theories of myth that he thinks are valuable. These theories treat myth as (1) a form of 
explanation which occurs at a certain development stage of human society and culture; (2) a 
form of symbolic statement which reflects a particular type of thought, the mythopoeic, at a 
certain development stage of human society and culture; (3) an expression of the unconscious; 
(4) a function in creating and maintaining social cohesion; (5) a form of legitimating social 
institutions and social practices; (6) a form of symbolic statement about social structure, possibly 
linked with ritual; (7) and, finally structuralist theory which treats myth as a common structure of 
mind and society. Honko, the Finnish folklorist, adds to this classification four more theories that 
are concerned with understanding myth as (1) a result of a historical situation; (2) a form of 
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religious communication and finally (3) as a form of religious genre.282 These are not lists that 
claim to be exhaustive, but they do help us map a tremendously varied field and outline in it the 
path of our argument.  
Several relevant things stand out in these classifications: First, the ubiquity of the 
sociopolitical setting. Myths are stories that are deeply intertwined in the fabric of social life 
incorporating and integrating a coherent view of the specific sociopolitical world they operate in. 
Even the psychological research method which decodes myth in relation to the unconscious 
refers mainly to Jung and neo-Jungian concepts of collective unconscious.283 Second, the 
multiplicity of research methods is telling as to the functions of myths. It is possible to produce 
meaningful research of myth from so many diverse perspectives because “all myth performs a 
number of functions simultaneously”.284   
Myths are multidimensional: a myth can be approached from, shall we say, ten different 
angles, some of which may have greater relevance than others depending on the nature 
of the material being studies and the question posed285  
Much in the same way attempting to pinpoint a universal, essential definition of myth misses the 
mark of the subject matter. Such a vast and varied topic requires that the analysis applied to it is 
“both flexible and multiform”.286 This is not to claim every interpretation is possible or that 
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every story could be called a myth, but that the quest for one all-encompassing definition is not 
the best way to achieve clarity and to widen analytical possibilities.  
Let us define the working concept of myth of our argument against some exiting 
definitions. Ricoeur points out that one of the oldest meanings of the word mythos is simply 
“saying”. Myths are first and foremost a form of discourse. To this Ricoeur adds the fact that 
myth is a fable, a work of fantasy and finally, that it has the structure of a plot.287 In a later work 
Ricoeur comments on the temporal cosmogenic aspects of myths. Every calendar, Ricoeur points 
out, has a ‘zero point’ which is determined by a founding event.288 Myth recalls the idea of a 
‘great time’ that envelopes all of reality. The primary function of this ‘great time’ is to order the 
times of societies and human beings who live in society in relation to cosmic time.  
[M]ythic time […] initiates a unique, overall scansion of time, by ordering in terms of 
one another, cycles of different durations, the great celestial cycle, biological 
recurrences and the rhythms of social life […] In this way myth representations 
contributed to the institution of calendar time289 
Cohen concurs with Ricoeur that myths are necessarily fantastic narratives of cosmogonies. He 
adds that the events that they depict have a sacred quality, involves supernatural beings and 
depict the origin or a transformation in a dramatic form.290 Mircea Eliade, similarly to Cohen’s 
additions, defines myth as narration of 
a sacred history [which] relates to an event that took place in primordial Time, the 
fabled time of the ‘beginnings’. In other words myth tells how, through the deeds of 
Supernatural Beings, a reality came into existence 291 
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The centrality of supernatural beings in the definition of myth is a contested matter. While most 
definitions agree cosmogony is a fundamental form of myth the part of other-worldly creature 
does not enjoy the same status. Honko’s definition is quite wide and contains four criteria: form, 
content, function and context. His aim is to allow for a delimited yet flexible definition that can 
encompass the different research approached to the study of myth. Narrative, Honko suggests, is 
the main form of myth but not the only form. Icons, religious behavior and dance could and 
should also be considered as mythical expressions. The content of myth “in general [contains] 
information about decisive creative events in the beginning of time”.292 But myths can also be 
stories that recount  
how our era started, how the goals that we strive to attain are determined and our most 
sacred values codified.293  
Mythology, through this perspective, is always cosmogenic because even non-cosmogenic 
stories still point to an origin of a community’s identity and thus to the beginning and the 
creation of its world. It is not, however, fantastic necessarily.  The supernatural component, as 
we can see, is no longer present under this reading. The fantastic and sacred, is turned into 
“decisive”. 
Seen from this point of view the 96th sura of the Koran, the birth of Christ, the life of 
Lenin, Che Gevera’s death and Mao’s speeches are all material which, under certain 
conditions, can be structured in a way which resembles ancient cosmogenic myths 294 
The ‘great time’ need not be supernatural but rather could be a documented historical era.  
Bottici makes a similar point about the sacred and the supernatural when she says that 
myths rely on figurative tools such as figures and images, but they do not necessarily do 
so at the service of any particular heroic content. To put it rather crudely, we do not need 
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primitive blood rituals in order to have a myth. Everything can be an object of myth, just 
as everything can be an object of poetry.295 
Bottici’s definition is much wider than the others’ of course. She situates myth between the 
explanation form of science and the absolute answers that religion seeks to provide. Unlike 
religions, myths need not give purpose to the question of the meaning of life. They simply let us 
know how it all began. Unlike science myths do not just name things in the world around us. 
They ground them in a manner that makes the world, closer to us. They make the world a place 
that we can call our own. This ‘bringing closer’ of myth is something Plato uses explicitly in the 
Republic when he offers the Noble Lie. Socrates’ myth makes the earth a mother and the 
inhabitants of Athens siblings, family. It does not offer the reason for the existence of mother 
earth. Like family, it asks that we accept this world as ours in care, responsibility, commitment 
and obedience. This form of grounding Bottici names, echoing Hans Blumenberg, significance 
(Bedeutsamkeit)  
Significance […] situates itself precisely between two extremes: meanings on the one 
hand (the Sinnfrage: ‘What is this?’) and the sense of ‘Being’ on the other (the 
Seinsfrage: ‘What is the sense of being?’). Significance is not (just) meaning, because 
there is meaning every time that there is language. But significance is not necessarily the 
question about the sense of the being either, because some myths do not aim to provide 
explanations of the ultimate meaning of being.296  
Myths, then, according to Bottici’s reading are cosmogenic to a degree and definitely do not 
necessitate the supernatural. In fact “everything, even the most banal event, can be the object of a 
mythical narrative.”297 We will not define myth this widely but it is important to note how varied 
and dynamic the definitions of myths could be.  
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This overview aims at describing the conceptual possibilities in the arena in which we are 
to argue for understanding trigger-narratives as a form of myth. What is needed for this analysis 
is not so much a comprehensive definition of myth but rather a delineation of the aspects of myth 
that are relevant to trigger-narratives.  Our working definition of myths here is that myths are 
narratives that can be expressed in other forms as well (images, videos, dance, prayer, action 
etc.) and which convey a creative moment of a beginning of a community. These narratives, 
supernatural or not, have a fantastic and awe-inspiring air about them. Note that in our definition 
we distinguish between the sense of awe and the supernatural. A sense of awe and a sense of the 
fantastic could emerge in circumstances in which there is no claim for supernatural revelation or 
intervention. One could have her breathtaking reaction to an unexpected political event that aims 
to change the world. Our introduction to this work points to this sense of awe as a crucial aspect 
of trigger-narratives.  
Our interest, however, does not lie with all myths that can be subsumed under our 
definition. We are interested in a particular form of myths. Myths emerge most often in oral 
traditions and they tend to have some mnemonic aids that are expressed among other ways in the 
form of recognizable formulas and themes.  
Formulas help implement rhythmic discourse and also act as mnemonic aids in their 
own right, as set expressions circulating through the mouths and ears of all298 
We are interested in myths that answer our definition and in addition portray the formula of a 
battle of a heroine or a hero with a monster.  
II. Monsters and Monsters2  
A hero’s great struggle with a monster is not usually a constitutive part the definition of 
myth. Even definitions that require the existence on supernatural beings might not depict 
                                                
298 Walter J. Ong. Orality and Literacy: 30th Anniversary Edition. (NY: Routledge, 1982), 34 
169 
 
struggles between them and heroines.  Two things are crucial though in this regard if we are to 
understand the status heroic struggles with monsters: first, myths work in and through narrative 
networks and they often have several versions. “There are no single myths, which are given once 
and for all.”299 Myths are repeated in several accounts and styles, sometimes adapting overtime 
to new circumstance and sometimes existing concurrently. This complex layered branching was, 
for example, a cause for concern to Lévi-Strauss and others who sought to interpret myth.  
[A] point which has worried the specialists until now, namely, that in the earlier 
(Homeric) versions of the Oedipus myth, some basic elements are lacking, such as 
Jocasta killing herself and Oedipus piercing his own eyes.300 
Lévi-Strauss’ solution was to collapse all versions into one form. These events, he says, “can 
easily be integrated”. In fact this integration is propounded as a solution to a problem 
which has, so far, been one of the main obstacles to the progress of mythological studies, 
namely, the quest for the true version, or the earlier one. On the contrary, we define the 
myth as consisting of all its versions; or to put it otherwise, a myth remains the same as 
long as it is felt as such.301 
One could reduce the many versions of the same myth into one main story structure. 
Alternatively, one could object302 and argue that Lévi-Strauss’ attempt “to catch the invariants of 
myth”303 leaves him entrapped scientific logos which does not facilitate or truly accounts for the 
multidimensional and web-like character of myth as a subject matter.  What is important for our 
argument is to recognize that myth is a story that echoes and overlaps with versions of itself in 
which certain events, persons and monsters, may appear and disappear. Second, myths are 
mostly located within a greater storyline. Oedipus and the Sphinx are the very tangible 
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background of Sophocles’ Antigone as well as Euripides’ lost play with the same title and The 
Phoenician Women. Through family connections, the timeline, the setting and the interacting and 
overlapping topics myth is never a single storyline. Thus, if we are to get back to our monsters 
and heroines, the heroine of one storyline and her battle with a monster can echo in another 
version or serve as a background story. Even if such battles do not figure in every myth as the act 
of creation does, the presence of such struggles of heroes and heroines with mythical monsters is 
extensive and substantial in this interconnected, productive and repetitive arena.  
 The functions of monsters and heroes, like the many overlapping functions of myth we 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, stretch from the representation of psychological 
unconscious to the sociopolitical legitimacy of behavior and institutions. As part of mythology 
monsters can be said to be the projection of our repressed fears or to symbolize the chaos that 
was fought off in the creation of a community in order to uphold the existing order as necessary 
and lifesaving. Ong suggests that monsters and heroes, which he characterizes as “heavy” and 
“bizarre” respectively, figure much in the mythological narrative network because they serve as 
mnemonic tools.  
Oral memory works effectively with ‘heavy’ characters, persons whose deeds are 
monumental, memorable and commonly public. Thus the noetic economy of its nature 
generates outsize figures, that is, heroic figures, not for romantic reasons or reflectively 
didactic reasons but for much more basic reasons: to organize experience in some sort of 
permanently memorable form. Colorless personalities cannot survive oral mnemonics 
[…]it is easier to remember the Cyclops than a two-eyed monster, or Cerberus than an 
ordinary one-headed dog.304 
If we accept this interpretation, monsters have a paradoxical role. On the one hand, they serve as 
the exact opposite of chaos and the subconscious since they uphold the ability to remember and 
communicate the epic oral tradition. On the other, the content of the story will depict them as 
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endangering the existing order. Of course heroes and monsters survived the transition into 
writing extremely well. Witches, Wizards, dragons, monsters, dark lords of rings and aliens 
figure much in modern and contemporary storylines.  Some cosmogonies tie the creation of the 
world or a sociopolitical arena with the sacrifice of a primordial monster.305 In fact, this theme is 
so prevalent that in the past some monarchs whose historical existence is not questioned have 
taken on a mythical persona of the hero defying a monster.306 Eliade gives several examples for 
such processes: The Serbian king Marko Kraljevic (1371-1395) in Yguslavia was fully 
incorporated into Yugoslavian heroic poetry for killing a three-headed dragon. Dieudonné de 
Gozon the grand master of the Knights of Rhodes (1346-1353) was named “Dragon Slayer” 
because it was believed that he killed the dragon of Malpasso. In short monsters and the heroes 
that rise to defeat them are one of the most familiar and repeated mythical paradigms.307  
We already discussed in length the characteristics of our heroines and heroes. We pointed 
out that they are depicted as spontaneous, lacking in powerful connections and overall their 
description emphasized them as vulnerable and unlikely mythical protagonists. Let us now 
examine the concept of monstrosity. In what follows I will use Kant’s description of the sublime 
in order to delineate the concept of the monstrous that I am intending here. The most 
fundamental and important difference between the sublime and the beautiful Kant point out, is 
that the latter is a revelation of nature’s purposiveness and the former a revelation of its counter-
purposiveness. The beautiful object appears as if it is adapted to our powers of judgement; the 
sublime   
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Contravene the ends of our power of judgement, to be ill-adapted to our faculty of 
presentation, and to do violence, as it were, to the imagination, and yet it is judged all the 
more sublime on that account308 
The sublime in fact is not a representation at all. “[I]t is the attunement of the spirit evoked by a 
particular representation.”309 What stands as the essence of the experience of the sublime is the 
realization of the power of our sense-transcending faculty in the face of a representation that 
resists our sense-dependent faculties. This comes about through the mere estimation of 
magnitude. Magnitude estimation in the final account is based on intuition. Measurements are a 
systematization of a primary intuition which means that “all estimation of the magnitude of 
objects of nature is in the last resort aesthetic (i.e. subjectively and not objectively 
determined).”310 However, while the possibility of the mathematical representation of this 
primary intuition is infinite, the intuitive ground of measurements is finite.  There are infinite 
numbers of possible sizes but we could only grasp objects intuitively to a certain degree and 
amount. Comprehension, the ability to grasp “the many in one intuition, [has] a greatest point 
beyond which it cannot go.”311 Apprehension, on the other hand, is limitless. The point of 
divergent between the finite nature of intuition and the potential infinity of the faculty of reason 
is where Kant’s concept of the sublime (erhaben) transpires. Coming across an intuition that one 
cannot estimate or grasp, awakens, emphasizes and makes clear the function and power of the 
faculty of reason that could account for the infinite regardless of the shortcomings of 
imagination.    
Kant does not speak a lot about the monstrous (das Ungeheure). The word is mentioned 
in the Critique of Judgement but three times all in the same excerpt and in connection to the 
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sublime. “An object is monstrous if by its magnitude it annihilates the end which its concept 
constitutes.”312 The monstrous has a grounding concept but it cannot be intuitively 
comprehended. Because it is too big to grasp in one intuition, we fail to conceptualize it. We 
reach the limit of our ability to comprehend (apprehension, as we said, could go on endlessly 
regardless of the lacking intuition). Elaborating on this border between comprehension and 
incomprehension, Kant offers another degree of object comprehension: the colossal.   
The colossal is the mere presentation of a concept which is almost too great for 
presentation, i.e. borders on the relatively monstrous313  
The colossal almost defies comprehension but in the final account succeeds in the process of 
comprehension. The experience of the sublime, however, does not have a grounding concept 
since it is an aesthetic judgment. The sublime, Kant points out, cannot be works of art where the 
form and size are determined by humans. It can also not be a familiar object of nature because 
such objects (e.g. animals) have a concept and a determinate ends. The sublime must be raw 
nature involving magnitude that is not inspiring fear. “Nature[…] is sublime in such of its 
phenomena as in their intuition convey the idea of their infinity,”314 which could only happen 
through failure of our imagination to aesthetically estimate a certain magnitude. It is a moment in 
which we abandon ourselves in front of an excessive intuition of magnitude alone and find our 
imagination inadequate in comparison to the immense power of our reason. It is pleasurable and 
moving, Kant suggests, for us to find how independent and strong our supersensible faculty is 
and how “its idea of noumenon”315 could serve as a comprehending tool to sensually non-
comprehendible phenomena. It is a proof of our superiority over the senses and Kant even goes 
as far as to suggest over nature itself. 
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Now Kant admits two things that dictate much of the relation between the monstrous and 
the sublime. First, the experience of the sublime necessitates a certain elevation of “the forces of 
the soul”316 over the usual sensually informed epistemological perspective. Second, although the 
experience of the sublime is grounded in what Kant refers to as universal human nature it is a 
product of culture. 317 Lacking a certain cultural orientation might make a potential experience of 
the sublime into the simpler and more accessible experience of the monstrous. Abandoning the 
grounding concept of an intuition and the physical fear is an acquired skill and that means that 
moving from an experience of the monstrous to the experience of the sublime is not a given. 
Kant goes to certain length in order to protect his sublime from “the monstrous potential inherent 
in it.”318 This attempt to limit the sublime by associating it with a certain mood, a certain 
abandoning of every-day perspective, makes for a fragile border between the two experiences.  
Kearney voices a concern about this fragile border and the contemporary amalgamations, 
postmodern and new age, of the sublime with the monstrous.319 The concern is that such 
mixtures equating that which exceeds all form in terms of end and ground allows for little words, 
the possibility of discerning and almost no action in the face of evil.  
In [these versions] of the sublime, the upwardly transcendent finds its mirror image in 
the downwardly monstrous. Both extremes are so marked by the experience of radical 
alterity that they transgress the limits of representation […], the two sometimes become 
virtually indistinguishable. By this account, horror is just as ‘ineffable’ as the vertical 
transcendence of God […]. There is, in short, an apophasis of the monstrous analogous 
to an apophasis of the divine.320  
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Kearney’s concern is three-fold: first, the mixture of exuberance and horror that is entailed by 
this combination of the radically good and the radically evil, makes the monstrously sublime 
attractive. Second, if we are to approach the zone of neither boundaries nor definitions, we might 
lose the concept of subjectivity and with it the option of agency. And finally, this form of the 
monstrous-sublime refers to “an archaic and unnameable non-object that defies language”321  
which leaves us literally aimless in front of great atrocities. Indeed what is it, if anything, that 
differentiates the monstrous from the sublime, but a certain kind of culturally acquired mood?  
Our concept of the monstrous in this work emerges against the fragile border that stretches 
between the monstrous and the sublime. It transpires in a form of a decision, the activist’s 
decision. I will name it monstrous2 in this section in order to avoid confusion in terminology. 
  In the face of imagination’s failure, the sublime is a movement of retreat inwards. 
Bracketing fear for our lives and our finite perspective we turn into the most abstract faculty and 
there find infinity and conceptual strength. But is this retreat away from intuition, away from 
finitude, and toward reason really a sign of power? The experience of the sublime is a sharp 
decision in favor of reason and recoiling away from intuition. Monstours2, I would like to 
suggest, involves a choice in the other direction. And this choice, the choice to proceed in the 
attempt to comprehend intuitively, diverts one from the silent position that an ineffable 
monstrosity or sublimity demand. The monstrous2 emerges when we insist on the movement 
toward the imagination comprehension of the manifold in one against all odds and in the face of 
difficulty and repeated failures. What the monstrous2 entails, and the sublime moves away from, 
is the possibility of action.   
The imagery associated with the sublime and the monstrous is our point of departure.  
The two occupy different realms of metaphors, descriptions and images. Kant recognizes the 
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closeness of his concept of the sublime to the concept of God. He even comments on the Jewish 
Law prohibition of God-like images in connection to his concept of the sublime.322 The sublime 
can “never be anything more than a negative presentation.”323 It is a feeling emanating from 
thrusting the sensuous aside. Kant, however, does differentiate between the experience of the 
sublime where the resistance of our reason to the lack of intuition feels us with omnipotence and 
the experience of God in front of which we do not exercise such resistance and do not enjoy a 
feeling of omnipotence but rather retreat into obedience. The explanation for Kant lies in the fact 
that our hearts are rarely pure and so we are in a state of fear in front of God. Fear, as we already 
said, does not allow for the distance required by the aesthetic judgement of the sublime.  
The individual that is actually in a state of fear, finding in himself good reason to be so, 
because he is conscious of offending with his evil disposition against a might directed by 
a will at once irresistible and just, is far from being in the frame of mind for admiring 
divine greatness, for which a mood of calm reflection and a quite free judgement are 
required.324 
One corollary of this remark is that if it was possible that we were to stand in front of God with 
completely pure hearts then, according to Kant, the monotheistic God is an experience of a 
sublime. The sublime than answers the formless, ubiquity normally attributed to the monotheistic 
God. Additionally, we can observe that both positions, in front of God and the concept of the 
sublime, could be interpreted as recoiling rather than resisting. A retreat into abstract 
conceptualization or a position of fear in front an omnipotent God, are closer to reverence, 
withdrawal and acceptance than to resistance and power. It is not clear that the ability to apply 
the concept of infinity on a resisting intuition is truly a sign of greatness or of resistance. It is fair 
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to assume that whatever this conceptualization-based resistance is, it is not easily or obviously 
associated with action-based resistance. And so we end up with an imagery gamut on which one 
end is a non-comprehendible frustrating chaotic intuition and on the other end an abstractly 
conceptualized concept of infinity.  
The imagery of the monstrous is complex and elaborate. It is not usually chaotic although 
it does inspire fear. Monsters occupy a completely different mode of description than the 
monotheistic God. To begin with, they usually have a form. It is heavy and bizarre as Ong says, 
but it is a form. Their form might be hard to comprehend or understand but monsters2325 as we 
usually encounter then in stories are not completely foreign to human intuitive comprehension 
process. Monsters2 unlike the sublime, are not completely other worldly. They are also not 
beyond comprehension once and for all. Comprehension, as Kant himself points out when he 
offers the concepts of the colossal, the monstrous and the sublime, comes in degrees. The 
monstrous2 is neither a possible adjective of the sublime, nor its evil content. The monsters2 
requires a completely different mood. It does not abandon the sensible when it fails and it does 
not retreat to reason alone because the intuition is excessive. The monstrous2 is a position in 
which the imagination stands on the border of comprehension insisting to intuitively comprehend 
against repeated failures. The sublime is associated formally with the monotheistic God.  
Namely, it defies in principle conceptual thinking. In front of it we are either in awe or 
trembling. By the monstrous2, on the other hand, I mean a response to intuition that is not fully 
graspable in one intuitive moment yet does not abandon this frustrating experience in favor of 
completely abstract conceptualization of the infinite which relives the frustration and replaces it 
with a feeling of omnipotence. Think of the Sphinx, for example.  The Sphinx has a human head 
and a lion’s body. It asks riddles and administers cruel punishments. The Sphinx is clearly not 
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sublime. It is a monster though. Its strangeness might mean that we would fail to grasp its nature 
and concept fully in one intuition, but it would not make sense to say that it is beyond grasp. We 
slowly come to understand the ways it works, that parallel concepts we know, and ways that are 
new. We might never understand it fully. It might be frustrating to find out that we cannot 
fathom it as one whole, but we insist on the parts we do understand just the same. We stay with 
intuition and its frustrating complexity. The monstrous2, which answers to popular imagery of 
monsters, is not the evil twin or another name for the Sublime or God. Monstrosity2 is more like 
the Greek gods. The gods and the monsters have an image. The gods are mighty and other but 
they have anthropomorphic characteristics too: Although they can be immortal they can be born. 
They can be jealous. They can act stupidly. They can be deceived. They can be punished. They 
sometimes depend on humans’ admiration and sacrifice. In short, they have flaws and feelings. 
Monsters2 are many times in forms of recognizable animals mingled into a hybrid, extinct 
animals or deformed versions of existing animals: a dog with three heads, a crocodile with wings 
etc. What they are absolutely not is beyond concepts and comprehension. Rather than comparing 
the monstrous2 to God, we could compare it to the concept of an angel, for example.  One does 
not usually go into a heroic battle with the monotheistic Supreme Being. Heroic mythical 
struggles happen between a heroine and a monster or an angel. Jacob didn’t fight God. He 
struggled with an angel. David didn’t struggle with Lyotard’s Hamakom,326 he fought with a 
giant. In the face of great evil Job laments but does not pull-out his sword to fight the forces that 
torture him. There is nothing to fight. The completely omnipotent Other is not a fair or possible 
struggle.  Like the sublime, the creatures that can be called monsters2 (or angels2) are others. 
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However, they are of an order that could be, at great danger, opposed and won over. 
Monotheistic Gods are not of this order. They do not invite struggles.  
Now, obviously, the concept of monstrosity2 that we propounded in the last excerpt is 
different from the concept of monstrosity that could be used in a natural amalgamation with the 
sublime. We cannot easily amalgamate the ineffable monotheistic God with a three-headed 
dragon or a Sphinx. “Creatures which hang around borders, and disrespect their integrity”, says 
Kearney “are traditionally known as monsters”.327 Indeed monsters hang around borders. The 
sublime, according to the distinction we wish to maintain, hangs far away from these borders, in 
the land where the borders or concepts for that matter, mean nothing at all. The “uncontainable 
excess”328 that is signaled my monsters, has degrees. Some things are uncontainable in one 
comprehending intuition.  Still, with effort and more than the simple one comprehending 
intuition they could be fathomed, resisted and made more containable. The oscillation between 
the monstrous and the sublime, between the retreat to reason and the insistence on a 
confrontation with the complex excessive existence offers exactly what Kant suggests: an 
acquired skill. Insisting to comprehend the excessive is as culturally acquired as comprehending 
it through the rational concept of infinity. It’s a choice. And it is a choice that has corollaries in 
the field of action. “Evil is basically alienation – something predetermined by forces beyond 
us”.329 The extent of these evil forces, their meaning and the way we wish to go about 
comprehending them dictates the gamut of our possible action and reaction.  
Kearney indeed suggests three ways of grasping, making sense and resisting these forces: 
(a) Practical understanding, which attempts to discern between good and evil with a view to 
providing a ground for action against evil; (b) working through, which through testimonies of 
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victims and mourning purges and turns “a position of mute helplessness to acts of revolt and self-
renewal”330 and finally (c) pardon, possibly a miracle, that is beyond reason but not irrational, 
and which can break of cycles of evil.331  To these we could add Ricoeur’s point about testimony 
and remembrance. He suggests in the context of incredible evil: “Horror isolates events by 
making them incomparable, incomparably unique and uniquely unique.”332 However, this 
isolation, says Ricoeur, cannot be posed as mutually antithetical to historical explanation. 
Ricoeur’s suggestion is that fiction can help us remember in a manner that does not forget the 
victims and is not drives solely by scientific curiosity which sometimes leans to the exotic.333 In 
the same way the epic remembered the ancient heroes and gave them eternal fame, fiction can 
remember the contemporary victims and give their “mundane” sufferings a stable and central 
status in the hall of remembrance. Our distinction between the monstrous2 and the sublime adds a 
fifth approach. When faced with a great evil we are many times presented with a choice. We can 
respond to the experience of the excessive as if it is in the form of the evil sublime: concept-less, 
without words and many times removed from anything humans could possibly comprehend or 
fight.  This is likely to elicit silent and reverence on our part, maybe a lament. This is the 
amalgamation Kearny and Ricoeur are arguing against. We could, on the other hand, respond to 
this evil as if it was a monster2 and not a monstrous-sublime: not quite comprehendible in one 
intuition but hanging on the borders of what is knowable despite its strangeness and otherness. 
This is likely to elicit a completely other response. Kearney speaks of this response when he 
explains that  
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Working-through the experience of evil - narratively, practically, cathartically - enables 
us to take the allure out of evil so that we can begin to distinguish between possible and 
impossible modes of protest and resistance.334  
We can resist, struggle, and maybe even change the monstrous2 because we insist not look at it 
with awe and reverence. And it is a matter of choice as it is a matter of discerning that we go 
about adopting this perspective. The monstrous and the sublime are a matter of a certain mood 
we abandon ourselves too or refuse to abandon ourselves to. Think about the Wizard of Oz. 
Dorothy insists to treat the ineffable wizard as a monster2 that one could rise up to. She meets 
creatures that fail to engender the same interpretation and thus live in fear and trembling, heart-
less and brain-less. They cannot resist the almighty and as a consequence live as powerless in 
their world. Dorothy summons her human qualities of resistance and insists to face the monster2 
only to find out it’s a man in a room. If we treat evil as a form of the sublime we are right to be 
silent in its presence. Who in her right senses would start that struggle? If we treat evil as a 
monster2, we might like Oedipus and others defeat it, or we might like Dorothy and others 
discover it was only very badly behaving human being. Choosing the interpretation of evil as a 
monster2 is better for those committed and interested in action.   
Resisting a monstrous2 is not always a clear cut issue. In fact it rarely is. We do not really 
have dragons. Our dogs have but one head. We have political orders, norms, institutions, wars, 
political leaders and we must decide how we treat the evil that comes our way. Kafka’s K. abides 
by the rules of his world as if it was the monstrously-sublime. He silently remains lost in the evil 
system. We could claim that he could have rebelled against a monster2 tearing it down insisting it 
was made simply by women and men. But it is hard to tell if he would have triumphed. 
Monsters2 could be quite deadly. Oedipus, for example, answers the Sphinx’s question. He wins 
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against the visible monster2 with wit and reason. Yet, others before him who attempted it died. 
Furthermore another monster, less obvious, less rational, crueler, is taking hold of Oedipus life at 
the same moment that he succeeds in defying the Sphinx. Oedipus moves from the hands of 
monster2 to the hands of something closer to the monstrous-sublime, fate. Trying to resist it, as 
Oedipus did after the Oracle, is unsuccessful and futile. Neo fights the Matrix. Like a rebellious 
version of Kafka’s K. he finds the weakness of the ubiquitous system and resists. He soon 
becomes a part of the system. He soon after defies it. But did he really defy it, the question 
looms? Is he ever outside the Matrix? Was the winning but a sublimely monstrous trick? Arendt 
makes a similar point when she describes Ghandi’s struggle against the British occupation of 
India. 
If Gandhi’s enormously powerful and successful strategy of nonviolent resistance had 
met with a different enemy – Stalin’s Russia, Hitler’s Germany even prewar Japan, 
instead of England - the outcome would not have been decolonization but massacre and 
submission335 
Now of course Arendt (and this work with her) is not claiming Hitler, Stalin or prewar Japan 
were monstrous-sublime. They were all men in rooms. The point Arendt is making demonstrates 
her distinction between power as the human ability to act in concert, on the one hand, and 
violence as the instrumental means to an end. Still this is an excellent historical example for a 
moment in which one must evaluate a course of action. Incidentally what was standing in front 
of Gandhi turned out to be a conquerable monster2. But of course he did not know that at the 
time. This is what makes his act so breathtakingly courageous. He simply insisted to read the 
situation in that way. This interpretation dictated a possible course of resistance. What would 
have stood in front of him had he been in Germany, Russia and prewar Japan could have also 
been interpreted as either a monstrous-sublime that will never yield or a monster2 that might. 
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Arendt is most probably right that the nonviolent resistance would not have lasted long in these 
arenas. This would have been a lost battle. History, of course, proved that Stalin’s Russia, 
Hitler’s Germany and prewar Japan were all monsters2 that could be defeated. The decision to 
act or retreat is many times a question of life and death. History, fiction and myth show that 
being the one who challenges the beast is not a guarantee for longevity especially if one 
happened to win. Ghandi and Luther King did not die of natural causes. If we return to the 
concern brought up by Kearney and Ricoeur about the amalgamation and identification of the 
monstrous and the sublime, the inability to discern in real time could and maybe even should 
deter one from acting in rebellion at specific moments in the present. It need not deter one from 
referring to such events as monster2 in the present and in their aftermath. Every event that has an 
aftermath is not sublime. It is monstrous2 which can be evil enough. We should in other words 
speak, conceptualize and seek to comprehend even of these historical evils that at the time were 
very similar to the monstrous-sublime. In the final account, we should not forget, they turned out 
to be a conquerable monster2 made up from the deeds and thoughts of men. Kant insisted 
artifacts could never be monstrously-sublime. Nothing made by humans should ever be titled 
ineffable. Anything we made which is evil we should be able to summon our powers and 
struggle to undo. Treating the monstrous2 as sublime in real time, could be a wise decision. One 
should attempt to discern what course of action is best at each situation rather than react 
automatically. Treating the monstrous2 as sublime when all danger is gone is unnecessary and 
irresponsible at best.   
Trigger-narratives, we wish to suggest, are exactly the making of this decision. They are 
a reminder and a proof that we have a choice.  Our trigger-narrative heroines and heroes insist on 
challenging a great force: they are rebelling individuals facing a great monster2. Against the great 
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force of an unjust practice, Parks, Bouazizi and Leef stood in their vulnerability and insisted to 
voice their protest. In fact, they demanded from the great force what the gods usually create and 
guard: they demanded nothing less than a different world. Their voice, human and godly at the 
same time, refused to be silenced. Their act inspires awe because it is exactly the act that does 
not yield in the face of great danger as if it is standing in front a sublime. It is an act that says 
“this evil is not in the form of a sublime - this is a human made monster2”. Against a mighty 
monstrous force that oppressed them and the people around them they turned their suffering into 
action in one awe inspiring stroke.  
Our heroes resemble a mythical formula of a hero fighting a great monster, defying and 
starting a new world, or political era thereafter. But myths are paradigmatically a matter of the 
past. Indeed most regularly they are a matter of the far and ancient past. How could we possibly 
discuss the dynamics of trigger-narratives as they unfold and relate them to myths?  What is the 
connection between this familiar and moving form and the world changing eruption that follows 
it?  
III.  Myths of the Present: Ritual and Awe 
Rituals are a return to the moment of awe. They are communal commemorations of a 
great past. They echo and act-out myth’s most basic characteristic as a sociopolitical narrative 
that refers to a beginning of a community. Although rituals are not a necessary condition for a 
narrative to be considered a myth,336 they are a common context. Ritual repetition, central in 
Eliade’s definition of the function of myth, is endowed with the power of the great past.  
[T]he time of any ritual coincides with the mythical time of the ‘beginning’. Through 
repetition of the cosmogonic act, concrete time, in which the construction takes place, is 
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projected into mythical time, in illo tempore when the foundation of the world 
occurred.337 
Such rituals are believed to reinstate the powers of the gods, the ancestors, or the heroes that 
stand at the heart of the making of this great past. 
Ritualistic recounting of myths of origin were thought to repair the fractures of the 
present by invoking some primordial  event which occurred at the birth of time – inilo 
tempora -  and so revive a feeling of primordial  oneness and belonging338  
In ritual we create the world again. We witness together, in a communal event, the great creative 
powers that remind us of the time during which our world didn’t exist and came in to being. The 
multidimensional dynamic aspect of myth is complemented by the practice of timeless stability 
which could be interpreted as a form of longing to the eternal and immortal. 
A rock reveals itself to be sacred because its very existence is a hierophany: 
incompressible, invulnerable, it is that which man is not. It resists time; its reality is 
coupled with perenniality.339  
 What I would like to do in this section is delve into the characteristics of myth and ritual that are 
connected to creativity, action and radical new beginnings rather than a sense of a-historical 
eternal return that encourages irrational submission. Rituals are not only an affirmation of our 
accepted social conduct, the legitimacy of our institution, our preference of sociopolitical topics 
and concerns and finally, our values and identities, they are also a reminder of the vulnerability 
of the present, of the possibility of creation and change. 
There are ritualistic processes in modern times. We might not think about them as ritual 
but nonetheless they exhibit many parallels  
[R]ituals such as elections are social routines through which [the models that a society 
or social group constructs of itself and for itself are reproduced within society. Indeed, 
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by virtue merely of their repetition, rituals powerfully contribute to reinforcing the 
circularity of political processes340  
Procedures hold the institutions of the sociopolitical arena firm through repetition. A feeling that 
a certain procedure was not fully performed causes unease. President Obama taking his oath for 
the second time in the inauguration of 2008 because he rearranged “a couple of words in the oath 
after being incorrectly prompted by the chief justice”341 is a good example. Any mistake in the 
ritual carries meaning as to the validly of the power it actually has and the legitimacy and 
stability of the institutions involved. The power of ritual is not only deep, it is also wide. The 
sense of a community that ritual reinstates can run through the ages and across continents. 
English-speakers hearing the words “earth-to earth, ashes to ashes, dust to dust” in a funeral 
ceremony, for example, get a “ghostly intimation, a simultaneity across homogenous, empty time 
[coming] from an as-it-were ancestral ‘Englishness.”342  
Of course this immutability of ritual is not absolute. Rituals can and do change theirs 
meanings, audiences and the actions performed during ceremonies. But such changes are 
dramatic since they touch of the most essential function of ritual: preserving and upholding what 
was, as a living reality in the present. Think for example of the issue of ordaining women as 
Rabbi’s, or the issue of the possibility and status of gay marriages.  Both of these examples 
revolve around a ritual. A change evokes deep feeling of fear and anger in some, and a deep 
feeling of regeneration in others. These reactions demonstrate that ritual still holds the power of 
defining the community as a return and as a creator.  
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The description so far can give us a sense of the weight and power that ritual, the 
reenactment of certain myths, has. Now let us look into the ways in which myth and ritual, so 
deeply intertwined with our lives, are connected to the world of action. On the one hand, ritual, 
the acting out of a mythical story is a defense of the world order against chaos,343 the anchoring 
of the “present in the past”, or offering an absolute point of reference for legitimizing existing 
institutions.344 On the other hand, following Ricœur’s point in his concept of mimesis3 narratives 
can do the exact opposite. In fact, according to mimesis3, narratives are said to come to express 
their full meaning when they challenge reality with an alternative. Fiction and history can 
challenge the present with possible futures. They can be catalysts of change. Indeed, at the stage 
of mimesis3, Ricoeur assigns myths a similar status to other forms of texts that he examines. Like 
every narrative myth too can challenge the existing order.  
Poetry and myth are not just nostalgia for some forgotten world. They constitute a 
disclosure of unprecedented world an opening into other possible worlds which 
transcend the established limits of our actual world345 
Myth offers itself as a horizon for creative contemporary interpretation. Yet, Ricoeur recognizes 
that myth operates differently in the present than other narratives. First, in his description of 
mimesis2 Ricoeur differentiates between traditional stories such as folklore and myth and more 
contemporary stories which are the subject matter of Time and Narrative, history and fiction. 
Tradition, says Ricoeur, is founded on a relationship between sedimentation and innovation. The 
former is history or previous innovative works that was covered over by time. Narrative 
traditions (such as the Hebrew and the Christian, the Celtic, Germanic, Icelandic and Slavic and 
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individual works such as the Iliad, and Oedipus) inform our narrative understanding and 
configuration as paradigms. These narratives  
furnish the rules for subsequent experimentation within the narrative field. These rules 
change under the pressure of new inventions but they change slowly and even resist 
change346 
It is within this set of relatively stable forms that innovation of mimesis2 acts. Myth, says 
Ricoeur, is closest to the stable pole of sedimentation. Only to the extent that we distance 
ourselves from forms of traditional narratives does deviation and innovation become the more 
prevalent phenomena.347 To summarize, myths are different from history and fiction in the stage 
of configuration where they are relatively slow to respond to circumstances and thus serve as 
infrastructure and inspiration. In the stage of mimesis3, as we saw Ricoeur suggest, they act like 
every other narrative in their ability to challenge reality and offer new possible worlds. I would 
like to ask if it is possible that myths are evocative in a different way in the stage of mimesis3 as 
well. In fact I would like to offer a perspective that describes them as possibly more mobilizing 
than other forms of narratives.  We know from experience that evoking foundation events of a 
community resonates strongly in the political arena. The Republican Tea-Party Movement 
probably chose its name because it wanted to resonate with the story of a beginning. This is not a 
rare political strategy and manifests itself within progressive and conservative contexts. President 
Obama evoked the immigrant status of the first Europeans that came to America when speaking 
of the way we should treat immigrants today.  
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Just about every nation in the world, to some extent, admits immigrants. But there’s 
something unique about America. We don’t simply welcome new immigrants, we don’t 
simply welcome new arrivals - we are born of immigrants. That is who we are. 
Immigration is our origin story. And for more than two centuries, it’s remained at the 
core of our national character; it’s our oldest tradition. It’s who we are. It’s part of what 
makes us exceptional. After all, unless your family is Native American, one of the first 
Americans, our families -- all of our families - come from someplace else348  
Evoking a founding event or a great time resonates with deeply held beliefs about values, 
identity and calls upon us to respond in a certain way. This response could be one upholding the 
past and calling for conserving age-old habits but it could also be a call for a change in policy 
and political behavior.  
It is true, however, that ritual, the reenacting of these narratives in the present, what we 
could assume is equivalent to re-figuration, mimesis3 of these narrative, brings into the present a 
strict sense of immutable formulas. It is not usually a call for action. Ritual allows for a temporal 
rhythm that is wider than ordinary action and each brief human life. It brings the wide horizons 
opened by the fantastic world of mythical narratives into the steady bit of periodical 
commemoration within real lives.349 Ritual takes us to another time or, better yet, makes our time 
other. But this “making-other” has a steady bit and it is faithful to events of the past in the sense 
of commemoration. How do we connect this conservative function of ritual with a call for 
action? Myths resonate deeply, they uphold social structures, legitimize social institutions and 
practices, they are said to reflect and present the subconscious of the community and its story of 
origin and sense of identity. Surely all this unique and extremely intense force manifesting itself 
in ritual plays a part in their process of re-figuration of reality. Myths have a greater weight than 
other stories; rituals are the reenactment of this weight. Myths and their rituals are not only the 
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stories of our values and identities; they are the stories of the dramatic beginning of our values 
and identities. They are the stories of radical change and transformation, of great courage, of a 
demand for a different order in great risk. Rituals, on the face of it, should be a form of enhanced 
call for action. Indeed I wish to claim that they can be.     
In sociopolitical societies where the past is no longer a source for legitimation because of 
a change in the value system or any other “weakening of traditional, multiplex structures of 
relationship” the longing for legitimation and stability can change its direction on the temporal 
axis and become a focus on the possible future instead of the past. Prophecy understood this way 
is “a sort of myth in reverse.”350  It had the symbolic content of myth but its horizon is in the 
opposite direction; it anchors the present in the future.351 The Great Past can also act as a Great 
Future. The question to be asked in connection to this suggestion made by Cohen is what would 
be the structure, characteristics and functions of a Great Present. I would like to propose that 
trigger-narratives are neither myths anchoring the present in the past world-creation, nor 
prophecies anchoring it in a future world-creation. They anchor the present in the fantastic option 
of being completely transformed right now. They are fantastic scenes of a “Great Present” world-
creation via a glorious battle with a great force.  
Trigger-narratives, like myths and prophecies, have the similar symbolic content. 
Specifically trigger-narratives exhibit a familiar form of a narrative that figures prominently in 
mythology: they are cosmogonies emerging from a struggle of an apparently weak but 
surprisingly determined heroine or hero against a monster (specifically not the monstrous-
                                                
350 Cohen, Percy S. “Theories of Myth”. Man. New Series, 4.3 (September, 1969),  351 
351 Kearney recognizes this temporal possibility of reversal as well when he discusses myth as a carrier of a utopian 
reference. This reference is describes as 
A surplus that exists not behind myth but in front of it [which] refers not just to ‘things hidden since 
the foundation of the world’ but to things which call for the transformation of the world” “Myth and 
Sacrificial Scapegoats: On Rene Girard”. Theory, Culture and Society. (London: Sage Publications, 
1995), 146 
191 
 
sublime) in the form of an oppressive power-relation. Like myth and prophecies they contain an 
air of the fantastic. The unbelievable courageous world-creating effect of an act by one simple 
person in the face of a great power takes our breath away. Trigger-narrative, as we demonstrated 
in length over the last four chapters, demand and many time provide, a new order of things. They 
function just like myths by creating legitimate institutions, demanding a change in the topics on 
the sociopolitical agenda, mirroring to society its structure, values and identity. Since these 
stories emerge in the present they additionally, as they create the new order, attempt to 
substantially change the existing order; they challenge the monster.352 Trigger-narratives can 
challenge the legitimacy of existing institutions, the mainstream agenda, the accepted values and 
behaviors.  When being in an arena in which a trigger-narrative started to operate we are in the 
middle of a world-creating scene.  
Of course there are two crucial differences. First, unlike the spectators of mythology or 
the listeners of a given prophecy, we do not know how the story ends. The struggle with the 
monster and the creation of the world are happening in the here and now. Second, and as a 
consequence, trigger-narratives put forward what no myth or prophecy could ever offer:  the 
option of joining.  In the events that circle trigger-narrative we oscillate between the position of a 
spectator and a participant/heroine/author. As spectators of trigger-narratives we are in awe that 
emerges from the three components: (a) the great and uneven battle, (b) the possibility of world 
creation and finally, (c) and the option of that hovers in the air awaiting an answer: will or will 
you not you take part? In November 2015 I was part of a demonstration in Tel Aviv against the 
government agreement over gas distribution in Israel and abroad. We walked, some 7,000 of us, 
down from the National Theater Square, Habima, to Dizingof Street, chanting our slogans, 
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raising our voices.  As I was walking down Ben Zion Avenue, feeling a need for a relief from the 
intensity I looked up, and my gaze caught the image of four or five young women and men 
standing at a porch, looking at us, maybe they were even taking pictures. They look like 
spectators in a theater up there from their safe and detached Bauhaus porch, and yet it was clear 
that they were somehow a part of us. Their interest in us already made them part. It took but a 
few minutes and people around me started calling them to come down. It was friendly enough, 
and so quite a few of us looked up and called them to join. We chanted a slogan from the 
summer of 2011: “Get out of the porch, the country is collapsing” which rhymes well in 
Hebrew.353 The young people on the balcony moved at unease, spoke to each other, giggled and 
disappeared in the apartment behind them. This was a presentation of the space that hovers 
around all demonstration but is greatly intensified in trigger-narratives: one is always presented 
with the option of moving from the position of the spectator or the disinterested by-stander to the 
position of the person taking part. But in trigger-narrative, since the sense of awe emanating 
from the challenging of the existing order in such a surprising act is dominant, the transition 
between the position of the spectator and the position of the participant is more dramatic and 
more tempting. It means one is becoming a part of this great story of creation. One is joining the 
heroine, becomes like her, and tries, like an author would, to “write” and be a part of the possibly 
good ending of this battle. When a trigger-narrative erupts, it is occupying the arena in a 
dramatic way. Something much bigger than usual is possibly about to happen and it makes the 
decision to jump in or not less mundane. A small inconsequential heroine dares the system and 
one is in a position to help and dare the system with her. This is a terrifying and empowering 
position. Going back full circle to our conclusion in Chapter One, being captivated by an awe-
                                                
353 "תסרוק הנידמה תספרמהמ ואצ" 
193 
 
inspiring story and being able to join to make it reach its desired end is nothing less than a 
shocking and exhilarating experience.  
Ritual is a repetition of a glorious past. If we agree that trigger-narrative present the 
symbolic content of specific myths (“there was a great battle with a monster and this is how our 
community was created”) and prophecies (“there is going to be a great battle with a monster and 
this is how our community will be finally free”) but with the slight difference that they transpire 
in the present, than we agree that their rituals of reenactment is simply - participation. Trigger-
narratives’ participation are the battle with the great monster in which our community is created. 
They are the primordial moment that years after will be reenacted, mentioned and turned into a 
myth of cosmogony. Rituals stripped from their temporal past component are tremendously 
explosive. 
We should, of course, qualify this. First, not all myths are necessarily ritual-based. We 
can think of myths that have the same content as trigger-narratives and didn’t give rise to a ritual. 
The story of David and Goliath comes to mind. Myths can be sociopolitical in many ways, not 
all are ritualistic or involving ceremonies. They can be taught in schools, echoed in songs, be 
part of other stories, figures of speech etc. we are starting from the phenomenon of participation 
in this work rather than from the nature of myth and so trigger-narratives are defined by their 
ability to inspire mass participation. Second, participation in trigger-narratives comes in many 
forms and need not always be manifested in streets full of demonstrating people.  In Parks’ case, 
for example, the boycott was less a bursting spectacle in which the president had to flee the 
country like in the Tunisian case, or the streets filled with 6% of the citizens like in the Israeli 
case, and more a mythical narrative about the one who dared the monster that circled in an ever 
growing number of joint acting communities. Both ways are ritualistic as they reenact, support 
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and join the moment of creation. Finally, since myths, prophecies and trigger-narratives are all 
stories told by humans to humans, they all have all three temporal horizons. They operate in the 
present, they are made coherent by the past and the present, and they all project to the future. 
They answer to the structure of human temporality. The point that I am making is that trigger-
narratives bring about events that are more intensely grounded in the present. Prophecies and 
myths are more intensely oriented towards the future and the past respectively.    
To summarize trigger-narratives are a form of present emerging mythology that aims to 
create a new order by challenging a monster, an oppressive existing power-relation. These 
narratives, like myths, echo deeply as they offer us to take part in creating a world in which we 
should live and challenge the world or a substantial part of the world in which we do live. Like 
myths they define the nature of our community, its values, aims and red-lines. This mythical 
charge of the events that we have been examining attracts people to join and gives the (many 
times very true) feeling that they are part of a cosmogony brought about by a great mythic battle. 
Indeed they soon become myths if they succeed, touchstones events in reference to which we 
explain who we are and how we got here. This is why their protagonists stay their symbol and 
heroes: they are at the heart of the story of the beginning of our world. This is why the 
excitement of participants and spectators is so sharp: at stake is being a part of a great battle and 
the creation of a new and better world. And of course, because we speak of politics and because 
we speak of myth, many more explanations are most probably possible. Accepting this reading 
entails many possible paths for elaboration. If trigger-narratives are myths of the present we 
could apply many of the philosophical, sociological and anthropological research methods we 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter to them. What happens to the institutions they 
legitimize?  How are they sacred if at all? Do trigger-narratives change with time? Do most 
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trigger-narratives bring about rituals? And can we say more about their forms? My hope is that 
these five chapters are indeed a call for further discussions and elaborations and that they 
provided an account that sheds new helpful light on these spectacular events of creation.    
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Conclusion 
This work set out to coin a term. It does so in two ways: first, in opposition to other 
existing concepts that the phenomenon might be subsumed under and second, by offering an 
interpretational unifying horizon. The fact that this work has two end-points is intended as a 
double-edged invitation for interpretation. First, it invites interpretations that could support or 
challenge the need for coining itself. Second, it invites additional possible unifying horizons.   
The first four chapters, which for the most part present a formal conception of trigger-narrative 
(e.g. size, truth claims, authorship, plot cohesion, status of protagonist, outcomes expectations 
etc.), are an answer to the first impetus to write this work which was to point to a unique 
phenomenon that has not been exclusively named. This need for coining gives rise to a second 
level of inquiry that could be summarized in one question: what is at the heart of this 
phenomenon? What makes it into one phenomenon and not an aggregate of peculiar and random 
characteristics? In answer to this question we do not need to argue for an essential definition or a 
complete conceptual cohesion. Unification is intended here as a certain perspective through 
which we can explain, discern and interpret the phenomenon at hand not as a patchwork of other 
concepts. It gives a horizon against which we can outline forms and dynamics and it is meant as 
guiding perspective that the phenomenon aligns with and departs from at times.  Myth, offered as 
such a frame in the last chapter, is one possibility of such unification, but it is fair to assume that 
is not the only one possible. My aim in this work was to draw attention to a certain mobilizing 
form in the political arena. Assuming the first four chapters are successful in arguing that a 
coining is required, it would be extremely beneficial to have the unifying frame suggested further 
elaborated and in addition to have more than one interpretive and/or unifying concept applied to 
this form. 
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The mythical frame applied to trigger-narrative opens the door to a series of possible 
investigations concerning their operation. Trigger-narratives if successful create a world and in it 
they presumably operate as a founding event, or even a cosmogony. To what extent do these 
stories operate like myths in the arenas that they create? Do they produce rituals? Are these 
rituals as rigid and sacred as the Sabbath for example or marriage? It seems that trigger-
narratives definitely tend to ossify into an unyielding form and some ritualistic behavior. The bus 
of Rosa Parks is in a museum. If we tell her story with a historical setting that makes it look even 
a little bit contrived or simply contextualized, we must publicly apologize and correct the 
mistake.354 The original narrative is not to be touched. The bus is to be observed. There is a 
certain defense against time and history.  A certain sense of sacredness, does take place. Still in 
comparison to fully-fledged rituals like observing the Sabbath and marriage we would stop short 
of saying the rigidness or sacredness are similar. I imagine that if someone was interviewed 
saying that before God chose the Sabbath as a rest day it was really Tuesday that was preferred 
more than a ten-line correction would be demanded. Trigger-narratives are myth-like narratives 
that create ritual-like structures. They create lasting structures and rituals in our sociopolitical 
lives but these differ somehow form religious and/or legal structures in rigidness, attachment and 
effect. It is at this moment of proximity that I think this work leaves trigger-narratives as a 
possible subject for further elaboration. To what degrees are trigger-narratives like myths and in 
what ways are they completely different?  Does this likeness produce subcategories? Does it 
change with the passing of time? Does it become more rigid or less so?  The questions applied to 
the process that trigger-narrative go through after the implementations of their aspired changes 
could be applied to the institutions that these narratives produce. What happens to the institutions 
they legitimize? Do they maintain an ideational connection to their story of origins or do they 
                                                
354 See p.5 in this work  
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move away from it? Do they “practice” the ritual of their inception more than other institution in 
the sociopolitical arena? Do they have particular ritual-like structures that are connected to the 
way in which they came about? Do they change their relation to this moment with time?   
It is clear from the questions that I am raising that this work points to the possibility of 
further interdisciplinary effort. More specifically one of the clear directions that I think this work 
points to is the possible interdisciplinary cooperation between political philosophy of narrative 
and the sociological methodology for the interpretation of social movements, frame-analysis. As 
I explain in Chapter Four the complementarity between Frame-Analysis and narrative 
philosophy is great since both outlooks focus on meaning-giving contexts and frames in order to 
understand human endeavors. What this sociological outlook offers is a gate into the world of 
researched and conceptualized data. This is a direction that I think is very much worth following 
to any philosopher interested in political action and narrative. Frame-analysis is teeming with 
concepts and data regarding the inception of social movements and the mechanisms that might 
encourage and hinder their successful continuous operation. Especially around the concept of 
issue-narratives there is a clear cluster of fascinating work that is pertinent. Philosophy 
elaborated much on metanarratives and quite a lot on the structure and role of testimony. Issue-
narratives, as I explain in Chapter Four, operate in connection with both but they crystalize 
around a burning and enraging issues such as a specific nuclear leak, a certain law, a certain 
accident etc. They are not tacit like metanarratives nor are they dependent necessarily on 
personal testimonies or repetition. These events serve as the grain around which a mobilizing 
narrative assumes shape and form creating a battleground around a specific issue or a cluster of 
issues. Trigger-narratives are greatly informed by this concept but much of the insights that take 
center stage in sociological accounts took a more peripheral position in this work although it is 
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clear to me that there is much to be explored in this overlap between trigger and issue narrative. 
This relative content marginalization occurred not because issue-narrative seemed unimportant to 
me, but because, as the work progressed, it became obvious that issue-narratives could be 
approached philosophically only after a coining took place.  
Here are three examples of sociological fame-analysis concepts that seem relevant to me, 
and that could be applied in an illuminating ways to trigger-narratives or other narrative oriented 
political descriptions. These are three among many. (a) The concept of resonance. Resonance 
refers to the degree in which the content of a mobilizing effort refers “the current life situation 
and experience of the potential constituents”.355 The story told in other words should refer in a 
compelling and believable way to challenges and grievances in the lives of the individuals it is 
attempting to mobilize. The extent to which a certain issue-narrative fits or taps into long held 
beliefs and thus might resonate more with certain audiences,356 touches on the efficacy of 
political narratives. Detached and unspecific stories are less likely to elicit a response. How does 
self-immolation resonate in a country like Israel in contrast to Tunisia? Does it resonate 
differently? Given that trigger-narrative create an atmosphere of radical change and a shift in the 
metanarrative, when looking at the tragic self-immolation of Silman in Tel-Aviv357 were we 
oscillating between two possible perspectives? Were we interpreting the event according to the 
old metanarrative and according to the new one on our horizon? We can ask this question about 
the trigger-narrative itself. Are interpretations of trigger-narratives change as events progress? If 
                                                
355 David E. Snow and Robert Benford. “Ideology, Frame Resonance and Participant Mobilization” From Structure 
to Action: Social Movement Participation Across Cultures. (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1988), 477 
356 William A. Gamson. "Political Discourse and Collective Action" From Structure to Action: Social Movement 
Participation Across Cultures. (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1988) 
357 On July 14 2012 Moshe Silman self-immolated in the Tel Aviv square where the Israeli Social Justice Movement 
started a year before. He was in debt. The state took most of his belongings and still wanted more. He self-
immolated like Bouazizi and like Leef he protested in the same square. He died six days later. See also p.111 in this 
work 
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so can these change be attributed to resonance? Is it resonance with the old metanarrative or the 
transforming metanarrative?   
(b) Another fascinating frame-analysis analysis points to the fact that resonance is not 
only a relation of a certain narrative to issues circulating the arena and/or a certain 
metanarratives. It is also a matter of being assigned the better or worse end of prevalent and 
uncritically accepted binary oppositions. According to this research what political challengers are 
up against are not 
a single, canonical story, or even a genre of stories [but] many stories that similarly 
navigate the poles of familiar oppositions358      
It is the accepted way of navigating between opposing poles rather than the content of the 
metanarratives themselves (or in addition to the content of the metanarratives themselves) that 
hinders certain stories from being considered and helps others be taken for granted. Polletta 
knowingly echoes Levi-Strauss’ analysis of myth when she is analyzing personal contemporary 
stories of women in search for work opportunity equality. Like him she examines the efficacy of 
stories in the sociopolitical arena in relation to familiar cultural oppositions. She gives fives 
popular examples for such binary oppositions: concrete/abstract, emotional/rational, 
female/male, personal/public, informal/formal, and folkloric/scientific.359 Some stories are 
assigned the worse end and must overcome extreme challenges while others are not even seen as 
stories but simply as descriptions of reality. These stories are not accepted only because they 
repeat a similar form or are familiar to us but rather because they repeat a way of navigating 
                                                
358 Polletta, Francesca and Pang Ching Bobby Che. “Narrative and Social Movements” The Oxford Handbook of 
Cultural Sociology, ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander, Ron Jacobs, and Philip Smith. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 493 
359 Francesca Polletta, and John Lee. “Is Telling Stories Good for Democracy? Rhetoric in Public  
Deliberation after 9/II”. American Sociological Review. (London: Sage, 2006) 
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“similarly between the poles of well-known oppositions.”360 We addressed this point in Chapter 
Four when speaking of testimonies that support or challenge metanarratives. This is an additional 
structural point and it raises a question: How do trigger-narratives figure on these oppositional 
binaries? Do they all tend to figure and manipulate this binary similarly? Or do they have 
different ways to navigate these oppositions to their favor? Better yet, does their incredible force 
have something to do with challenging or echoing these binaries in a completely new way? The 
binaries are deeply felt in all of our three case studies. The moments in which they transition are 
breathtaking. Think, for example, of the moment in which the Tunisian and even the Egyptian 
armies refused to act against their civilians. I am bracketing obvious self-interest here in favor of 
outlining the narrative that was publicly created. The formal/informal binary was challenged at 
that very moment. It became unclear who was the informal and thus illegitimate sociopolitical 
structure and who was the formal representative of these states.     
(c) Finally the concept of repertoire of contention is extremely relevant. Contention does 
not spring from nowhere and one way to explain spontaneity and contagion in social movements 
is through familiar forms of collective action in different eras and locations. When a particular 
form of resistance, say sit-ins, suddenly spreads it is because a certain action from a given 
repertoire was selected in response to an event.361 Contention is a form of language with its 
familiar bank of sociopolitical forms.  
No less than in the case of religious rituals or civic celebrations, contentious politics is 
not born out of organizers’ heads but is culturally inscribed and socially communicated 
                                                
360 Polletta, Francesca and Pang Ching Bobby Che. “Narrative and Social Movements” The Oxford Handbook of 
Cultural Sociology, ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander, Ron Jacobs, and Philip Smith. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), 495 
361 Charles Tilly. From Mobilization to Revolution. (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978) 
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[…] Leaders invent, adapt, and combine various forms of contention to gain support from 
people who might otherwise stay at home 362 
This introduces interesting information concerning mass participation. It is centering mainly on 
the behavior of contention and less on the mobilizing content but we might widen the question to 
ask if such a repertoire exists in terms of content as well. To what extent do trigger-narratives use 
a known repertoire of myths and local legends? Are there other forms of contention repertoire 
that are more popularly prevalent during those events? Can we point more specifically to the 
ways that they are used in trigger-narrative events?  
As I said in the beginning of the discussion of interdisciplinary options, I find this 
specific connection to be a fascinating and fecund new ground for enlarging our understanding of 
political contention. I would be as bold as to suggest that considering the vibrant departments of 
Sociology and Philosophy at Boston College and its frame-analysis and narrative world 
renowned experts it would be extremely beneficial if there was a co-departmental graduate 
course focusing on political philosophical thinking of narrative, frame-analysis and their possible 
overlaps.  
One more word about my concept of the monstrous: I use the term monster in opposition 
to the term sublime in Chapter Five in order to denote evils that could be made into less 
petrifying reality. I use the word petrifying here intentionally and in reference to its Greek 
source: petra, stone. The sublime makes us into a stone; it freezes us, makes us unable to act, 
non-human in the sense of passive to whatever befalls us. Unlike the sublime which is 
unalterable and leaves us with a combination of horror and awe, most stories about monsters end 
with the monster misunderstood, reformed or dead. Jack and the Giant, David and Goliath, the 
Wizard of Oz, Monsters Inc., Harry Potter and the Basilisks, the Alien and many children’s 
                                                
362 Sidney Tarrow. Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. (NY: Cambridge  University 
Press, 2011), 29 
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stories such as Hensel and Gretel and Little Red Riding Hood.363 Stories that have monsters in 
them tend to end well for the weak that rise against them in the final account. They are a 
symbolized way to denote a power-relation from the perspective of the oppressed. We either 
become friends with the monsters because we understand that we misjudged them, reveal them 
for the sham that they are, or do away with them.  
The protagonists of trigger-narratives stand up to a certain power-relation because they 
find it oppressive. It could be a law, a cultural habit, or a certain regime. It need not necessarily 
be a governmental related injustice. As they reveal the form of this oppressive political reality 
they make it into a challengeable form of oppression. Understanding or suddenly seeing a power 
structure as monstrous is meant as a way of diminishing its level of horror.  What I mean by the 
monstrous is that the specific oppressive power structure could reveal itself as flexible and 
capable of change. The US Civil Rights Movement is one of the best examples for that. The 
monstrous power-relation was called out and resisted. The state recognized the injustice within 
its system and urged by the oppressed and their supporters used its own mechanisms to correct it. 
An oppressive existence called out to be monstrous is a moment in which oppression receives a 
form and can become a fair target.  
Any system that has gone bad in the sense that it is discriminative and oppressive towards 
the people subjected to its power, is always human-made evil. The point of this obvious 
observation is that every human-made evil is always vulnerable to human-made action of 
resistance. It is part of the power of the protagonists of trigger-narratives that they remind us that 
systems gone bad are not a law of nature. They are made of humans in rooms and many times, 
not always, but many times, humans in rooms can be resisted and transformed by humans in the 
streets and in the courts. In that sense, the way that one chooses to interpret the evil before her 
                                                
363 Many thanks to Sahar Dabach for her help in compiling this monster list.   
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defines the option of action she has or does not have. Parks, Bouazizi and Leef remind us we 
have a choice to make. They empower their followers by widening their possible gamut of 
action.       
* 
A woman gets back from work and on the way home, as a private person, she refuses to 
obey an unjust law. She is not armed. She is not the first. For all she knows she might be harmed 
and nothing will become of it. The world is the world and it is likely to stay as it is. Nonetheless 
she is tired of sitting in a bus in this world, a world that assigns seats according to race. She is 
more tired of this fact than tired from a long day of work. So she continues to sit when the bus 
driver asks her to get up. She continues to sit when he threatens to call the police. She will not be 
home early today. She continues to sit in protest against the world in which she must get up in 
the futile hope that the world would recoil. And for some reason and against most odds and 
expectations the world takes a year to hover around the problem and then concedes and changes.  
This work began with curiosity. My hope is that I deepened and elaborated the possibility 
for more curiosity around the subject of trigger-narratives. 
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